{"title":"允许双重股权结构公司在伦敦证券交易所溢价上市:借鉴国际经验,认识本地情况","authors":"J. Ho","doi":"10.1093/CMLJ/KMAB016","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"While ‘one share, one vote’ has been widely recognized as a bedrock principle of good corporate governance in protecting shareholders’ basic rights, some regulators consider this principle to be too inflexible to cater for investors with different risk appetites and issuers with different profiles. For example, entrepreneurs may wish to raise equity capital to finance some promising growth of their companies, but at the same time, they do not want to surrender too much control of their companies to those outsiders who may have different views on how to operate the companies. If all stock exchanges stick to the ‘one share, one vote’ principle, these entrepreneurs may prefer not to offer shares of their companies to the public and simply shelve those growth projects indefinitely until they can solicit sufficient funding from other sources. In this case, economies may suffer and investors may lose promising investment opportunities with handsome returns. Key points","PeriodicalId":43720,"journal":{"name":"Capital Markets Law Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Allowing dual class share structure companies in the Premium listing segment of the London Stock Exchange: appreciating international experiences and recognizing local conditions\",\"authors\":\"J. Ho\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/CMLJ/KMAB016\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"While ‘one share, one vote’ has been widely recognized as a bedrock principle of good corporate governance in protecting shareholders’ basic rights, some regulators consider this principle to be too inflexible to cater for investors with different risk appetites and issuers with different profiles. For example, entrepreneurs may wish to raise equity capital to finance some promising growth of their companies, but at the same time, they do not want to surrender too much control of their companies to those outsiders who may have different views on how to operate the companies. If all stock exchanges stick to the ‘one share, one vote’ principle, these entrepreneurs may prefer not to offer shares of their companies to the public and simply shelve those growth projects indefinitely until they can solicit sufficient funding from other sources. In this case, economies may suffer and investors may lose promising investment opportunities with handsome returns. Key points\",\"PeriodicalId\":43720,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Capital Markets Law Journal\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Capital Markets Law Journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/CMLJ/KMAB016\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Capital Markets Law Journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CMLJ/KMAB016","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
Allowing dual class share structure companies in the Premium listing segment of the London Stock Exchange: appreciating international experiences and recognizing local conditions
While ‘one share, one vote’ has been widely recognized as a bedrock principle of good corporate governance in protecting shareholders’ basic rights, some regulators consider this principle to be too inflexible to cater for investors with different risk appetites and issuers with different profiles. For example, entrepreneurs may wish to raise equity capital to finance some promising growth of their companies, but at the same time, they do not want to surrender too much control of their companies to those outsiders who may have different views on how to operate the companies. If all stock exchanges stick to the ‘one share, one vote’ principle, these entrepreneurs may prefer not to offer shares of their companies to the public and simply shelve those growth projects indefinitely until they can solicit sufficient funding from other sources. In this case, economies may suffer and investors may lose promising investment opportunities with handsome returns. Key points
期刊介绍:
This journal is essential for all serious capital markets practitioners and for academics with an interest in this growing field around the World. It is the first periodical to focus entirely on aspects related to capital markets for lawyers and covers all of the fields within this practice area: Debt; Derivatives; Equity; High Yield Products; Securitisation; and Repackaging. With an international perspective, each issue covers articles and news relevant to the financial centres in the US, Europe and Asia. The journal provides a mix of thoughtful and in-depth consideration of the law and practice of capital markets through analytical articles on topical issues written by leading practitioners and academics in the international arena. There are also articles on matters of best practice and opinion on legal and practice developments from around the world. In particular the journal offers: • Unique specialist coverage of international capital markets practice • High level of analysis for experienced lawyers and academics • Team of internationally respected editors from leading centres in the US, Europe and Asia • Quality of articles assured through peer review system.