Pub Date : 2023-10-21DOI: 10.1080/20531702.2023.2266913
Florian Kriener, Leonie Brassat
The Collective Security Treaty Organization’s military intervention in Kazakhstan in January 2022 quashed the unfolding nonviolent protest movement in the country. Nonetheless, the intervention raised few concerns with regard to the prohibition of the use of force in international law. Among states and scholars, the invitation issued by the Kazakh president was regarded as sufficient to justify the intervention. This article critically assesses this understanding. The intervening states limited the Kazakh people’s right to self-determination and violated protesters’ human rights. Against this backdrop, the authors develop an argument for why international law prohibits states from intervening in another state in order to quash nonviolent protest movements. While the intervention in Kazakhstan serves as the primary example, the argument also applies more broadly and is of particular importance as nonviolent protest movements have a central role in spreading democracy and advancing human rights.
{"title":"Quashing protests abroad: The CSTO’s intervention in Kazakhstan","authors":"Florian Kriener, Leonie Brassat","doi":"10.1080/20531702.2023.2266913","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20531702.2023.2266913","url":null,"abstract":"The Collective Security Treaty Organization’s military intervention in Kazakhstan in January 2022 quashed the unfolding nonviolent protest movement in the country. Nonetheless, the intervention raised few concerns with regard to the prohibition of the use of force in international law. Among states and scholars, the invitation issued by the Kazakh president was regarded as sufficient to justify the intervention. This article critically assesses this understanding. The intervening states limited the Kazakh people’s right to self-determination and violated protesters’ human rights. Against this backdrop, the authors develop an argument for why international law prohibits states from intervening in another state in order to quash nonviolent protest movements. While the intervention in Kazakhstan serves as the primary example, the argument also applies more broadly and is of particular importance as nonviolent protest movements have a central role in spreading democracy and advancing human rights.","PeriodicalId":37206,"journal":{"name":"Journal on the Use of Force and International Law","volume":"24 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135510907","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-19DOI: 10.1080/20531702.2023.2270264
Russell Buchan, Nicholas Tsagourias
In July 2023, the democratically elected president in Niger was overthrown in a military coup. The ousted president called on the international community to help restore democracy in Niger and ECOWAS threatened to use force to achieve this objective. This article explores whether ECOWAS’s threat of force was lawful under international law on the basis of the doctrine of intervention by invitation and considers two possible grounds. First, given Niger’s membership of ECOWAS and the AU, it examines whether Niger has consented to intervention under these organisations’ constitutive agreements. Second, it assesses whether Niger’s deposed democratic president can provide ad hoc consent to intervention on the basis of his government’s democratic credentials even though it does not exercise effective control over Niger’s territory and population. More generally, this article uses Niger as a springboard to elaborate on when consent can be invoked as a justification for military intervention.
{"title":"Intervention by invitation and the scope of state consent","authors":"Russell Buchan, Nicholas Tsagourias","doi":"10.1080/20531702.2023.2270264","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20531702.2023.2270264","url":null,"abstract":"In July 2023, the democratically elected president in Niger was overthrown in a military coup. The ousted president called on the international community to help restore democracy in Niger and ECOWAS threatened to use force to achieve this objective. This article explores whether ECOWAS’s threat of force was lawful under international law on the basis of the doctrine of intervention by invitation and considers two possible grounds. First, given Niger’s membership of ECOWAS and the AU, it examines whether Niger has consented to intervention under these organisations’ constitutive agreements. Second, it assesses whether Niger’s deposed democratic president can provide ad hoc consent to intervention on the basis of his government’s democratic credentials even though it does not exercise effective control over Niger’s territory and population. More generally, this article uses Niger as a springboard to elaborate on when consent can be invoked as a justification for military intervention.","PeriodicalId":37206,"journal":{"name":"Journal on the Use of Force and International Law","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135729118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-18DOI: 10.1080/20531702.2023.2270283
