{"title":"《往返月球:重新审视总统决策和阿波罗计划》","authors":"Adam M. McMahon","doi":"10.1016/j.spacepol.2022.101516","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Why did President John F. Kennedy call on the nation to send Americans to the moon? And why did his successors see the expensive and risky Apollo program to completion even after his death? Drawing from the literature on presidential decision-making, I argue Kennedy's announcement was both ordinary and epiphenomenal. Using archival materials spanning the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations, this article augments existing research and contends the 35th president constrained his own options by criticizing the outgoing Eisenhower administration for allowing a “missile gap” during the 1960 presidential campaign. After learning it did not exist, JFK's own crisis rhetoric set expectations and forced him to compete with the Soviets in a new arena at the height of the Cold War. His assassination made it politically risky for his successors to alter the lunar program, relegating both Johnson and Nixon to claim residual credit and avoid blame for diminishing the American crewed space exploration program. Reevaluating the historical role of the president in achieving one of the most significant government-led endeavors in history reveals how Kennedy's past actions inadvertently drove the development of space policy at mid-century.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":45924,"journal":{"name":"Space Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"To the Moon and Back: Reexamining Presidential Decision-Making and the Apollo Program\",\"authors\":\"Adam M. McMahon\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.spacepol.2022.101516\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Why did President John F. Kennedy call on the nation to send Americans to the moon? And why did his successors see the expensive and risky Apollo program to completion even after his death? Drawing from the literature on presidential decision-making, I argue Kennedy's announcement was both ordinary and epiphenomenal. Using archival materials spanning the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations, this article augments existing research and contends the 35th president constrained his own options by criticizing the outgoing Eisenhower administration for allowing a “missile gap” during the 1960 presidential campaign. After learning it did not exist, JFK's own crisis rhetoric set expectations and forced him to compete with the Soviets in a new arena at the height of the Cold War. His assassination made it politically risky for his successors to alter the lunar program, relegating both Johnson and Nixon to claim residual credit and avoid blame for diminishing the American crewed space exploration program. Reevaluating the historical role of the president in achieving one of the most significant government-led endeavors in history reveals how Kennedy's past actions inadvertently drove the development of space policy at mid-century.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":45924,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Space Policy\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-11-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Space Policy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026596462200042X\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Space Policy","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026596462200042X","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
To the Moon and Back: Reexamining Presidential Decision-Making and the Apollo Program
Why did President John F. Kennedy call on the nation to send Americans to the moon? And why did his successors see the expensive and risky Apollo program to completion even after his death? Drawing from the literature on presidential decision-making, I argue Kennedy's announcement was both ordinary and epiphenomenal. Using archival materials spanning the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations, this article augments existing research and contends the 35th president constrained his own options by criticizing the outgoing Eisenhower administration for allowing a “missile gap” during the 1960 presidential campaign. After learning it did not exist, JFK's own crisis rhetoric set expectations and forced him to compete with the Soviets in a new arena at the height of the Cold War. His assassination made it politically risky for his successors to alter the lunar program, relegating both Johnson and Nixon to claim residual credit and avoid blame for diminishing the American crewed space exploration program. Reevaluating the historical role of the president in achieving one of the most significant government-led endeavors in history reveals how Kennedy's past actions inadvertently drove the development of space policy at mid-century.
期刊介绍:
Space Policy is an international, interdisciplinary journal which draws on the fields of international relations, economics, history, aerospace studies, security studies, development studies, political science and ethics to provide discussion and analysis of space activities in their political, economic, industrial, legal, cultural and social contexts. Alongside full-length papers, which are subject to a double-blind peer review system, the journal publishes opinion pieces, case studies and short reports and, in so doing, it aims to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas and opinions and a means by which authors can alert policy makers and international organizations to their views. Space Policy is also a journal of record, reproducing, in whole or part, official documents such as treaties, space agency plans or government reports relevant to the space community. Views expressed in the journal are not necessarily those of the editors or members of the editorial board.