奥斯汀的怀疑主义之路再探

Mark Kaplan
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在《其他人的想法》中,奥斯汀坚持认为,除非有特殊理由怀疑他看到的鸟是被填充的,否则他不需要做足够的事情来证明它没有被填充,就可以被认为知道他刚刚声称知道的事情:他看到的那只鸟是一只金翅雀。但假设奥斯汀有以下论点:你不知道这只鸟不是一只填充的金翅雀。如果你不知道这只鸟不是填充的金翅雀,你就不知道这鸟是金翅雀。所以,你不知道这只鸟是金翅雀。奥斯汀会拒绝这一论点的哪个前提?我的观点是,答案是“两者都不是”:奥斯汀会否定他需要选择一个拒绝的前提的想法。这篇文章的重点是解释原因。
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Austin’s Way with Skepticism Revisited
In “Other Minds,” Austin maintained that, unless there is a special reason to suspect the bird he saw is stuffed, he does not need to do enough to show it is not stuffed in order to be credited with knowing what he has just claimed to know: that the bird he saw is a goldfinch. But suppose Austin were presented with the following argument: You don’t know the bird is not a stuffed goldfinch. If you don’t know the bird is not a stuffed goldfinch, you don’t know the bird is a goldfinch. Therefore, you don’t know the bird is a goldfinch. Which of the premises of this argument would Austin have rejected? My brief is that the answer is, “Neither”: Austin would have dismissed the very idea that he needed to choose a premise to reject. The burden of this essay is to explain why.
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来源期刊
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期刊介绍: As the first international journal entirely devoted to philosophical skepticism, the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism publishes high-quality articles and discussion notes on any field of research relevant to the study of skeptical thought. The journal also contains critical notices and reviews of major books on skepticism, and organizes book symposia on recent ground-breaking works. On occasion, it publishes special issues devoted to current lively debates on specific topics or authors. The wide range of areas covered includes the history and significance of ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary skepticism as well as discussions of current specific skeptical problems and arguments in epistemology, metaethics, ontology, philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language.
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