Utilitas最新文献

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IF 0.9 2区哲学 N/A PHILOSOPHY

Utilitas

Pub Date : 2024-08-27 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820824000086

Vivian Feldblyum

Few views have seen a more precipitous fall from grace than hedonism, which once occupied a central position in the history of ethics. Recently, there have been efforts to revive interest in the view, including well-motivated pleas for contemporary ethicists to at least take the view seriously. In this article, I argue for the seriousness of hedonism on metaethical grounds. Taking J.S. Mill's argument for hedonism as a test case, I show that historically, classic hedonism was grounded metaethically via a commitment to two positions: empiricist epistemology and the view that pleasure occurs in sensation. Together, these two positions provided principled grounds for various iterations of classic hedonism. Moreover, these two positions are still serious options in both contemporary epistemology and the contemporary literature on the nature of pleasure. Insofar as a contemporary ethicist takes those two views seriously, they ought to take classic hedonism seriously as well.

享乐主义曾一度在伦理学史上占据核心地位，它的陨落比享乐主义更为猝不及防。近来，人们努力恢复对这一观点的兴趣，包括善意地呼吁当代伦理学者至少认真对待这一观点。在本文中，我将从元伦理学的角度论证享乐主义的严肃性。以J.S.密尔对享乐主义的论证为例，我表明，从历史上看，经典的享乐主义是通过对两个立场的承诺而获得元伦理学基础的：经验主义认识论和快乐发生于感觉的观点。这两个立场共同为经典享乐主义的各种迭代提供了原则基础。此外，在当代认识论和关于快乐本质的当代文献中，这两种立场仍然是重要的选择。只要当代伦理学家认真对待这两种观点，他们就应该认真对待经典享乐主义。

引用次数: 0

Partial Aggregation for Prioritarians 优先者的部分聚合

IF 0.9 2区哲学 N/A PHILOSOPHY

Utilitas

Pub Date : 2024-08-27 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820824000074

Makan Nojoumian

Prioritarianism is a family of views comparing distributions of well-being. What unites prioritarians is the thought that when deciding whether a distribution is overall better than another, the worse off have priority. There are different ways of making this idea more precise. However, some of these views have extreme aggregative implications and others have extreme anti-aggregative implications. This raises the question: can prioritarians accommodate partial aggregation (aggregating in some but not all cases) and avoid both extremes? In this paper, I explore and focus on a neglected anti-aggregation condition. I identify a family of views I call ‘bounded prioritarianism’ that meet this condition by placing an upper bound on the moral significance of benefits. I argue that anyone sympathetic to partial aggregation ought to opt for a version of bounded prioritarianism.

优先主义是比较福利分配的一系列观点。优先论者的共同思想是，在决定一种分配是否总体上优于另一种分配时，境况较差的人享有优先权。有不同的方法可以使这一观点更加精确。然而，其中一些观点具有极端的总量含义，而另一些观点则具有极端的反总量含义。这就提出了这样一个问题：优先权论者能否容纳部分聚合（在某些情况下聚合，但并非在所有情况下都聚合），并避免两种极端情况？在本文中，我将探讨并关注一个被忽视的反聚合条件。我确定了一系列观点，称之为 "有界优先论"，它们通过为利益的道德意义设定上限来满足这一条件。我认为，任何同情部分聚合的人都应该选择有界先验主义。

引用次数: 0

Posthumous Harm and Changing Desires 遗害与欲望的变化

IF 0.9 2区哲学

Utilitas

Pub Date : 2024-05-03 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820824000062

Andrea S. Asker

The desire-satisfactionist defense of the existence of posthumous harm faces the problem of changing desires. The problem is that, in some cases where desires change before the time of their objects, the principle underlying the desire-satisfactionist defense of posthumous harm yields implausible results. In his prominent desire-satisfactionist defense of posthumous harm, David Boonin proposes a solution to this problem. First, I argue that there are two relevantly different versions of the problem of changing desires, and that Boonin's proposed solution addresses only one of them. Second, I argue that modifying the underlying principle is a better approach to overcoming the problem of changing desires since it addresses both versions of the problem. I defend this approach against objections by showing that the problems raised are problems for the principle as a general theory of harm, not for the principle as part of the desire-satisfactionist defense of posthumous harm.

