通过对私人物品征收专项税为公共物品提供资金

IF 1.3 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Land Economics Pub Date : 2021-12-27 DOI:10.3368/le.98.3.082721-0101
Nathan W. Chan, Matthew J. Kotchen
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引用次数: 4

摘要

我们在不纯公共产品的博弈论模型中考察了专用税(即用于资助公共产品供应的私人产品税)。我们证明,专用税可以增加或减少对征税商品的需求。最优专用税通常不能实现帕累托最优分配,但它可以产生一个条件有效的平衡,提供相对或多或少的公共产品,这在一定程度上取决于私人产品和公共产品之间的互补性或可替代性。我们还证明了一个中立的结果:当个人可以直接捐款时,足够低的专用税不会影响均衡分配。
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Funding Public Goods through Dedicated Taxes on Private Goods
We examine dedicated taxes (i.e., taxes on private goods used to finance public good provision) in a game-theoretic model of impure public goods. We show that a dedicated tax can increase or decrease demand for the taxed good. The optimal dedicated tax generally cannot achieve the Pareto-optimal allocation, but it can generate a conditionally efficient equilibrium with comparatively more or less public good provision, depending in part on complementarity or substitutability between the private and public good. We also demonstrate a neutrality result: when individuals can make direct donations, sufficiently low dedicated taxes will not impact equilibrium allocation.
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来源期刊
Land Economics
Land Economics Multiple-
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
22
期刊介绍: Land Economics is dedicated to the study of land use, natural resources, public utilities, housing, and urban land issues. Established in 1925 by the renowned economist and founder of the American Economic Association, Richard T. Ely at the University of Wisconsin, Land Economics has consistently published innovative, conceptual, and empirical research of direct relevance to economists. Each issue brings the latest results in international applied research on such topics as transportation, energy, urban and rural land use, housing, environmental quality, public utilities, and natural resources.
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