Meng Wang , Yongjie Zhang , Yizhe Dong , Gaofeng Zou , Wanlong Zhao
{"title":"交互式信息披露和非处罚监管审查风险","authors":"Meng Wang , Yongjie Zhang , Yizhe Dong , Gaofeng Zou , Wanlong Zhao","doi":"10.1016/j.jmse.2022.10.003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Using monthly data from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange's ‘Hudongyi’ platform and comment letters from December 2014 to December 2018, this study investigates the influence of interactive information disclosure on non-penalty regulatory review risk. The findings reveal that the richness and activeness of interactive information disclosure are positively associated with regulatory review risk. Moreover, the non-penalty regulatory review is effective as it significantly reduces the probability of receiving a comment letter in the subsequent three periods. The timeliness of interactive information disclosure is negatively associated with regulatory review risks. Additionally, we find that newspaper media coverage partially mediates the relationship between interactive information disclosure and regulatory review risk. For companies with low levels of internal governance, in low-competitive industries, and state-owned companies, the positive relationship between the number of investor questions and regulatory review risk is strengthened. These findings enrich the literature on the determinants of regulatory review risk and the economic consequences of interactive information disclosure in emerging markets.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":36172,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Science and Engineering","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.4000,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Interactive information disclosure and non-penalty regulatory review risk\",\"authors\":\"Meng Wang , Yongjie Zhang , Yizhe Dong , Gaofeng Zou , Wanlong Zhao\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jmse.2022.10.003\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Using monthly data from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange's ‘Hudongyi’ platform and comment letters from December 2014 to December 2018, this study investigates the influence of interactive information disclosure on non-penalty regulatory review risk. The findings reveal that the richness and activeness of interactive information disclosure are positively associated with regulatory review risk. Moreover, the non-penalty regulatory review is effective as it significantly reduces the probability of receiving a comment letter in the subsequent three periods. The timeliness of interactive information disclosure is negatively associated with regulatory review risks. Additionally, we find that newspaper media coverage partially mediates the relationship between interactive information disclosure and regulatory review risk. For companies with low levels of internal governance, in low-competitive industries, and state-owned companies, the positive relationship between the number of investor questions and regulatory review risk is strengthened. These findings enrich the literature on the determinants of regulatory review risk and the economic consequences of interactive information disclosure in emerging markets.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":36172,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Management Science and Engineering\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":5.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Management Science and Engineering\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2096232022000543\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Management Science and Engineering","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2096232022000543","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Interactive information disclosure and non-penalty regulatory review risk
Using monthly data from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange's ‘Hudongyi’ platform and comment letters from December 2014 to December 2018, this study investigates the influence of interactive information disclosure on non-penalty regulatory review risk. The findings reveal that the richness and activeness of interactive information disclosure are positively associated with regulatory review risk. Moreover, the non-penalty regulatory review is effective as it significantly reduces the probability of receiving a comment letter in the subsequent three periods. The timeliness of interactive information disclosure is negatively associated with regulatory review risks. Additionally, we find that newspaper media coverage partially mediates the relationship between interactive information disclosure and regulatory review risk. For companies with low levels of internal governance, in low-competitive industries, and state-owned companies, the positive relationship between the number of investor questions and regulatory review risk is strengthened. These findings enrich the literature on the determinants of regulatory review risk and the economic consequences of interactive information disclosure in emerging markets.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Engineering and Applied Science (JEAS) is the official journal of the Faculty of Engineering, Cairo University (CUFE), Egypt, established in 1816.
The Journal of Engineering and Applied Science publishes fundamental and applied research articles and reviews spanning different areas of engineering disciplines, applications, and interdisciplinary topics.