{"title":"论语言体理论中的辩证法概念","authors":"Nara M. Figueiredo","doi":"10.4013/FSU.2021.221.13","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ness and concreteness. Concreteness is traditionally considered in the twentieth century philosophy as a feature of a material object in contrast to abstractness. This distinction marks a line in the metaphysical debate about entities. There is no consensual account of what they are, but there are clear paradigmatic cases that enable the distinction: “(...) [I]t is universally acknowledged that numbers and the other objects of pure mathematics are abstract (if they exist), whereas rocks and trees and human beings are concrete” (Rosen, 2020, para. 1). According to the authors of linguistic enact ivism, the philosophical tradition maintains that “(...) the concrete is that which is closer to actual perceptions, to the fact icity of the real world, while the abstract is that which is more general, that which, removed from the senses, indicates commonalities across actual instantiations” (LB, p. 111). Indeed, it is acknowledged that the distinction between the mental and material realms have been a crucial factor in the development of distinction between abstract and concrete since Descartes","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":"22 1","pages":"108-116"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"On the notion of dialectics in the linguistic bodies theory\",\"authors\":\"Nara M. Figueiredo\",\"doi\":\"10.4013/FSU.2021.221.13\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ness and concreteness. Concreteness is traditionally considered in the twentieth century philosophy as a feature of a material object in contrast to abstractness. This distinction marks a line in the metaphysical debate about entities. There is no consensual account of what they are, but there are clear paradigmatic cases that enable the distinction: “(...) [I]t is universally acknowledged that numbers and the other objects of pure mathematics are abstract (if they exist), whereas rocks and trees and human beings are concrete” (Rosen, 2020, para. 1). According to the authors of linguistic enact ivism, the philosophical tradition maintains that “(...) the concrete is that which is closer to actual perceptions, to the fact icity of the real world, while the abstract is that which is more general, that which, removed from the senses, indicates commonalities across actual instantiations” (LB, p. 111). Indeed, it is acknowledged that the distinction between the mental and material realms have been a crucial factor in the development of distinction between abstract and concrete since Descartes\",\"PeriodicalId\":41989,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Filosofia Unisinos\",\"volume\":\"22 1\",\"pages\":\"108-116\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-03-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Filosofia Unisinos\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.4013/FSU.2021.221.13\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Filosofia Unisinos","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.4013/FSU.2021.221.13","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
On the notion of dialectics in the linguistic bodies theory
ness and concreteness. Concreteness is traditionally considered in the twentieth century philosophy as a feature of a material object in contrast to abstractness. This distinction marks a line in the metaphysical debate about entities. There is no consensual account of what they are, but there are clear paradigmatic cases that enable the distinction: “(...) [I]t is universally acknowledged that numbers and the other objects of pure mathematics are abstract (if they exist), whereas rocks and trees and human beings are concrete” (Rosen, 2020, para. 1). According to the authors of linguistic enact ivism, the philosophical tradition maintains that “(...) the concrete is that which is closer to actual perceptions, to the fact icity of the real world, while the abstract is that which is more general, that which, removed from the senses, indicates commonalities across actual instantiations” (LB, p. 111). Indeed, it is acknowledged that the distinction between the mental and material realms have been a crucial factor in the development of distinction between abstract and concrete since Descartes