欲望满足论者为死后伤害的存在所做的辩护面临着欲望变化的问题。问题在于，在某些情况下，如果欲望在其对象出现之前就发生了变化，那么欲望满足论为死后损害辩护所依据的原则就会产生难以置信的结果。戴维-布宁（David Boonin）在其著名的欲望满足论的死后伤害辩护中提出了解决这一问题的方法。首先，我认为改变欲望的问题有两个相关的不同版本，而布宁提出的解决方案只解决了其中之一。其次，我认为修改基本原则是解决欲望变化问题的更好办法，因为它同时解决了两个版本的问题。面对反对意见，我为这一方法辩护，指出所提出的问题是作为一般损害理论的原则的问题，而不是作为欲望满足论者为死后损害辩护的原则的问题。

引用次数: 0

Does the Patterned View Avoid the Ideal Worlds Objection? 模式化观点是否避免了理想世界异议？

IF 0.9 2区哲学

Utilitas

Pub Date : 2024-04-26 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820824000037

Benedict Rumbold

Can we formulate a moral theory that captures the moral significance of patterns of group behaviour we cannot affect through our own action while at the same time avoiding the so-called ‘Ideal Worlds’ objection? In a recent article, Caleb Perl has argued that we can. Specifically, Perl claims that one view that does so is his Patterned View: roughly, you ought to act only in accordance with that set of sufficiently general rules that has optimal moral value (Perl 2021: 98). The Patterned View undoubtedly constitutes a welcome contribution to our existing set of moral theories. However, does it avoid the Ideal Worlds objection? In this article, I argue ‘no’.

我们能否提出一种道德理论，既能捕捉到我们无法通过自身行动影响的群体行为模式的道德意义，又能避免所谓的 "理想世界 "异议？在最近的一篇文章中，Caleb Perl 认为我们可以做到这一点。具体而言，珀尔声称，他的模式化观点就是这样一种观点：粗略地说，你应该只按照那套具有最佳道德价值的足够普遍的规则行事（珀尔 2021: 98）。模式化观点无疑是对我们现有道德理论的一个可喜贡献。然而，它能避免理想世界的反对吗？在本文中，我认为 "不能"。

引用次数: 0

Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, The Value Gap (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), pp. xv + 215. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen，《价值差距》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，2022 年），第 xv + 215 页。

IF 0.9 2区哲学

Utilitas

Pub Date : 2024-04-25 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820824000050

Alex Gregory

引用次数: 0

Intergenerational Justice and Freedom from Deprivation 代际公正与免于匮乏

IF 0.9 2区哲学

Utilitas

Pub Date : 2024-04-12 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820824000049

Dick Timmer

Almost everyone believes that freedom from deprivation should have significant weight in specifying what justice between generations requires. Some theorists hold that it should always trump other distributive concerns. Other theorists hold that it should have some but not lexical priority. I argue instead that freedom from deprivation should have lexical priority in some cases, yet weighted priority in others. More specifically, I defend semi-strong sufficientarianism. This view posits a deprivation threshold at which people are free from deprivation, and an affluence threshold at which people can live an affluent life, even though their lives may be even further improved beyond that point. I argue that freedom from deprivation in one generation lexically outweighs providing affluence in another generation; in all other cases, freedom from deprivation does not have lexical priority.

几乎每个人都认为，免于剥夺的自由在规定代际之间的公正要求时应具有重要的分量。一些理论家认为，免于剥夺的自由应始终高于其他分配问题。另一些理论家则认为，免于剥夺的自由应具有一定的优先权，但不是词义上的优先权。而我则认为，在某些情况下，免于剥夺的自由应具有词义上的优先权，而在其他情况下则应具有加权优先权。更具体地说，我为半强充分主义辩护。这种观点假定了一个匮乏门槛，在这个门槛上人们可以免于匮乏，同时假定了一个富裕门槛，在这个门槛上人们可以过上富裕的生活，尽管在这个门槛之后他们的生活可能会进一步改善。我认为，从词义上讲，一代人免于匮乏的自由比另一代人过上富裕的生活更重要；在所有其他情况下，免于匮乏的自由并不具有词义优先性。

