欧洲法院的司法消极主义?

Q4 Social Sciences Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies Pub Date : 2019-06-01 DOI:10.1556/2052.2019.00009
Ernő Várnay
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引用次数: 2

摘要

根据普遍接受的理解,当法院行为不当,超出司法职能的限制,表现得像立法机构时,就会产生司法激进主义。令人信服的是,在绝大多数案件中,欧洲联盟法院履行了欧洲联盟创始条约赋予它的职责,没有任何过度,但有些裁决可能被定性为积极的,无论是对欧洲法律体系的正常运作是必要的还是有用的,还有一些决定(拒绝或回避决定)可以被视为司法被动主义的表现。司法被动主义的定义是狭义的,即法院明确拒绝或避免对其面前的案件作出裁决,或没有回答合法提交给它的问题。在欧盟法院的判例中,当法院系统地等待撤回诉讼,超过诉讼的合理时间,或者没有回答国家法院在初步裁决程序中提出的问题。当《欧盟基本权利宪章》第267条意义上的“不是法院或法庭”的资格有问题时,或者当《欧盟根本权利宪章》的范围定义过于狭隘时,国家法院提出的问题可能被视为被动主义。可能会出现这样的情况——至少在理论上是这样——在这种情况下,法院虽然有能力采取行动,但却将问题推迟到欧盟或成员国立法者或国家法官来决定,而在废除程序中受到审查的行为的资格并不完全令人信服,称其“不是符合《TFEU第263条》的行为”。当法院以一种有问题的方式坚持其立场(保守主义即被动主义),从其早期立场后退,明确或隐含地推翻其先前裁决,缩小了欧盟法律的范围时,就会使用“广义司法被动主义”的标签,事实证明,法院在主要诉讼中系统地反对会员国、委员会和当事方,主张不允许对初步问题进行转介——在许多案件中,法院避免了司法被动主义的诱惑。另一方面,法院在初步裁决程序方面的严格程度近年来有所提高。法院对将转介机构定性为“法院或法庭”采取了不那么仁慈的做法;事实证明,这些问题比以前更多地是“假设性的”,更重要的是,缺乏关于事实和监管背景的足够信息,更容易导致不可接受。欧洲联盟法院消极主义背后的驱动力是,在欧洲一体化危机时期,司法机构的“合理性”,对判例法负担过重和公众不必要压力的自卫,就欧洲一体化的传统理论基础而言,为了保持司法管理的健康和一定的“路径依赖”。
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Judicial Passivism at the European Court of Justice?
According to the generally accepted understanding, judicial activism arises when a court behaves improperly, straying beyond the limits of the judicial function and acting like a legislature.It is convincing that in the great majority of the cases the Court of Justice of the European Union fulfils the roles assigned to it by the founding treaties of the European Union without any excess, but there are decisions which may be characterized as activist, be they necessary or useful for the proper functioning of the European legal system, and there are decisions (refusing or avoiding to decide) which may be qualified as manifestations of judicial passivism.Judicial passivism is defined in the narrow sense of the term, i.e., when the court clearly refuses or avoids to decide the case before it, or does not answer the question legitimately referred to it. In the jurisprudence of the CJEU, such cases arise when the Court systematically waits for the withdrawal of the action, exceeds the reasonable time of the proceedings, or does not answer the question raised in the preliminary ruling procedure by the national court. The inadmissibility of questions referred by national courts may be perceived as passivism when the qualification of ‘not a court or tribunal’ in the sense of Article 267 TFEU is questionable, or when the scope of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is defined too narrowly. Cases may arise – at least in theory – in which the Court, while it would be in a position to act, defers the question to the EU or the Member State’s legislator or to the national judge to decide, with the not entirely convincing qualification of the act under scrutiny in annulment proceedings as ‘not an act for the Article 263 TFEU’. The label ‘judicial passivism in a broad sense of the term’ is used when the Court sticks to its position in a questionable manner (conservatism as passivism), steps back from its earlier position, narrowing the scope of EU law expressly or implicitly overruling its former decision, or it introduces new conditions with the same result (retreat).It has been demonstrated that the Court systematically opposed the Member States, the Commission and the parties in the main proceedings, arguing in favour of inadmissibility of referrals for preliminary questions − the Court avoided, in a large number of cases, the temptation of judicial passivism. On the other hand, the Court’s increased rigour in the preliminary ruling procedures is detectable in recent years. The Court took a less benevolent approach towards the qualification of the referring body as ‘court or tribunal’; the questions proved to be ‘hypothetical’ more often than before, and more importantly, the lack of sufficient information regarding the factual and regulatory context led more easily to inadmissibility.The driving forces behind the passivism of the Courts of the European Union are the ‘reasonableness’ of the judiciary in a time of crisis of the European integration, self-defence against the overburden of case-law and against unnecessary pressure from the public, in order to maintain the health of the management of justice and a certain ‘path-dependence’ as far as the traditional theoretical foundations of European integration are concerned.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.20
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21
期刊介绍: Acta Juridica presents the achievements of the legal sciences and legal scholars in Hungary and details of the Hungarian legislation and legal literature. The journal accepts articles from every field of the legal sciences. Recently, the editors have encouraged contributions from outside Hungary, with the aim of covering the legal sciences in the whole of Central and Eastern Europe. Publishes book reviews and advertisements.
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