Luke Nelson, James Bornholt, A. Krishnamurthy, E. Torlak, Xi Wang
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This paper presents an analysis of noninterference specifications used in a range of formally verified systems. The main findings are that these systems use distinct specifications and that they often employ small variations, both complicating their security implications. We categorize these specifications and discuss their trade-offs for reasoning about information flows in systems.
期刊介绍：
Operating Systems Review (OSR) is a publication of the ACM Special Interest Group on Operating Systems (SIGOPS), whose scope of interest includes: computer operating systems and architecture for multiprogramming, multiprocessing, and time sharing; resource management; evaluation and simulation; reliability, integrity, and security of data; communications among computing processors; and computer system modeling and analysis.
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