{"title":"七叶树行动：丘吉尔对隆美尔被遗忘的进攻，1942年3月至5月","authors":"M. Samuels","doi":"10.1080/07292473.2023.2178109","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Although much has been written about the arguments between Churchill and Auchinleck over when Eighth Army should move over to the offensive in the spring of 1942, the plans for that offensive have been almost entirely overlooked in the literature. Drawing on the records in the archives, and on Auchinleck’s personal correspondence, reveals a planning process characterised by disagreements between the senior officers involved, a lack of urgency, and a flawed operational concept.","PeriodicalId":43656,"journal":{"name":"War & Society","volume":"42 1","pages":"178 - 196"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Operation Buckshot: Churchill’s Forgotten Offensive against Rommel, March-May 1942\",\"authors\":\"M. Samuels\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/07292473.2023.2178109\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Although much has been written about the arguments between Churchill and Auchinleck over when Eighth Army should move over to the offensive in the spring of 1942, the plans for that offensive have been almost entirely overlooked in the literature. Drawing on the records in the archives, and on Auchinleck’s personal correspondence, reveals a planning process characterised by disagreements between the senior officers involved, a lack of urgency, and a flawed operational concept.\",\"PeriodicalId\":43656,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"War & Society\",\"volume\":\"42 1\",\"pages\":\"178 - 196\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-02-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"War & Society\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"98\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/07292473.2023.2178109\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"历史学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"HISTORY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"War & Society","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07292473.2023.2178109","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"HISTORY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Operation Buckshot: Churchill’s Forgotten Offensive against Rommel, March-May 1942
Although much has been written about the arguments between Churchill and Auchinleck over when Eighth Army should move over to the offensive in the spring of 1942, the plans for that offensive have been almost entirely overlooked in the literature. Drawing on the records in the archives, and on Auchinleck’s personal correspondence, reveals a planning process characterised by disagreements between the senior officers involved, a lack of urgency, and a flawed operational concept.
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