States of Disorder, Ecosystems of Governance: Complexity Theory Applied to UN Statebuilding in the DRC and South Sudan

ship with local populations that encounter PMSCs. The authors argue that publicly traded companies are more likely to adhere to these norms because of their expanded client lists and desire to retain their reputation than are privately owned PMSCs. The book includes an empirical case study of Iraq that simultaneously evaluates the effects of global competition (e.g. publicly traded firms) and introduces subcontracting into the empirical literature. The authors catalog instances of financial fraud and human rights abuse in Iraq from 2003 to 2018. Publicly traded firms are associated with decreases in abuse and fraud, or increases in performance, compared to privately held PMSCs. The case study on Iraq would benefit from a discussion of how the US changed its management approach and use of PMSCs through the period. One striking vignette is the competition between Aegis and DynCorp for a contract to monitor other PMSCs. Aegis won the contract and reported violations by other PMSCs and themselves making this a case that fits the authors theoretical claims about competition and improved monitoring. However, the episode has limited generalizability to weak states or instances where financial constraint limits the number of firms the employer can hire. The authors also explore the role of subcontracting – which occurs when a primary contractor hires another PMSC to deliver services and, thus, extends the potential agency problems. Subcontracting is common in security privatization and frequently mentioned by scholars and media, but this is the first rigorous treatment of the subject. Consistent with expectations, the authors find that subcontracting increases the likelihood of abuse and fraud. In sum, through clear theorizing, innovative research design, and extensive analysis, Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski significantly extend our understanding of PMSCs, counterinsurgency, and civil wars.