谈判不作为惯性:多议题争端中错失机会对谈判决策影响的动态模型

IF 0.9 Q3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS International Negotiation-A Journal of Theory and Practice Pub Date : 2020-07-23 DOI:10.1163/15718069-BJA10004
Lesley G. Terris, Noya Lishner-Levy, O. Tykocinski
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引用次数: 2

摘要

旨在解决国际争端的谈判往往以僵局告终。在当前的文章中,我们关注由错失机会引发的死锁。在不作为惯性效应的背景下,心理学领域对错过有利机会的后果进行了广泛的研究。这个概念最近被引入到谈判文献中。放弃一个有吸引力的行动机会会让人容易后悔,并增加放弃随后次等机会的可能性,即使这些机会仍然具有积极价值。本文通过采用一种新的多步骤多议题范式,加深了不作为惯性在国际谈判中的适用性,该范式更接近于现实谈判。利用新的平台,我们展示了动态谈判环境中的不作为惯性效应,并将个体的惯性心态与后悔体验联系起来。所提出的方法和分析将有助于研究人员和实践者解释惯性引起的僵局,并促进加速成功解决的干预措施。
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Negotiation Inaction Inertia: A Dynamic Model of the Impact of Missed Opportunities on Negotiation Decisions in Multi-issue Disputes
Negotiations aimed at resolving international disputes often end in deadlock. In the current article, we focus on deadlocks triggered by missed opportunities. The consequences of missing an advantageous opportunity have been studied extensively in the field of psychology within the context of the inaction inertia effect. The concept was recently introduced into the negotiation literature. Forgoing an attractive action opportunity creates vulnerability to regret and increases the likelihood of forgoing subsequent inferior opportunities, even if they still have positive value. The current article deepens the applicability of inaction inertia to international negotiations, by adopting a new multi-step multi-issue paradigm, which better approximates real-life negotiations. Using the new platform, we demonstrate the inaction inertia effect in a dynamic negotiation setting and link an individual’s inertia mindset to the experience of regret. The methodology and analysis presented will help researchers and practitioners explain inertia-induced deadlocks, and facilitate interventions that expedite successful resolutions.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
33
期刊介绍: International Negotiation: A Journal of Theory and Practice examines negotiation from many perspectives, to explore its theoretical foundations and to promote its practical application. It addresses the processes of negotiation relating to political, security, environmental, ethnic, economic, business, legal, scientific and cultural issues and conflicts among nations, international and regional organisations, multinational corporations and other non-state parties. Conceptually, the Journal confronts the difficult task of developing interdisciplinary theories and models of the negotiation process and its desired outcome.
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