Educational Authority and Manipulation

Even though a culture which rejects objective values cannot justify educational authority, it cannot function without it. Consequently, it tends to resorts to hidden forms of authority which are more manipulative than overt authority. Covert forms of authority subject people to normalizing judgment to detect signs of deviancy while getting them involved in discourses and practices that produce new desires suitable for the frictionless functioning of society. Epistemic authority tends to deteriorate to "regimes of truth" that control beliefs through power politics. Education involves children in practices that are regarded as valuable. It assumes that some practices are preferable to others and that students ought to be guided to the valued alternatives. This means that some choices are made for children instead of just letting them act on their preferences. In that sense education presupposes authority, both deontic and epistemic. Deontic authority is concerned with the authority to give orders, epistemic authority is concerned with competence. Teachers need deontic authority to coordinate the pedagogical situation. In addition, teachers need to be epistemic authorities: they ought to master the subject matter and the pedagogical knowledge needed for teaching. The crucial question is whether such an educational authority can be justified. That is, whether there are valuable practices and genuine knowledge, whether their value or validity can be established, and whether there are ways of coordinating social activity to reach the valued goals. To use authority for the benefit of the student presupposes a conception of what is really good for her. If the good is something completely subjective, something relative to individual choice, the exercise of authority is an attempt to mould students according to the preferences of those in authority. Ultimately it does not make a difference whether it is the interests of the "I" (the individual teacher) or the "we" (the group she represents or society) which determines the nature of the manipulation. In the absence of objective values, the exercise of educational authority tends to become manipulative. The argument of this paper begins by focusing on some fundamental reasons for the necessity of authority for complex practices like education. It then proceeds to discuss whether educational authority can be justified. I argue that an adequate Paioousis 14:2, 2001 21 justification presupposes objective values. The attempt to educate in value subjectivist and relativist frameworks involves a cognitive dissonance which has undesirable consequences for the practice. Even though the terminology of objective values is repulsive to many modem thinkers, it is not possible to avoid thinking in terms of the good life, or to replace such talk by the idea of disengaged freedom together with the meta-ethics of the fact/value dichotomy. Even those who in theory assume that values are subjective and independent of the order of nature, in practice cannot avoid relying on notions like the virtues and the good life. The aim here is not to try and justify that there are objective values because that would go much beyond the scope of the article. I have argued elsewhere that we have good reason to believe in objective values although we cannot justify them conclusively. The aim of this paper is merely to show that without a notion of objective values we cannot justify authority and that this has undesirable consequences for educational practice. I analyze these undesirable consequences with the help of theories by Alasdair Macintyre, Erich Fromm and Michel Foucault. Macintyre argues that value subjectivism abolishes the distinction between manipulative and nonmanipulative relationships. Fromm suggests that an attempt to avoid overt authority leads to anonymous authority which tends to be manipulative. Foucault points out that normalization is an effective but hidden form of power widely used in education. Hidden power creates new desires in addition to controlling existing ones. These theories provide partial support for the argument of this paper although their authors don't share the exact conception of value objectivism that is assumed here. My main argument proceeds as follows: (1) Even though a culture which rejects objective values cannot justify educational authority, it cannot function without it. (2) Without objective norms governing human relationships there are no criteria for legitimate ways of influencing other people. If legitimate and illegitimate forms of influence cannot be distinguished, genuine forms of education cannot be differentiated from such distortions of it like manipulation and indoctrination. (3) The rejection of a framework of objective values makes it impossible to justify authority. Insofar as educational authority cannot be justified, and the complicated forms of cooperation required in educational institutions are not possible without authority, it becomes necessary to resort to hidden forms of 22 Pai~usis 14:2, 2001 influence which tend to be more manipulative than open authority. (4) Hidden control takes various forms both with respect to deontic and epistemic authority. With regard to deontic authority, we have two developments: (a) the prevalence of the techniques of control are based on extensive surveillance and normalizing judgment, and (b) modern forms of power cease intending to restrict the expression of desires, because such prohibitions become difficult to justify outside of a framework of objective values. Rather, they now intend to get people involved in appropriate forms of discourse and practice in order to produce new desires suitable for the frictionless functi~ning of society. Effective power now produces a new type of an individual who is easily manipulated and adjustable. (5) A culture which professes epistemological relativism with its inherent bent towards various forms of irrationalism faces a special problem of controlling beliefs. If there are no genuine norms governing the inquiry for truth and knowledge, and truth itself is a product of power, genuine forms of teaching cannot be distinguished from indoctrination and manipulation, because the prevalent forms of "knowledge" and "truth" would be products of established power interests and would serve their ends. Even if we assume that there are genuine epistemological criteria, we may still be sceptical about real life manifestations of epistemic authority because of the underdetermined nature ofrational inquiry. (6) The use of hidden forms of authority is worse than open authority because the former tends to be more manipulative than the latter. Legitimate forms of educational authority promote the emotional, moral and intellectual development of the student in the context of pre-given values. 1. Why do educational practices need authority? My first claim is that the proper functioning of educational institutions presupposes both deontic and epistemic authority. An epistemic authority has the character of a witness, as differentiated from deontic authority who has the character of a leader. Someone is an epistemic authority for me in a certain field when her endorsement of a view in that field enhances the probability I subscribe to it. 3 Deontic authority is concerned with prescriptions for coordinated action towards a goal. The need for educational authority arises from two sources: (a) the temporary deficiency of the child to care for herself and (b) the forms of cooperation needed by institutional action, which presuppose agreement on the goals to be sought in common and the concrete steps to be taken to reach those goals. I shall first focus on the need for authority arising from deficiency. Consider Paioousis 14:2, 2001 23 a child of seven years. She needs authoritative guidance if she is to survive, and especially to flourish and realize her potential as a human being capable of creativity and independent thinking. The role of authority here is substitutional: it takes the place of a capacity which the child potentially has and will acquire with maturity. Furthermore, the function of authority is to seek the good of the child, not the interests of the exerciser of authority. This presupposes knowledge of the good on the basis of which one must seek to remove the deficiency by nurture and education. In addition to this special need for authority arising from temporary deficiency, educational institutions need authority simply because they involve complicated forms of human cooperation. Authority has two ineradicable functions in a community: (a) to ensure common or united action, (b) to decide what specifically are the goals to be sought for in common. 5 Every community needs authority to unify its action. Since the common good can be pursued by various means, consensus is not a sufficient method of producing united action. Even if the community consisted merely of enlightened and well-intentioned people, it would still need authority, because the good may be attained in diverse ways. But it is not only the choice of means which makes authority necessary for a community. An essential function of authority is the specification of the ends of common life and action. The good to be sought through common means must be decided in concrete terms: this road to be built, these educational skills to be sought. It is possible for a small group of people performing simple tasks to function successfully without a person in authority. For example, two people may move furniture just by mutual agreement, without any authority. But any amount of complexity in the task or increase in the number of people involved makes authority necessary. If we need, for example, four people to move a piece of furniture and there are several exits that could be used equally well, then someone has to make the relevant decisions and coordinate the operation. Even a small community practicing government by majo