Svenja Raube
ABSTRACTFollowing the coup d’état in Niger on 26 July 2023, the situation in Niger remains tense. However, it is not the coup against a democratically elected government itself that attracts attention from an international law perspective, but the threat by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to intervene militarily in Niger to restore the pre-coup balance of power. The international legal assessment of ECOWAS’s threat to use force not only raises common questions within the doctrine of ‘intervention by invitation’, but also highlights the relevance of a problem about which there is little clarity in international legal doctrine – the problem of forward-looking intervention treaties containing anticipatory invitations. Using the case of Niger as a starting point, this article aims to examine the legal concept of anticipatory intervention treaties in the jus ad bellum, before ultimately applying the results of this legal analysis to the case of Niger.KEYWORDS: Use of forceJus ad bellumintervention by invitationanticipatory invitationtreaty-based consentcoup d’état AcknowledgementsThe author would like to thank Claus Kreß for his invaluable comments on previous drafts, as well as James A Green and Marcus Hickleton for their helpful remarks and editorial guidance.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Sarah Dean, Niamh Kennedy and Larry Madowo, ‘Niger soldiers claim power after president’s own guards reportedly seize him’, CNN (27 July 2023) https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/26/africa/niger-presidency-attempted-coup-intl/index.html.2 Peter Beaumont, ‘Gabon military officers declare coup after Ali Bongo wins disputed election’, The Guardian (31 August 2013) www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/30/gabon-coup-military-takeover-gabonese-election-disputed.3 The coup d’état in Gabon was the first in recent years in a member state of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). ECCAS condemned the coup on 31 August 2023 and announced that an ECCAS Peace and Security Council will be convened soon to discuss the issue: ECCAS, ‘Communique sur la Situation Politique au Gabon’ (30 August 2023) https://ceeac-eccas.org/2023/08/31/communique-sur-la-situation-politique-au-gabon/. The AU has suspended Gabon’s membership in the AU: see African Union, ‘Communique of the 1172nd of the PSC held on 31 August 2023, on the situation in the Republic of Gabon’ (31 August 2023) https://peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-1172nd-of-the-psc-held-on-31-august-2023-on-the-situation-in-the-republic-of-gabon. To the fact, however, that ECCAS’s ability to have an impact on the situation may be limited due to its close ties to Gabon, see Alexander Hudson and David Towriss, ‘Two More Coups in Africa: Similarities, Differences, and What Comes Next’, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (5 September 2023) www.idea.int/blog/two-more-coups-africa-similarities-differences-and-what
83国际法协会:《侵略与使用武力问题最终报告》(2018);另见《维也纳条约法公约》(1969)1155 UNTS 331,第7(2)(a)条,其中根据IDI提供了确定国家机关发出同意的指导:见Hafner, Institut de Droit International (n 80) 402.84 Corten (n 42) 154-5;Georg Nolte, Eingreifen auf Einladung: Zur völkerrechtlichen Zulässigkeit des Einsatzes fremder Truppen im internen Konflikt auf Einladung der Regierung (Springer, 1999) 582.85 Hafner, Institut de Droit International (n 80) 325.86 See n 45.87 Hammady (n 63).88适用集体安全机制的情况是根据第25条:“a)在任何成员国发生侵略或冲突或受到侵略或冲突威胁的情况下;b)两个或几个会员国之间发生冲突;c)发生内部冲突时:(1)有可能引发人道主义灾难,或(2)对分区域的和平与安全构成严重威胁;(d)严重和大规模侵犯人权和法治;(e)推翻或企图推翻民主选举产生的政府;f)调解和安全理事会可能决定的任何其他情况:见《洛梅尔议定书》(第5条)。89同上,第21条和第22.90条《洛姆皮尔斯议定书》第26条规定,授权启动该机制的机构包括:西非经共体调解和安全理事会、一个成员国、非盟和联合国。参见《洛姆皮尔斯议定书》(n 5)第8.92条参见大卫·威普曼的《基于条约的干预:谁能说不?》(1995) 62《芝加哥大学法律评论》607,615;伊恩·布朗利,国际法和国家使用武力(牛津大学出版社,1963年)317-21;Robert Jennings和Arthur Watts(编),《奥本海姆国际法》第1卷(朗曼,1992年第9版)435,446-7.93 Lieblich(78) 10.94严格来说,“预期的”或“预期的同意”这一术语似乎更全面,因为不排除预期的邀请在理论上也可以采取单方面声明的形式,然而,“基于条约的同意”一词在国家实践方面是准确的,可能会简化这一主题。关于这些术语在学术上的用法,参见,例如Wippman (n 92);Agata Kleczkowska,“条约授权和临时同意对军事援助合法性的意义”(2020)7使用武力和国际法杂志270.95格奥尔格·B·佐蒂亚德斯,条约权利干预-其在当今国际法中的合法性(尼科西亚盖卡出版社,1965)32;布拉德·R·罗斯,《格雷戈里·H·福克斯和布拉德·R·罗斯的“亲民主”入侵协议的非法性》,《民主治理与国际法》(剑桥大学出版社,2000年)328、334、337;Corten (n 42) 257;W . Michael Reisman,“苏联在伊朗的干涉权条约的终止”(1980)74 American Journal of International Law 144, 151-2;关于反对任何规范冲突的论点,见亚伦·J·托马斯和安·范·温宁·托马斯,不干预,法律及其在美洲的进口(南卫理公会大学出版社,1956年)92.96布朗利(1992年)317-21.97詹宁斯和沃茨(1992年)446-7.98威普曼(1992年)615;Ademola Abass和Mashood Baderin,“迈向非洲有效的集体安全和人权保护:对新非洲联盟构成法案的评估”(2002)49荷兰国际法评论第1期;利布利希(78年)192-202;约拉姆·丁斯坦,《战争、侵略与自卫》(剑桥大学出版社,2017年第6版)129.99 The SS Wimbledon[1923年8月17日]PCIJ Ser A No .1, 25.100 Lieblich (n 78) 192-7;Visser (n 42) 30.101 De Wet (n 43) 419-27;Gerard Hafner先生,国际法学会,“国际法中使用武力的当前问题:C小组-应请求提供军事援助”(第十届委员会,罗德会议,2011年9月8日)第4条第3款:“如果军事援助基于条约,则需要针对具体情况提出特别请求。”103其他可能的职能是威慑潜在的对手和维持现状:关于潜在职能的列举,见Kleczkowska (n 94) 272-3.104 .这种冲突的情况可以是,例如,在邀请国领土上发生的外国侵略、内部冲突或人道主义灾难。105但是,应当澄清的是,在预先邀请的情况下,这种时间上的接近也可能存在,但在这里,这种时间上的接近似乎是相当巧合的但是,也有在国际条约中发出特别邀请的例子。
