大企业与中国干部管理

Q3 Social Sciences Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies Pub Date : 2021-12-08 DOI:10.22439/cjas.v39i2.6399
Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, Kasper Ingeman Beck
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引用次数: 0

摘要

中国的领导干部是轮流的。大企业和政界之间出现了一种有趣的轮转形式。这意味着中国五分之一的省长和副省长都有大型国有企业负责人的商业背景。这是如何发生的,以及相关的商业领袖拥有哪些资格,都笼罩在神秘之中。本文通过对参加中国高管领导力项目(CELP)的中国商界领袖的人类学研究,试图打开黑盒子。本研究考察了CELP参与者在党、政府和企业职位上的职业发展路径。研究表明,261名参与CELP的国有企业(2005-2018年)中,有84人随后获得晋升,其中20人从国有企业晋升为党政领导职务。在某些情况下,前商界领袖成为重要省份的党委书记或重要部委的部长。这篇文章还认为,中国的商界领袖已经设法保持了他们在中国名门制度中的行政地位。事实上,中国企业领导人是准官员(准官),是领导更新的重要招聘基地。因此,文章认为党-政-商“铁三角”内的干部轮转构成了中国政治体制的主要统一和稳定因素。
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Big Business and Cadre Management in China
Leading cadres in China are subject to rotation. An interesting form of rotation takes place between big business and the political world. That means one fifth of China’s governors and vice governors have a business background as heads of one of China’s large State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). How this takes place and which qualifications the involved business leaders possess are shrouded in mystery. Based on prosopographical studies of Chinese business leaders who have participated in the Chinese Executive Leadership Program (CELP), this article attempts to open the black box. The study examines the career pathways of CELP participants in Party, government and business positions. The study shows that 84 of the 261 CELP SOE participants (2005-2018) were subsequently promoted, and 20 of these promotions were from SOEs to leading Party and government positions. In some cases, former business leaders became Party secretaries in important provinces or ministers in key ministries. The article also argues that Chinese business leaders have managed to keep their administrative ranking in the Chinese nomenklatura system. In fact, Chinese business leaders are quasi officials (zhun guan) and form an important recruitment base for leadership renewal. As such, the article suggests that the rotation of cadres within the ‘Iron Triangle’ of Party–government–business constitutes the main unifying and stabilising factor in the Chinese political system.
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来源期刊
Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies
Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations
CiteScore
1.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
6
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