COVID-19证券自愿披露的价值——零?

IF 0.9 Q2 LAW Capital Markets Law Journal Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI:10.1093/cmlj/kmaa014
Mitu G. Gulati
{"title":"COVID-19证券自愿披露的价值——零?","authors":"Mitu G. Gulati","doi":"10.1093/cmlj/kmaa014","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"An age-old question in the world of securities disclosure is whether there is value in mandating that issuers disclose key pieces of information about themselves to the investing public or whether these issuers will voluntarily disclose the optimal amount of information as a function of reputational pressures. Many academic articles have been written about this topic, and different regulatory systems around the world take starkly different positions on the question. Yet, there is no clear answer to the core question of whether issuers will voluntarily disclose useful information that only they know to investors at key times (eg when investors are being asked to buy securities) or whether a mandatory system with penalties and monitoring is necessary to induce this disclosure. The current COVID-19 pandemic may present an opportunity to examine this question in the sovereign issuer context. As a result of a strange confluence of factors, there seems to little negative effect of this global pandemic on the international sovereign debt market. If anything, this market is booming more than ever with countries across the range ratings quality being able to borrow billions of dollars at rates comparable to preCOVID times. Important for purposes of the question we have raised, each and every one of these countries has been impacted by the pandemic differently. And, more important, each of these countries is taking different steps to tackle the crisis and has information as to what is going on at the local level that global investors likely know little about. One might ask therefore: are we seeing these different issuers, who the market has been showering with billions of dollars in lending, disclose the kind of detailed information as to their responses to the pandemic and how they are going to get out from under it that investors would like to have? For sovereigns, there is no mandatory requirement that they disclose anything on the matter of pandemic responses, so what we are talking about is their voluntary disclosure. Let us take the example of Brazil. It issued $3.5 billion in sovereign bonds in the international markets a few weeks ago. That Brazil was able to place such a large issuance in the context of the pandemic is particularly noteworthy since its government’s response to the pandemic is widely considered to be among the most disastrous in the world. One might think though that perhaps, in order to persuade investors to give it these billions, Brazil’s leading public health expert will have prepared detailed explanations for how and why the","PeriodicalId":43720,"journal":{"name":"Capital Markets Law Journal","volume":"15 1","pages":"259 - 261"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/cmlj/kmaa014","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The value of voluntary COVID-19 securities disclosure—zero?\",\"authors\":\"Mitu G. Gulati\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/cmlj/kmaa014\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"An age-old question in the world of securities disclosure is whether there is value in mandating that issuers disclose key pieces of information about themselves to the investing public or whether these issuers will voluntarily disclose the optimal amount of information as a function of reputational pressures. Many academic articles have been written about this topic, and different regulatory systems around the world take starkly different positions on the question. Yet, there is no clear answer to the core question of whether issuers will voluntarily disclose useful information that only they know to investors at key times (eg when investors are being asked to buy securities) or whether a mandatory system with penalties and monitoring is necessary to induce this disclosure. The current COVID-19 pandemic may present an opportunity to examine this question in the sovereign issuer context. As a result of a strange confluence of factors, there seems to little negative effect of this global pandemic on the international sovereign debt market. If anything, this market is booming more than ever with countries across the range ratings quality being able to borrow billions of dollars at rates comparable to preCOVID times. Important for purposes of the question we have raised, each and every one of these countries has been impacted by the pandemic differently. And, more important, each of these countries is taking different steps to tackle the crisis and has information as to what is going on at the local level that global investors likely know little about. One might ask therefore: are we seeing these different issuers, who the market has been showering with billions of dollars in lending, disclose the kind of detailed information as to their responses to the pandemic and how they are going to get out from under it that investors would like to have? For sovereigns, there is no mandatory requirement that they disclose anything on the matter of pandemic responses, so what we are talking about is their voluntary disclosure. Let us take the example of Brazil. It issued $3.5 billion in sovereign bonds in the international markets a few weeks ago. That Brazil was able to place such a large issuance in the context of the pandemic is particularly noteworthy since its government’s response to the pandemic is widely considered to be among the most disastrous in the world. One might think though that perhaps, in order to persuade investors to give it these billions, Brazil’s leading public health expert will have prepared detailed explanations for how and why the\",\"PeriodicalId\":43720,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Capital Markets Law Journal\",\"volume\":\"15 1\",\"pages\":\"259 - 261\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/cmlj/kmaa014\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Capital Markets Law Journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/cmlj/kmaa014\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Capital Markets Law Journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/cmlj/kmaa014","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

