{"title":"可靠的知识","authors":"J. Dixon","doi":"10.48106/dial.v74.i3.03","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Recently John Turri (2015b) has argued, contra the orthodoxy amongst epistemologists, that reliability is not a necessary condition for knowledge. From this result, Turri (2015a, 2017, 2016a, 2019) defends a new account of knowledge — called abilism — that allows for unreliable knowledge. I argue that Turri’s arguments fail to establish that unreliable knowledge is possible and argue that Turri’s account of knowledge is false because reliability must be a necessary condition for knowledge.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Reliable Knowledge\",\"authors\":\"J. Dixon\",\"doi\":\"10.48106/dial.v74.i3.03\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Recently John Turri (2015b) has argued, contra the orthodoxy amongst epistemologists, that reliability is not a necessary condition for knowledge. From this result, Turri (2015a, 2017, 2016a, 2019) defends a new account of knowledge — called abilism — that allows for unreliable knowledge. I argue that Turri’s arguments fail to establish that unreliable knowledge is possible and argue that Turri’s account of knowledge is false because reliability must be a necessary condition for knowledge.\",\"PeriodicalId\":46676,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"DIALECTICA\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-11-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"7\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"DIALECTICA\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i3.03\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"Arts and Humanities\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"DIALECTICA","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i3.03","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
Recently John Turri (2015b) has argued, contra the orthodoxy amongst epistemologists, that reliability is not a necessary condition for knowledge. From this result, Turri (2015a, 2017, 2016a, 2019) defends a new account of knowledge — called abilism — that allows for unreliable knowledge. I argue that Turri’s arguments fail to establish that unreliable knowledge is possible and argue that Turri’s account of knowledge is false because reliability must be a necessary condition for knowledge.
期刊介绍：
Dialectica publishes first-rate articles predominantly in theoretical and systematic philosophy. It is edited in Switzerland and has a focus on analytical philosophy undertaken on the continent. Continuing the work of its founding members, dialectica seeks a better understanding of the mutual support between science and philosophy that both disciplines need and enjoy in their common search for understanding.
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
分享
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
扫码关注我们
