{"title":"道德风险和沟通同意","authors":"Renée Jorgensen Bolinger","doi":"10.1111/PAPA.12144","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In addition to protecting agents’ autonomy, consent plays a crucial social role: it enables agents to secure partners in valuable interactions that would be prohibitively morally risk otherwise. To do this, consent must be observable: agents must be able to track the facts about whether they have received a consent-based permission. I argue that this morally justifies a consent-practice on which communicating that one consents is sufficient for consent, but also generates robust constraints on what sorts of behaviors can be taken as consentcommunicating.","PeriodicalId":47999,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.3000,"publicationDate":"2019-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PAPA.12144","citationCount":"14","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Moral Risk and Communicating Consent\",\"authors\":\"Renée Jorgensen Bolinger\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/PAPA.12144\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In addition to protecting agents’ autonomy, consent plays a crucial social role: it enables agents to secure partners in valuable interactions that would be prohibitively morally risk otherwise. To do this, consent must be observable: agents must be able to track the facts about whether they have received a consent-based permission. I argue that this morally justifies a consent-practice on which communicating that one consents is sufficient for consent, but also generates robust constraints on what sorts of behaviors can be taken as consentcommunicating.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47999,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Philosophy & Public Affairs\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-04-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PAPA.12144\",\"citationCount\":\"14\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Philosophy & Public Affairs\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"98\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/PAPA.12144\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ETHICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PAPA.12144","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
In addition to protecting agents’ autonomy, consent plays a crucial social role: it enables agents to secure partners in valuable interactions that would be prohibitively morally risk otherwise. To do this, consent must be observable: agents must be able to track the facts about whether they have received a consent-based permission. I argue that this morally justifies a consent-practice on which communicating that one consents is sufficient for consent, but also generates robust constraints on what sorts of behaviors can be taken as consentcommunicating.