{"title":"政府补贴对职业团队运动联盟的影响","authors":"H. Dietl, Markus Lang, Cornel Nesseler","doi":"10.5167/UZH-141847","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article develops a game-theoretical model to analyze the effect of subsidies on player salaries, competitive balance, club profits, and welfare. Within this model, fan demand depends on win percentage, competitive balance, and aggregate talent. The results show that if a large market club receives a subsidy and fans have a relatively strong preference for aggregate talent, compared to competitive balance and own team winning percentage, club rofits and welfare increase for both clubs. If the small-market club is subsidized, a small subsidy increases competitive balance and player salaries of both clubs.","PeriodicalId":45894,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Sport Finance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2017-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The impact of government subsidies in professional team sports leagues\",\"authors\":\"H. Dietl, Markus Lang, Cornel Nesseler\",\"doi\":\"10.5167/UZH-141847\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This article develops a game-theoretical model to analyze the effect of subsidies on player salaries, competitive balance, club profits, and welfare. Within this model, fan demand depends on win percentage, competitive balance, and aggregate talent. The results show that if a large market club receives a subsidy and fans have a relatively strong preference for aggregate talent, compared to competitive balance and own team winning percentage, club rofits and welfare increase for both clubs. If the small-market club is subsidized, a small subsidy increases competitive balance and player salaries of both clubs.\",\"PeriodicalId\":45894,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Journal of Sport Finance\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2017-01-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"6\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Journal of Sport Finance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5167/UZH-141847\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"HOSPITALITY, LEISURE, SPORT & TOURISM\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Sport Finance","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5167/UZH-141847","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"HOSPITALITY, LEISURE, SPORT & TOURISM","Score":null,"Total":0}
The impact of government subsidies in professional team sports leagues
This article develops a game-theoretical model to analyze the effect of subsidies on player salaries, competitive balance, club profits, and welfare. Within this model, fan demand depends on win percentage, competitive balance, and aggregate talent. The results show that if a large market club receives a subsidy and fans have a relatively strong preference for aggregate talent, compared to competitive balance and own team winning percentage, club rofits and welfare increase for both clubs. If the small-market club is subsidized, a small subsidy increases competitive balance and player salaries of both clubs.
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