{"title":"研发竞争下的Cournot-Bertrand比较:产出与研发补贴","authors":"Jiaqi Chen, Sang-Ho Lee","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12336","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>We compare Cournot and Bertrand competitions with R&D investment under output versus R&D subsidy policies. We demonstrate that Cournot firms invest more (less) in R&D and the government grants more (less) subsidies than for Bertrand firms with output (R&D) subsidies. We also find that both competition modes yield the same welfare with output subsidy, while Bertrand yields higher welfare than Cournot with R&D subsidy. Finally, firms' profits and welfare in Cournot are higher under output subsidies, while they can be higher in Bertrand under R&D subsidies if the product substitutability is high and the firm's R&D investment is efficient.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"19 1","pages":"77-100"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Cournot–Bertrand comparisons under R&D competition: Output versus R&D subsidies\",\"authors\":\"Jiaqi Chen, Sang-Ho Lee\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/ijet.12336\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>We compare Cournot and Bertrand competitions with R&D investment under output versus R&D subsidy policies. We demonstrate that Cournot firms invest more (less) in R&D and the government grants more (less) subsidies than for Bertrand firms with output (R&D) subsidies. We also find that both competition modes yield the same welfare with output subsidy, while Bertrand yields higher welfare than Cournot with R&D subsidy. Finally, firms' profits and welfare in Cournot are higher under output subsidies, while they can be higher in Bertrand under R&D subsidies if the product substitutability is high and the firm's R&D investment is efficient.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":44551,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Journal of Economic Theory\",\"volume\":\"19 1\",\"pages\":\"77-100\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-01-27\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"7\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Journal of Economic Theory\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ijet.12336\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Economic Theory","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ijet.12336","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Cournot–Bertrand comparisons under R&D competition: Output versus R&D subsidies
We compare Cournot and Bertrand competitions with R&D investment under output versus R&D subsidy policies. We demonstrate that Cournot firms invest more (less) in R&D and the government grants more (less) subsidies than for Bertrand firms with output (R&D) subsidies. We also find that both competition modes yield the same welfare with output subsidy, while Bertrand yields higher welfare than Cournot with R&D subsidy. Finally, firms' profits and welfare in Cournot are higher under output subsidies, while they can be higher in Bertrand under R&D subsidies if the product substitutability is high and the firm's R&D investment is efficient.
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