Introduction

This issue of the Journal on the Use of Force and International Law (JUFIL) features a guest editorial comment – co-written by Claus Kreß (a member of our Advisory Board) and Benjamin Nußberger (a previous contributor to this journal) – considering the crisis in The Gambia in the early part of 2017, following the refusal of President Yahya Jammeh to transfer power to the president-elect, Adama Barrow. Kreß and Nußberger use The Gambia example, which has received relatively little consideration as yet in scholarship, to highlight a subtle interplay between a UN resolution and the notion of ‘intervention by invitation’ (in the context of cases involving considerations of democratic legitimacy). The articles section of this issue begins with a piece that, to some extent, moves beyond the ‘pure’ ad bellum mandate of this journal, but one that had such significant points of overlap that the JUFIL editors were very keen to publish it: Matteo Tondini examines – and attempts to clarify – the scope and contents of international law principles and rules applicable to the use of force in maritime law enforcement operations. Tondini’s analysis is focused on how the criteria of unavoidability, reasonableness and necessity, as developed by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, are to be interpreted according to, and complemented by, the principles and rules contained in international human rights law instruments and in the related case law. Chris O’Meara’s contribution then returns us to more traditional ad bellum territory – self-defence – but does so in a way that is notably unique. O’Meara argues that academic and judicial consideration of the right of self-defence in international law has focused on the right as it applies to states, meaning that little attention has been paid to how this right of national (i.e. state) selfdefence relates to, and interacts with, the concurrent right of military personnel and their units to defend themselves. O’Meara highlights some fundamental problems that stem from this focus on national self-defence alone, and offers some unified thinking – taking into account both national and personal/unit self-defence – with regard to a range of issues that relate to the application of the inherent right. It is clear that predominant opinion is now that (at least some) cyberattacks should rightly be considered to be violations of Article 2(4), and that, in extreme cases, a cyber-attack may lead to self-defence under