中位数和随机规则下群体的风险均值和自利转移

IF 0.6 Q4 ECONOMICS Games Pub Date : 2023-02-13 DOI:10.3390/g14010016
Yoshio Kamijo, Teruyuki Tamura
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引用次数: 0

摘要

这项研究的目的是确定对风险和利他主义的态度是否受到群体或独处的影响。与以往关于群体决策的经济学研究相反,我们排除了群体非正式讨论的影响,当个人在群体中做出决策时,非正式讨论被认为是一个“黑匣子”。在这方面,我们实验中的受试者只被要求向其他成员展示他们的脸,而没有进一步的交流。此外,我们采用了两种集体决策规则,即中位数规则和随机规则,这两种规则提供了讲真话的机制。在匿名投资和捐赠的实验中,我们发现,在控制了个人的风险和利他主义偏好后,在一个群体中做出决定的受试者提供的金额明显低于单独做出决定的人。研究结果表明,无论采用哪种集体决策规则,当人们在一个群体中时,他们都更厌恶风险,更自私。
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Risk-Averse and Self-Interested Shifts in Groups in Both Median and Random Rules
The purpose of this study was to determine whether attitudes toward risk and altruism are affected by being in a group or being alone. In contrast to previous economic research on group decision-making, we excluded the effects of group informal discussions, which are thought to be a “black box” when individuals make decisions in a group. In this regard, the subjects in our experiment were only requested to show their faces to the other members, without further communication. Moreover, we adopted two collective decision rules, i.e., the median rule and the random rule, which provide the truth-telling mechanism. In the experiments of both anonymous investment and donation, we found that the subjects who made decisions in a group offered significantly lower amounts than those who made decisions alone, after controlling for individuals’ risk and altruistic preferences. The findings imply that people are more risk-averse and self-interested when they are in a group, regardless of which collective decision rules are adopted.
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来源期刊
Games
Games Decision Sciences-Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
11.10%
发文量
65
审稿时长
11 weeks
期刊介绍: Games (ISSN 2073-4336) is an international, peer-reviewed, quick-refereeing open access journal (free for readers), which provides an advanced forum for studies related to strategic interaction, game theory and its applications, and decision making. The aim is to provide an interdisciplinary forum for all behavioral sciences and related fields, including economics, psychology, political science, mathematics, computer science, and biology (including animal behavior). To guarantee a rapid refereeing and editorial process, Games follows standard publication practices in the natural sciences.
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