{"title":"Anticipatory consent to military intervention: analysis in the wake of the coup d’état in Niger in 2023","authors":"Svenja Raube","doi":"10.1080/20531702.2023.2270283","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20531702.2023.2270283","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTFollowing the coup d’état in Niger on 26 July 2023, the situation in Niger remains tense. However, it is not the coup against a democratically elected government itself that attracts attention from an international law perspective, but the threat by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to intervene militarily in Niger to restore the pre-coup balance of power. The international legal assessment of ECOWAS’s threat to use force not only raises common questions within the doctrine of ‘intervention by invitation’, but also highlights the relevance of a problem about which there is little clarity in international legal doctrine – the problem of forward-looking intervention treaties containing anticipatory invitations. Using the case of Niger as a starting point, this article aims to examine the legal concept of anticipatory intervention treaties in the jus ad bellum, before ultimately applying the results of this legal analysis to the case of Niger.KEYWORDS: Use of forceJus ad bellumintervention by invitationanticipatory invitationtreaty-based consentcoup d’état AcknowledgementsThe author would like to thank Claus Kreß for his invaluable comments on previous drafts, as well as James A Green and Marcus Hickleton for their helpful remarks and editorial guidance.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Sarah Dean, Niamh Kennedy and Larry Madowo, ‘Niger soldiers claim power after president’s own guards reportedly seize him’, CNN (27 July 2023) https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/26/africa/niger-presidency-attempted-coup-intl/index.html.2 Peter Beaumont, ‘Gabon military officers declare coup after Ali Bongo wins disputed election’, The Guardian (31 August 2013) www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/30/gabon-coup-military-takeover-gabonese-election-disputed.3 The coup d’état in Gabon was the first in recent years in a member state of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). ECCAS condemned the coup on 31 August 2023 and announced that an ECCAS Peace and Security Council will be convened soon to discuss the issue: ECCAS, ‘Communique sur la Situation Politique au Gabon’ (30 August 2023) https://ceeac-eccas.org/2023/08/31/communique-sur-la-situation-politique-au-gabon/. The AU has suspended Gabon’s membership in the AU: see African Union, ‘Communique of the 1172nd of the PSC held on 31 August 2023, on the situation in the Republic of Gabon’ (31 August 2023) https://peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-1172nd-of-the-psc-held-on-31-august-2023-on-the-situation-in-the-republic-of-gabon. To the fact, however, that ECCAS’s ability to have an impact on the situation may be limited due to its close ties to Gabon, see Alexander Hudson and David Towriss, ‘Two More Coups in Africa: Similarities, Differences, and What Comes Next’, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (5 September 2023) www.idea.int/blog/two-more-coups-africa-similarities-differences-and-what","PeriodicalId":37206,"journal":{"name":"Journal on the Use of Force and International Law","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135883964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-11DOI: 10.1080/20531702.2023.2264085
Anne Peters
A veto exercised by a permanent member of the UN Security Council to shield that state’s own manifest and prima facie aggression from condemnation and collective action by the Council is legally flawed. The UN Charter can be reasonably interpreted as prohibiting such a veto and depriving it of legal force. This flows from Article 27(3) of the Charter, in conjunction with the prohibition of the abuse of rights, as a manifestation of the principle of good faith, and the obligation to respect the right to life, against the background that the prohibition has the status of jus cogens. These norms generate a legal responsibility of all Security Council members to treat such vetoes as abusive and therefore as an abstention.
