International Journal of Economic Theory最新文献

We study an information network incorporating both information transmitters and aggregators. Given these roles, an array of network patterns (the geodesic-distance network, core-star, overlapping-core-stars, star-with-satellite, cycles) emerges as equilibrium and/or efficient, depending on transmission rates and link costs. When aggregator roles are endogenously determined, the monocentric network with one aggregator connecting to all other transmitters on a tree graph is the unique equilibrium pattern under sufficiently high transmission rates and small link costs. With moderate transmission rates and link costs, the multicentric network with multiple aggregators may arise—in this case, the monocentric network may not be efficient.

We study an information network incorporating both information transmitters and aggregators. Given these roles, an array of network patterns (the geodesic-distance network, core-star, overlapping-core-stars, star-with-satellite, cycles) emerges as equilibrium and/or efficient, depending on transmission rates and link costs. When aggregator roles are endogenously determined, the monocentric network with one aggregator connecting to all other transmitters on a tree graph is the unique equilibrium pattern under sufficiently high transmission rates and small link costs. With moderate transmission rates and link costs, the multicentric network with multiple aggregators may arise—in this case, the monocentric network may not be efficient.

This study develops a dynamic two-country model with trade costs linked to international infrastructure stock. With variable markups and firm heterogeneity, the welfare impact of trade costs depends on firms' cost distribution. Governments engage in a dynamic public investment game, leading to multiple steady states. The dynamic equilibrium of the noncooperative policy game may exhibit history dependency; a small (large) initial infrastructure stock results in decreasing (increasing) infrastructure over time, leading to autarky (freer trade). Comparing these outcomes with international cooperation reveals that cooperation achieves a higher steady-state infrastructure stock and helps avoid a “low development trap.”

This paper investigates Cournot competition between two firms, where the government offers subsidies to one firm to attract it to the government's objective region. If the firm accepts the offer, it incurs additional costs because the government's objective region is not the firm's optimal location. I find that a firm receiving the offer accepts it when the subsidy is larger than the additional cost in a perfect information situation. However, if the additional cost is the firm's private information, a situation exists where the firm accepts the offer even if the additional cost is larger than the government's subsidy.

This paper investigates Cournot competition between two firms, where the government offers subsidies to one firm to attract it to the government's objective region. If the firm accepts the offer, it incurs additional costs because the government's objective region is not the firm's optimal location. I find that a firm receiving the offer accepts it when the subsidy is larger than the additional cost in a perfect information situation. However, if the additional cost is the firm's private information, a situation exists where the firm accepts the offer even if the additional cost is larger than the government's subsidy.

We analyze the endogenous choice of competition mode by introducing a common supplier into a vertical structure. Contrary to previous findings, we derive that when choosing a competition mode, firms consider two opposing factors: (i) the horizontal effect arising from competition with a rival firm, and (ii) the vertical effect, which influences the price charged by the common supplier. When the common supplier adopts uniform pricing, if the both products are somewhat differentiated, the vertical effect becomes more important than the horizontal effect, making the price contract the dominant strategy. On the other hand, if the products are sufficiently homogeneous and the horizontal effect is more important than the vertical effect, both firms will choose a quantity contract. Meanwhile, when the common supplier adopts discriminatory pricing, choosing a quantity contract becomes the unique equilibrium. Finally, if the both products are somewhat differentiated, each firm's profit is higher under price competition than under quantity competition.

For a second-price common value auction with an “almost all-inclusive ring,” we analyze whether the auctioneer should reveal the ring's presence, and if so, whether this revelation should be public or private to the nonring bidder. We show that for a family of value functions, public revelation induces the nonring bidder to bid higher than in a noncooperative scenario. This implies that the auctioneer may improve his position this way. On the other hand, it highlights a new tactic that an auctioneer may use to manipulate bidder behavior by creating the false impression of collusion to induce higher bids.

We study interactions between campaign spending and ideology in an election where two parties compete over an electorate with ideologically biased voters. The parties target voters with costly persuasive effort, which, together with ideology, defines the party each voter votes for. In equilibrium, the joint distribution of party expenditures reaches a maximum for a specific value of the ideological bias, which identifies the focus of the campaign, that is, the group most heavily targeted by the campaign. This focus shifts from swing voters to the strongest partisans of the party with the smaller budget, as the gap between party budgets increases.