引用次数: 0

Lives, Limbs, and Liver Spots: The Threshold Approach to Limited Aggregation 生命、肢体和肝斑：有限聚集的阈值法

IF 0.9 2区哲学

Utilitas

Pub Date : 2024-03-18 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820824000013

S. Matthew Liao, James Edgar Lim

Limited Aggregation is the view that when there are competing moral claims that demand our attention, we should sometimes satisfy the largest aggregate of claims, depending on the strength of the claims in question. In recent years, philosophers such as Patrick Tomlin and Alastair Norcross have argued that Limited Aggregation violates a number of rational choice principles such as Transitivity, Separability, and Contraction Consistency. Current versions of Limited Aggregation are what may be called Comparative Approaches because they involve assessing the relative strengths of various claims. In this paper, we offer a non-comparative version of Limited Aggregation, what we call the Threshold Approach. It states that there is a non-relative threshold that separates various claims. We demonstrate that the Threshold Approach does not violate rational choice principles such as Transitivity, Separability, and Contraction Consistency, and we show that potential concerns regarding such a view are surmountable.

有限聚合"（Limited Aggregation）认为，当有相互竞争的道德诉求需要我们关注时，我们有时应根据相关诉求的强度，满足最大的诉求总量。近年来，帕特里克-汤姆林（Patrick Tomlin）和阿拉斯泰尔-诺克罗斯（Alastair Norcross）等哲学家认为，"有限聚合 "违反了一系列理性选择原则，如传递性原则、可分性原则和收缩一致性原则。当前版本的 "有限聚合 "可称为 "比较法"，因为它们涉及评估各种主张的相对优势。在本文中，我们提出了一种非比较型的有限聚合法，即我们所说的阈值法。该方法指出，有一个非相对的门槛将各种主张区分开来。我们证明，阈值法并不违反理性选择原则，如传递性、可分性和收缩一致性，我们还证明，对这种观点的潜在担忧是可以克服的。

引用次数: 0

Josh Milburn, Food, Justice, and Animals: Feeding the World Respectfully (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), pp. 224. Josh Milburn, Food, Justice, and Animals：以尊重的方式喂养世界》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，2023 年），第 224 页。

IF 0.9 2区哲学

Utilitas

Pub Date : 2024-01-29 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000328

Nicolas Delon

引用次数: 0

Robin Attfield, Applied Ethics: An Introduction (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2023), pp. vi + 218. Robin Attfield, Applied Ethics：导论》（剑桥，政治出版社，2023 年），第 vi + 218 页。

IF 0.9 2区哲学

Utilitas

Pub Date : 2024-01-04 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000304

Workineh Kelbessa

引用次数: 0

The Good and the Wrong of Hypocritical Blaming 虚伪指责的好与坏

IF 0.9 2区哲学

Utilitas

Pub Date : 2023-12-21 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000274

Kartik Upadhyaya

Provided we blame others accurately, is blaming them morally right even if we are guilty of similar wrongdoing ourselves? On the one hand, hypocrisy seems to render blame morally wrong, and unjustified; but on the other, even hypocritical blaming seems better than silence. I develop an account of the wrongness of hypocritical blaming which resolves this apparent dilemma. When holding others accountable for their moral failings, we ought to be willing to reason, together with them, about our own, similar failings. Hypocrisy undermines this process of mutual deliberation. Thus, even if better than silence, hypocritical blaming is second-best, and that is why it is wrong.

如果我们准确地指责他人，那么即使我们自己也有类似的错误行为，指责他们在道德上是否正确？一方面，虚伪的指责似乎在道德上是错误的，也是不合理的；但另一方面，即使是虚伪的指责似乎也比沉默要好。我对虚伪指责的错误性进行了阐述，从而解决了这一明显的两难问题。在追究他人的道德过失时，我们应该愿意与他们一起推理我们自己的类似过失。虚伪破坏了这一相互商讨的过程。因此，虚伪的指责即使比沉默好，也是退而求其次，这就是为什么它是错误的。

引用次数: 0

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