青少年罪犯的欺骗行为:同伴及其社会地位如何影响欺骗行为

IF 1.7 4区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Economic Inquiry Pub Date : 2023-07-03 DOI:10.1111/ecin.13168
Kaiwen Leong, Huailu Li, Sharon Xuejing Zuo
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们以 204 名青少年囚犯为对象进行了一项实验,研究同龄人塑造的作弊内在心理成本如何改变囚犯的作弊行为。我们发现,天生不诚实的囚犯如果天真地暴露了自己较高的作弊意愿,那么他们在实际游戏中的作弊行为确实会更多。当有机会观察到同伴是否作弊的不完美信号时,只有先天不诚实的囚犯才会遵循这一信号,并做出更多的作弊行为。这种积极的治疗效果会随着信号的显著性而增加,当作弊信号来自有影响力的同伴时,这种效果会更加明显。
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Cheating amongst youth offenders: How peers and their social status influence cheating

We conducted an experiment with 204 youth inmates to study how the intrinsic psychological cost of cheating that was shaped by peers changed inmates' cheating behavior. We find that innately dishonest inmates who naively revealed their higher willingness to cheat indeed cheated more in the actual game. When given the chance to observe an imperfect signal of whether a peer cheated, only innately dishonest inmates followed this signal and cheated more. This positive treatment effect increases with the saliency of the signal, and becomes more pronounced when the cheating signal is from an influential peer.

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来源期刊
Economic Inquiry
Economic Inquiry ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
3.80
自引率
5.60%
发文量
63
期刊介绍: Published since 1962, (formerly Western Economic Journal), EI is widely regarded as one of the top scholarly journals in its field. Besides containing research on all economics topic areas, a principal objective is to make each article understandable to economists who are not necessarily specialists in the article topic area. Nine Nobel laureates are among EI long list of prestigious authors.
期刊最新文献
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