{"title":"沟通(un)精明与恐怖主义的失败:巴基斯坦恐怖组织的案例","authors":"Muhammad Feyyaz","doi":"10.1080/17467586.2019.1630745","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The central hypothesis of this article is that there are a large number of terrorist groups which prolifically employ strategic communication (stratcom), while paradoxically, there are others who markedly underutilize it, and therefore, fail to mobilize support for the professed cause. The decisive determinant for either of the two ends, it is argued, obtains in the intellectual endowment or its banality among the conspiratorial groupings. A case of stratcom by two leading Pakistani Taliban groups – Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and TTP – Jammat ul Ahrar – is systematically investigated. The analysis clearly engenders that these terrorist organizations are communication un-savvy, because, they are not only religiously and secularly less informed and increasingly rhetorical but are intellectually far less creative to articulate a people inspired rhetorical vision. The brutalization of the civilians further trivializes their discourses. They have thus largely failed to evoke meaningful social mobilization. Besides further elaborating on the findings, the conclusion reflects on a few limitations of the research, offers input for broadening the research scope of some of the key dimensions of terrorism literature and ends with the discussion on some policy implications.","PeriodicalId":38896,"journal":{"name":"Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward Terrorism and Genocide","volume":"13 1","pages":"24 - 46"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17467586.2019.1630745","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Communication (un)savviness and the failure of terrorism: a case of Pakistani terrorist organizations\",\"authors\":\"Muhammad Feyyaz\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/17467586.2019.1630745\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACT The central hypothesis of this article is that there are a large number of terrorist groups which prolifically employ strategic communication (stratcom), while paradoxically, there are others who markedly underutilize it, and therefore, fail to mobilize support for the professed cause. The decisive determinant for either of the two ends, it is argued, obtains in the intellectual endowment or its banality among the conspiratorial groupings. A case of stratcom by two leading Pakistani Taliban groups – Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and TTP – Jammat ul Ahrar – is systematically investigated. The analysis clearly engenders that these terrorist organizations are communication un-savvy, because, they are not only religiously and secularly less informed and increasingly rhetorical but are intellectually far less creative to articulate a people inspired rhetorical vision. The brutalization of the civilians further trivializes their discourses. They have thus largely failed to evoke meaningful social mobilization. Besides further elaborating on the findings, the conclusion reflects on a few limitations of the research, offers input for broadening the research scope of some of the key dimensions of terrorism literature and ends with the discussion on some policy implications.\",\"PeriodicalId\":38896,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward Terrorism and Genocide\",\"volume\":\"13 1\",\"pages\":\"24 - 46\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-01-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17467586.2019.1630745\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward Terrorism and Genocide\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2019.1630745\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"Social Sciences\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward Terrorism and Genocide","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2019.1630745","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
本文的中心假设是,有大量的恐怖组织大量使用战略沟通(stratcom),而矛盾的是,还有其他恐怖组织明显没有充分利用它,因此,未能动员支持公开宣称的事业。这两种目的的决定性的决定因素,在阴谋集团的智力禀赋或平庸中获得。两个主要的巴基斯坦塔利班组织-巴基斯坦塔利班运动(TTP)和TTP - Jammat ul Ahrar -的战略案件被系统地调查。分析清楚地表明,这些恐怖组织缺乏沟通能力,因为他们不仅在宗教上和世俗上缺乏信息,而且越来越多地修辞,而且在智力上也缺乏创造性,无法表达一个受人民启发的修辞愿景。对平民的残酷对待使他们的言论更加庸俗。因此,它们在很大程度上未能唤起有意义的社会动员。除了进一步阐述研究结果外,结论部分还反映了研究的一些局限性,为扩大恐怖主义文献的一些关键维度的研究范围提供了输入,并以讨论一些政策含义结束。
Communication (un)savviness and the failure of terrorism: a case of Pakistani terrorist organizations
ABSTRACT The central hypothesis of this article is that there are a large number of terrorist groups which prolifically employ strategic communication (stratcom), while paradoxically, there are others who markedly underutilize it, and therefore, fail to mobilize support for the professed cause. The decisive determinant for either of the two ends, it is argued, obtains in the intellectual endowment or its banality among the conspiratorial groupings. A case of stratcom by two leading Pakistani Taliban groups – Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and TTP – Jammat ul Ahrar – is systematically investigated. The analysis clearly engenders that these terrorist organizations are communication un-savvy, because, they are not only religiously and secularly less informed and increasingly rhetorical but are intellectually far less creative to articulate a people inspired rhetorical vision. The brutalization of the civilians further trivializes their discourses. They have thus largely failed to evoke meaningful social mobilization. Besides further elaborating on the findings, the conclusion reflects on a few limitations of the research, offers input for broadening the research scope of some of the key dimensions of terrorism literature and ends with the discussion on some policy implications.