{"title":"The war in Ukraine and legal limitations on Russian vetoes","authors":"Anne Peters","doi":"10.1080/20531702.2023.2264085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20531702.2023.2264085","url":null,"abstract":"A veto exercised by a permanent member of the UN Security Council to shield that state’s own manifest and prima facie aggression from condemnation and collective action by the Council is legally flawed. The UN Charter can be reasonably interpreted as prohibiting such a veto and depriving it of legal force. This flows from Article 27(3) of the Charter, in conjunction with the prohibition of the abuse of rights, as a manifestation of the principle of good faith, and the obligation to respect the right to life, against the background that the prohibition has the status of jus cogens. These norms generate a legal responsibility of all Security Council members to treat such vetoes as abusive and therefore as an abstention.","PeriodicalId":37206,"journal":{"name":"Journal on the Use of Force and International Law","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136063667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-10DOI: 10.1080/20531702.2023.2266180
General Editors: Agata Kleczkowska, Seyfullah Hasar
Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 See the records of the UNSC meetings: UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.9241 (12 January 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9241 (Resumption 1) (12 January 2023); Un Doc S/PV.9243 (13 January 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9245 (17 January 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9254 (6 February 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9256 (8 February 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9262 (17 February 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9268 (23 February 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9269 (24 February 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9280 (14 March 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9286 (17 March 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9300 (31 March 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9301 (10 April 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9308 (24 April 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9308 (Resumption 1) (24 April 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9316 (4 April 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9321 (15 May 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9325 (18 May 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9334 (30 May 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9340 (6 June 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9364 (29 June 2023). See also the records of the UNGA 11th emergency special session: UN Doc A/ES-11/PV.17 (22 February 2023), UN Doc A/ES-11/PV.18 (23 February 2023) and UN Doc A/ES-11/PV.19 (23 February 2023). See also G7 Japan 2023, ‘Foreign Ministers’ Communiqué’ (18 April 2023) www.mofa.go.jp/files/100492731.pdf.2 UNGA Res ES-11/6, UN Doc A/RES/ES-11/6 (23 February 2023).3 Ibid, preamble.4 Ibid, para 5.5 UN Doc A/ES-11/PV.19 (n 1) 8.6 UN Doc S/PV.9301 (n 1) 21.7 UN Doc S/PV.9364 (n 1) 13.8 UN Doc S/PV.9243 (n 1) 19; UN Doc S/PV.9269 (n 1) 5. See also President of the Republic of Poland, ‘Joint declaration by Presidents of Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania’ (11 January 