我通过你,我们通过我:迪特里希·冯·希尔德布兰德和卡罗尔·沃伊蒂拉谈社区的个人基础

IF 0.4 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY METAPHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI:10.1111/meta.12643
Lasha Matiashvili
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文试图从人际关系和第二人称参与在第一人称复数视角构成中的特殊作用和性质出发,审视希尔德布兰德和沃伊蒂拉的现象学社会本体论。希尔德布兰德和沃伊蒂拉都赞同个人和人格的独特价值是不同维度社区的基本原则,包括面对面的“我-你”方式,以及更复杂的,甚至是匿名的“我们”社区。两位哲学家都否认第一人称复数比第一人称单数在构成上的首要地位,唯一的例外是基督的神秘身体,“我”是由“我们”构成的。此外,它们的共同点是对现象学运动中一个流派的批判性重新评价,这首先与马克斯·舍勒关于“集体人”可能性的概念有关。根据希尔德布兰德和沃伊蒂拉的描述,这篇文章赞同“我”、“你”和“我们”的关系特征,声称“我们”取决于“我”的经验维度。
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I through thou, and we through I: Dietrich von Hildebrand and Karol Wojtyla on the personal foundation of community

This article is an attempt to scrutinize the phenomenological social ontology of Dietrich von Hildebrand and Karol Wojtyla by drawing on the particular role and nature of interpersonal relatedness and second-person engagement in the constitution of first-person-plural perspective. Both Hildebrand and Wojtyla endorse the unique value of the person and personality as the foundational principle for different dimensions of community, including the face-to-face “I-thou” way of being together and more complex, even anonymous, we communities. Both philosophers deny the constitutive primacy of first-person plural over first-person singular, the only exception being the mystical body of Christ when “I” is conditioned and formed by “we.” Moreover, what they have in common is the critical reappraisal of one stream in the phenomenological movement, first and foremost associated with Max Scheler's conception of the possibility of a “collective person.” Drawing on Hildebrand's and Wojtyla's accounts, the article endorses the view regarding the relational character of “I,” “thou,” and “we,” claiming that “we” hinges on an experiential dimension of “I.”

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来源期刊
METAPHILOSOPHY
METAPHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
0.90
自引率
0.00%
发文量
58
期刊介绍: Metaphilosophy publishes articles and reviews books stressing considerations about philosophy and particular schools, methods, or fields of philosophy. The intended scope is very broad: no method, field, or school is excluded.
期刊最新文献
Issue Information The purpose of metaphysics: Apology of excess Moral testimony and epistemic privilege The poverty of postmodernist constructivism: And a case for naturalism out of Hume, Darwin, and Wittgenstein Virtuous leadership: Ambiguities, challenges, and precedents
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