良心价值的平衡观

IF 0.7 2区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-03-29 DOI:10.1111/japp.12655
Doug McConnell, Julian Savulescu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在主流观点中,良知之所以有价值,是因为它促进了道德的统一。然而,如此定义的良心将系统地阻止威胁团结的道德成长,即使团结已经围绕压迫性的道德价值观形成。这激发了Carolyn McLeod的另一种“动态观点”,即良心在某种程度上是有价值的,因为它们是动态的。当良知与我们最好的道德判断相互作用,塑造或“重组”支撑良知的道德价值观时,良知是动态的,有时会以牺牲团结为代价。我们从两个方面修改和扩展了麦克劳德的说法:(1)我们反对她关于良心鼓励自身重组的说法。我们认为,事实恰恰相反——良心创造了一个改变的动机障碍,道德判断必须克服这个障碍才能成功地改造良心。因此,确保活力的任务就落在了道德判断上。(2)然而,这种动机障碍使良心发挥了麦克劳德所忽视的有价值的作用——补偿道德判断的局限性。在我们的平衡观点中,良心的价值取决于它足够开放,可以被我们最好的道德判断塑造,但又足够迟钝,可以弥补扭曲的道德判断,并在认知负荷下指导行动。
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The Balanced View of the Value of Conscience

On the mainstream view, consciences are valuable because they promote moral unity. However, conscience, so defined, will systematically prevent moral growth that threatens unity, even when unity has formed around oppressive moral values. This motivates Carolyn McLeod's alternative ‘Dynamic View’ whereby consciences are valuable to the extent that they are dynamic. Consciences are dynamic when they interact with our best moral judgements to shape or ‘retool’ the moral values underpinning conscience, sometimes at an initial cost to unity. We modify and extend McLeod's account in two ways: (1) We object to her claim that conscience encourages its own retooling. We argue that the opposite is true – conscience creates a motivational barrier to change that moral judgement must overcome to successfully retool conscience. The task of ensuring dynamism, therefore, falls to moral judgement. (2) However, this motivational barrier enables conscience to play a valuable role that McLeod overlooks – compensating for the limitations of moral judgement. On our Balanced View, the value of conscience depends on it being sufficiently open to being shaped by our best moral judgements but inert enough to compensate for distorted moral judgements and to guide action when under cognitive load.

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CiteScore
2.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
71
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