2023) www.president.pl/news/joint-declaration-by-presidents-of-ukraine-poland-and-lithuania,63122.9 UN Doc S/PV.9256 (n 1) 7.10 UN Doc S/PV.9243 (n 1) 20.11 UN Doc S/PV.9243 (n 1) 21; UN Doc A/ES-11/PV.18 (n 1) 10, 13; UN Doc S/PV.9254 (n 1) 20; UN Doc S/PV.9269 (n 1) 35; ibid, 29; UN Doc S/PV.9340 (n 1) 15; UN Doc A/ES-11/PV.17 (n 1) 17.12 UN Doc S/PV.9269 (n 1) 34.13 UN Doc A/ES-11/PV.18 (n 1) 20.14 UN Doc A/ES-11/PV.17 (n 1) 15.15 Ibid, 30–31.16 See, also, Letter dated 17 January 2023 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2023/46 (18 January 2023).17 See, e.g. statements made by Switzerland (UN Doc S/PV.9243 (n 1) 8); Poland (UN Doc S/PV.9243 (n 1) 20); Ukraine (UN Doc S/PV.9243 (n 1) 18); Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden, Norway (UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.9357 (23 June 2023) 20; UN Doc S/PV.9254 (n 1) 19; UN Doc S/PV.9300 (n 1) 21; UN Doc S/PV.9269 (n 1) 28); UK (UN Doc S/PV.9243 (n 1) 16); Luxemburg (UN Doc S/PV.9243 (n 1) 31); and Albania (UN Doc S/PV.9300 (n 1) 3).18 ‘Belarus leader says he wants guarantees that Russia will defend his country if it is attacked’, Reuters (10 April 2023) www.reuters.com/world/europe/belarus-leader-says-he-wants-guarantees-that-russia-will-defend-his-country-if-2023-04-10/.19
点击放大图片点击缩小图片披露声明作者未发现潜在的利益冲突。注1参见联合国安理会会议记录:《联合国安理会逐字记录》,联合国文件S/PV.9241(2023年1月12日);联合国文件S/PV.9241(恢复)(2023年1月12日);Un Doc S/PV.9243(2023年1月13日);联合国文件S/PV.9245(2023年1月17日);联合国文件S/PV.9254(2023年2月6日);联合国文件S/PV.9256(2023年2月8日);联合国文件S/PV.9262(2023年2月17日);联合国文件S/PV.9268(2023年2月23日);联合国文件S/PV.9269(2023年2月24日);联合国文件S/PV.9280(二零二三年三月十四日);联合国文件S/PV.9286(2023年3月17日);联合国文件S/PV.9300(2023年3月31日);联合国文件S/PV.9301(二零二三年四月十日);联合国文件S/PV.9308(2023年4月24日);联合国文件S/PV.9308(恢复)(2023年4月24日);联合国文件S/PV.9316(二零二三年四月四日);联合国文件S/PV.9321(2023年5月15日);联合国文件S/PV.9325(二零二三年五月十八日);联合国文件S/PV.9334(二零二三年五月三十日);联合国文件S/PV.9340(二零二三年六月六日);联合国文件S/PV.9364(2023年6月29日)。另见第十一届联合国大会紧急特别会议记录:UN Doc . A/ES-11/PV.17(2023年2月22日),UN Doc . A/ES-11/PV.18(2023年2月23日)和联合国文件A/ES-11/PV.19(2023年2月23日)。另见G7日本2023,“外交部长公报”(2023年4月18日)www.mofa.go.jp/files/100492731.pdf.2 UNGA Res ES-11/6, UN Doc A/ Res /ES-11/6(2023年2月23日)如上,preamble.4同上,联合国文件A/ES-11/PV.19,第5.5段(n 1) 8.6联合国文件S/PV.9301(n 1) 21.7联合国文件S/PV.9364(n 1) 13.8 UN Doc S/PV.9243(n 1) 19;联合国文件S/PV.9269(n) 5;另见波兰共和国总统,“乌克兰、波兰和立陶宛总统联合声明”(2023年1月11日)www.president.pl/news/joint-declaration-by-presidents-of-ukraine-poland-and-lithuania,63122.9联合国文件S/PV.9256(n 1) 7.10 UN Doc S/PV.9243(n 1) 20.11 UN Doc S/PV.9243(n 1) 21;联合国文件A/ES-11/PV.18(n 1) 10,13;联合国文件S/PV.9254(n 1) 20;联合国文件S/PV.9269(n 1) 35;如上,29日;联合国文件S/PV.9340(n 1) 15;联合国文件A/ES-11/PV.17(n 1) 17.12 UN Doc S/PV.9269(n 1) 34.13联合国文件A/ES-11/PV.18(n 1) 20.14 UN Doc . A/ES-11/PV.17(n 1) 15.15同上,30-31.16又见2023年1月17日伊朗伊斯兰共和国常驻联合国代表给安全理事会主席的信,联合国文件S/2023/46(2023年1月18日)见瑞士所作的发言(联合国文件S/PV.9243)(n 1) 8);波兰(联合国文件S/PV.9243)(n 1) 20);乌克兰(联合国文件S/PV.9243)(n 1) 18);立陶宛、拉脱维亚、爱沙尼亚、丹麦、芬兰、冰岛、瑞典、挪威(联合国安理会逐字记录,联合国文件S/PV.9357)(2023年6月23日)20;联合国文件S/PV.9254(n 1) 19;联合国文件S/PV.9300(n 1) 21;联合国文件S/PV.9269(n 1) 28);联合王国(联合国文件S/PV.9243)(n 1) 16;卢森堡(联合国文件S/PV.9243)(n 1) 31;和阿尔巴尼亚(联合国文件S/PV.9300)(n - 1) 3)只要白俄罗斯领导人说他希望保证俄罗斯将保卫他的国家如果攻击”,路透社(2023年4月10日)www.reuters.com/world/europe/belarus领袖——说——他希望——担保-俄罗斯-将保卫他的国家——如果- 2023 - 04 - 10/.19”为俄罗斯捍卫白俄罗斯明斯克,莫斯科举行会谈,如果是攻击,作为自己的领土”,塔斯(2023年4月10日)https://tass.com/politics/1602009.20 Thiam Ndiaga,布基纳法索军政府要求离开法国军队的,路透社(2023年1月22日)www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-military-govt-demands-departure-french-troops-national-television-2023-01-21/.21 