{"title":"罗素与唐纳伦的描写","authors":"W. J. Pollock","doi":"10.15173/russell.v42i1.5210","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:The paper argues that Donnellan's distinction between the referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions, whilst a genuine feature of language, does not count against Russell's Theory of Descriptions where Russell's theory is regarded as a theory of the semantics of descriptions and not the pragmatics of individual uses on a particular occasion. The argument I shall present is simple but decisive and ought to resolve once and for all the debate about the significance of Donnellan's distinction for Russell's theory, provided of course that Russell's theory really does concern the semantics of definite descriptions rather than their use on particular occasions.","PeriodicalId":41601,"journal":{"name":"RUSSELL-THE JOURNAL OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Russell Versus Donnellan on Descriptions\",\"authors\":\"W. J. Pollock\",\"doi\":\"10.15173/russell.v42i1.5210\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract:The paper argues that Donnellan's distinction between the referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions, whilst a genuine feature of language, does not count against Russell's Theory of Descriptions where Russell's theory is regarded as a theory of the semantics of descriptions and not the pragmatics of individual uses on a particular occasion. The argument I shall present is simple but decisive and ought to resolve once and for all the debate about the significance of Donnellan's distinction for Russell's theory, provided of course that Russell's theory really does concern the semantics of definite descriptions rather than their use on particular occasions.\",\"PeriodicalId\":41601,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"RUSSELL-THE JOURNAL OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL STUDIES\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"RUSSELL-THE JOURNAL OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL STUDIES\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.15173/russell.v42i1.5210\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"RUSSELL-THE JOURNAL OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL STUDIES","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.15173/russell.v42i1.5210","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:The paper argues that Donnellan's distinction between the referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions, whilst a genuine feature of language, does not count against Russell's Theory of Descriptions where Russell's theory is regarded as a theory of the semantics of descriptions and not the pragmatics of individual uses on a particular occasion. The argument I shall present is simple but decisive and ought to resolve once and for all the debate about the significance of Donnellan's distinction for Russell's theory, provided of course that Russell's theory really does concern the semantics of definite descriptions rather than their use on particular occasions.
期刊介绍：
Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies is published semiannually, in the summer and the winter, by The Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster University. Both print and electron ic editions are published. From 1971 until 1999 Russell was titled Russell: the Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives and was published first by McMaster University Library Press (1971–96) and then by McMaster University Press (1997–99). The ISSN of the print edition is 0036-0163; that of the electronic edition, 1913-8032. Russell is published with the assistance of grants from the Aid to Journals programme of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and from McMaster’s Faculty of Humanities.
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