证券披露领域的一个古老问题是,强制发行人向投资大众披露自己的关键信息是否有价值,或者这些发行人是否会自愿根据声誉压力披露最佳信息量。关于这个话题,已经写了很多学术文章,世界各地不同的监管体系对这个问题的立场截然不同。然而,对于发行人是否会在关键时刻(例如,当投资者被要求购买证券时)自愿向投资者披露只有他们知道的有用信息,或者是否有必要建立一个带有惩罚和监督的强制性制度来诱导这种披露,这一核心问题没有明确的答案。当前的新冠肺炎大流行可能提供了一个在主权发行人背景下审视这个问题的机会。由于各种因素的奇怪汇合,这场全球疫情似乎对国际主权债务市场没有什么负面影响。如果说有什么不同的话,那就是这个市场比以往任何时候都更加繁荣,评级质量范围内的国家能够以与新冠疫情前相当的利率借款数十亿美元。就我们提出的问题而言,重要的是,这些国家中的每一个都受到了不同的疫情影响。更重要的是,这些国家中的每一个都在采取不同的措施来应对危机,并掌握着全球投资者可能知之甚少的地方层面正在发生的事情的信息。因此,有人可能会问:我们是否看到这些不同的发行人披露了投资者希望的关于他们应对疫情的详细信息,以及他们将如何摆脱疫情?对于主权国家来说,没有强制性要求他们披露任何关于疫情应对的信息,所以我们谈论的是他们的自愿披露。让我们以巴西为例。几周前,它在国际市场上发行了35亿美元的主权债券。巴西能够在疫情背景下发行如此大规模的债券尤其值得注意,因为巴西政府对疫情的反应被广泛认为是世界上最灾难性的。不过,有人可能会认为,也许为了说服投资者给它数十亿美元,巴西领先的公共卫生专家会准备详细解释
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
The value of voluntary COVID-19 securities disclosure—zero?
An age-old question in the world of securities disclosure is whether there is value in mandating that issuers disclose key pieces of information about themselves to the investing public or whether these issuers will voluntarily disclose the optimal amount of information as a function of reputational pressures. Many academic articles have been written about this topic, and different regulatory systems around the world take starkly different positions on the question. Yet, there is no clear answer to the core question of whether issuers will voluntarily disclose useful information that only they know to investors at key times (eg when investors are being asked to buy securities) or whether a mandatory system with penalties and monitoring is necessary to induce this disclosure. The current COVID-19 pandemic may present an opportunity to examine this question in the sovereign issuer context. As a result of a strange confluence of factors, there seems to little negative effect of this global pandemic on the international sovereign debt market. If anything, this market is booming more than ever with countries across the range ratings quality being able to borrow billions of dollars at rates comparable to preCOVID times. Important for purposes of the question we have raised, each and every one of these countries has been impacted by the pandemic differently. And, more important, each of these countries is taking different steps to tackle the crisis and has information as to what is going on at the local level that global investors likely know little about. One might ask therefore: are we seeing these different issuers, who the market has been showering with billions of dollars in lending, disclose the kind of detailed information as to their responses to the pandemic and how they are going to get out from under it that investors would like to have? For sovereigns, there is no mandatory requirement that they disclose anything on the matter of pandemic responses, so what we are talking about is their voluntary disclosure. Let us take the example of Brazil. It issued $3.5 billion in sovereign bonds in the international markets a few weeks ago. That Brazil was able to place such a large issuance in the context of the pandemic is particularly noteworthy since its government’s response to the pandemic is widely considered to be among the most disastrous in the world. One might think though that perhaps, in order to persuade investors to give it these billions, Brazil’s leading public health expert will have prepared detailed explanations for how and why the
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
21
期刊介绍: This journal is essential for all serious capital markets practitioners and for academics with an interest in this growing field around the World. It is the first periodical to focus entirely on aspects related to capital markets for lawyers and covers all of the fields within this practice area: Debt; Derivatives; Equity; High Yield Products; Securitisation; and Repackaging. With an international perspective, each issue covers articles and news relevant to the financial centres in the US, Europe and Asia. The journal provides a mix of thoughtful and in-depth consideration of the law and practice of capital markets through analytical articles on topical issues written by leading practitioners and academics in the international arena. There are also articles on matters of best practice and opinion on legal and practice developments from around the world. In particular the journal offers: • Unique specialist coverage of international capital markets practice • High level of analysis for experienced lawyers and academics • Team of internationally respected editors from leading centres in the US, Europe and Asia • Quality of articles assured through peer review system.
期刊最新文献
A critical evaluation of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs): payments’ final frontier? Can GDP-linked debt be the answer to sovereign debt crises? Auditors report and the German Capital Markets Model Case Act (KapMuG)—legal consequences for EY in the Wirecard scandal Editors’ Note Do we really need a ‘perfectly reasonable investor’ within MAR?
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1