交互式信息披露和非处罚监管审查风险

IF 5.4 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Management Science and Engineering Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jmse.2022.10.003
Meng Wang , Yongjie Zhang , Yizhe Dong , Gaofeng Zou , Wanlong Zhao
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引用次数: 1

摘要

本研究利用2014年12月至2018年12月深圳证券交易所“沪通一”平台的月度数据和意见书,考察了交互式信息披露对非处罚性监管审查风险的影响。研究发现,互动信息披露的丰富性和活跃度与监管审查风险呈正相关。此外,非处罚监管审查是有效的,因为它大大降低了在随后的三个时期收到评论信的可能性。交互式信息披露的及时性与监管审查风险呈负相关。此外,我们发现报纸媒体报道在互动信息披露与监管审查风险的关系中起到部分中介作用。对于内部治理水平较低的公司、竞争力较低的行业和国有企业,投资者提问数量与监管审查风险之间的正相关关系得到强化。这些发现丰富了关于监管审查风险的决定因素和新兴市场交互式信息披露的经济后果的文献。
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Interactive information disclosure and non-penalty regulatory review risk

Using monthly data from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange's ‘Hudongyi’ platform and comment letters from December 2014 to December 2018, this study investigates the influence of interactive information disclosure on non-penalty regulatory review risk. The findings reveal that the richness and activeness of interactive information disclosure are positively associated with regulatory review risk. Moreover, the non-penalty regulatory review is effective as it significantly reduces the probability of receiving a comment letter in the subsequent three periods. The timeliness of interactive information disclosure is negatively associated with regulatory review risks. Additionally, we find that newspaper media coverage partially mediates the relationship between interactive information disclosure and regulatory review risk. For companies with low levels of internal governance, in low-competitive industries, and state-owned companies, the positive relationship between the number of investor questions and regulatory review risk is strengthened. These findings enrich the literature on the determinants of regulatory review risk and the economic consequences of interactive information disclosure in emerging markets.

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来源期刊
Journal of Management Science and Engineering
Journal of Management Science and Engineering Engineering-Engineering (miscellaneous)
CiteScore
9.30
自引率
3.00%
发文量
37
审稿时长
108 days
期刊介绍: The Journal of Engineering and Applied Science (JEAS) is the official journal of the Faculty of Engineering, Cairo University (CUFE), Egypt, established in 1816. The Journal of Engineering and Applied Science publishes fundamental and applied research articles and reviews spanning different areas of engineering disciplines, applications, and interdisciplinary topics.
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