风险和歧义应该如何影响我们的慈善捐赠?

IF 1.2 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Utilitas Pub Date : 2023-05-16 DOI:10.1017/s0953820823000055
Lara Buchak
{"title":"风险和歧义应该如何影响我们的慈善捐赠?","authors":"Lara Buchak","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000055","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n Suppose we want to do the most good we can with a particular sum of money, but we cannot be certain of the consequences of different ways of making use of it. This article explores how our attitudes towards risk and ambiguity bear on what we should do. It shows that risk-avoidance and ambiguity-aversion can each provide good reason to divide our money between various charitable organizations rather than to give it all to the most promising one. It also shows how different attitudes towards risk and ambiguity affect whether we should give to an organization which does a small amount of good for certain or to one which does a large amount of good with some small or unknown probability.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"How Should Risk and Ambiguity Affect Our Charitable Giving?\",\"authors\":\"Lara Buchak\",\"doi\":\"10.1017/s0953820823000055\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n Suppose we want to do the most good we can with a particular sum of money, but we cannot be certain of the consequences of different ways of making use of it. This article explores how our attitudes towards risk and ambiguity bear on what we should do. It shows that risk-avoidance and ambiguity-aversion can each provide good reason to divide our money between various charitable organizations rather than to give it all to the most promising one. It also shows how different attitudes towards risk and ambiguity affect whether we should give to an organization which does a small amount of good for certain or to one which does a large amount of good with some small or unknown probability.\",\"PeriodicalId\":45896,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Utilitas\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-05-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"6\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Utilitas\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000055\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Utilitas","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000055","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6

摘要

假设我们想用一笔特定的钱做我们能做的最好的事情,但我们不能确定使用它的不同方式的后果。本文探讨了我们对风险和模糊性的态度如何影响我们应该做什么。这表明,规避风险和规避歧义都可以为我们在各种慈善组织之间分配资金提供充分的理由,而不是将资金全部捐给最有前途的慈善组织。它还表明,对风险和模糊性的不同态度如何影响我们是应该给予一个为某些事情做了少量好事的组织,还是给予一个以某种小概率或未知概率做了大量好事的组织。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
How Should Risk and Ambiguity Affect Our Charitable Giving?
Suppose we want to do the most good we can with a particular sum of money, but we cannot be certain of the consequences of different ways of making use of it. This article explores how our attitudes towards risk and ambiguity bear on what we should do. It shows that risk-avoidance and ambiguity-aversion can each provide good reason to divide our money between various charitable organizations rather than to give it all to the most promising one. It also shows how different attitudes towards risk and ambiguity affect whether we should give to an organization which does a small amount of good for certain or to one which does a large amount of good with some small or unknown probability.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
Utilitas
Utilitas PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
1.50
自引率
11.10%
发文量
43
期刊最新文献
Classic Hedonism Reconsidered Partial Aggregation for Prioritarians Posthumous Harm and Changing Desires Does the Patterned View Avoid the Ideal Worlds Objection? Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, The Value Gap (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), pp. xv + 215.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1