在前线后统治苏联农村

IF 0.2 4区 历史学 Q2 HISTORY RUSSIAN HISTORY-HISTOIRE RUSSE Pub Date : 2022-12-28 DOI:10.30965/18763316-12340040
Peter Fraunholtz
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在俄罗斯内战期间,薄弱的农村机构有理由通过外部干预,以采购代理和粮食旅的形式追求中央集权,以履行国家粮食义务,并在俄罗斯农村建立苏维埃权威。这项对奔萨省的研究表明,到1920年底,省当局用来加强地方官员采购工作的资源种类已经大大超出了代理人和大队的范围。奔萨的采购当局作出了重大努力,以提高volost和村官员的机构纪律水平。省级官员在采取重大步骤加强农村采购机制的工作时,能够更好地有选择地而不是主要地使用武装力量。他们对使用武装胁迫的谨慎意识因安东诺夫叛乱及其破坏当地采购机构或使其不稳定的可能性而增强,就像在坦波夫发生的那样。因此,当奔萨达到其相当有限的采购配额的105%时,这不是一个重大的采购成功,而是一个官僚主义的成功;省级官员成功地加强了对下级的期望,要求他们的工作远远超出他们以前的能力,以实现体制目标,而农民的抵抗被保持在一个可控的水平。奔萨省的采购经验表明,内战时期的经济管理和国家-农民关系更为复杂,而稳定的省份,具有战略地位,使布尔什维克得以避免更广泛的农民暴力,1920-21年大规模强制征用粮食在很大程度上导致了这种暴力。
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Ruling the Soviet Countryside behind the Frontlines
During the Russia civil war, weak rural organs justified outside intervention in the pursuit of centralization in the form of procurement agents and food brigades to implement state grain obligations and establish Soviet authority in the Russian countryside. This study of Penza province suggests that by late 1920 the types of resources available to provincial authorities to reinforce the procurement work of local officials had expanded well beyond agents and brigades. Procurement authorities in Penza engaged in a significant effort to raise the level of institutional discipline among volost and village officials. Provincial officials, in taking significant steps to strengthen the performance of the rural procurement machinery, were better positioned to use armed force more selectively rather than primarily. Their sense of caution about the use of armed coercion was heightened by the Antonov revolt and its potential for destroying or destabilizing the local procurement apparatus as it had in Tambov. Thus, when Penza reached 105% fulfillment of its rather modest procurement quota this was not a significant procurement success as much as a bureaucratic one; provincial officials managed to enforce expectations that subordinates work well beyond their previous capacity to accomplish institutional goals while peasant resistant was kept to a manageable level. Penza province’s procurement experience suggests a more complex picture of Civil War economic management and state-peasant relations and that stable provinces, strategically situated, allowed the Bolsheviks to avoid more widespread peasant violence, driven to a great degree by large-scale forced grain requisitions in 1920–21.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
50.00%
发文量
24
期刊介绍: Russian History’s mission is the publication of original articles on the history of Russia through the centuries, in the assumption that all past experiences are inter-related. Russian History seeks to discover, analyze, and understand the most interesting experiences and relationships and elucidate their causes and consequences. Contributors to the journal take their stand from different perspectives: intellectual, economic and military history, domestic, social and class relations, relations with non-Russian peoples, nutrition and health, all possible events that had an influence on Russia. Russian History is the international platform for the presentation of such findings.
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