John Irish,“法国将在一个月内从布基纳法索撤军”,路透社(2023年1月26日)www.reuters.com/world/africa/france-withdraw-troops-burkina-faso-within-month-foreign-ministry-2023-01-25/.22 Thiam Ndiaga,“布基纳法索标志着法国在其领土上的军事行动正式结束”,路透社(2023年2月20日)www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-marks-official-end-french-military-operations-its-soil-2023-02-19/.23法国驻伦敦大使馆,《欧洲和外交部发言人新闻发布会问答(节选)》(2023年1月26日)https://uk.ambafrance.org/Spokesperson-on-Ukraine-Russian-influence-in-Africa-and-Iran.24同上。25卢旺达和贝宁就边境安全问题讨论军事合作,非洲新闻(2023年4月16日)www.africanews.com/2023/04/16/rwanda-benin-talk-military-cooperation-over-border-security/;James Tasamba,“卢旺达,贝宁同意军事合作”,阿纳多卢通讯社(2023年4月16日)www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/rwanda-benin-agree-to-military-cooperation/2873438.26同上,27同上,28内罗毕新闻编辑室,Djaffar Al Katanty和Stanys Bujakera,“卢旺达因涉嫌
{"title":"Digest of state practice: 1 January – 30 June 2023","authors":"General Editors: Agata Kleczkowska, Seyfullah Hasar","doi":"10.1080/20531702.2023.2266180","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20531702.2023.2266180","url":null,"abstract":"Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 See the records of the UNSC meetings: UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.9241 (12 January 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9241 (Resumption 1) (12 January 2023); Un Doc S/PV.9243 (13 January 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9245 (17 January 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9254 (6 February 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9256 (8 February 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9262 (17 February 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9268 (23 February 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9269 (24 February 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9280 (14 March 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9286 (17 March 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9300 (31 March 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9301 (10 April 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9308 (24 April 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9308 (Resumption 1) (24 April 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9316 (4 April 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9321 (15 May 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9325 (18 May 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9334 (30 May 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9340 (6 June 2023); UN Doc S/PV.9364 (29 June 2023). See also the records of the UNGA 11th emergency special session: UN Doc A/ES-11/PV.17 (22 February 2023), UN Doc A/ES-11/PV.18 (23 February 2023) and UN Doc A/ES-11/PV.19 (23 February 2023). See also G7 Japan 2023, ‘Foreign Ministers’ Communiqué’ (18 April 2023) www.mofa.go.jp/files/100492731.pdf.2 UNGA Res ES-11/6, UN Doc A/RES/ES-11/6 (23 February 2023).3 Ibid, preamble.4 Ibid, para 5.5 UN Doc A/ES-11/PV.19 (n 1) 8.6 UN Doc S/PV.9301 (n 1) 21.7 UN Doc S/PV.9364 (n 1) 13.8 UN Doc S/PV.9243 (n 1) 19; UN Doc S/PV.9269 (n 1) 5. See also President of the Republic of Poland, ‘Joint declaration by Presidents of Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania’ (11 January 2023) www.president.pl/news/joint-declaration-by-presidents-of-ukraine-poland-and-lithuania,63122.9 UN Doc S/PV.9256 (n 1) 7.10 UN Doc S/PV.9243 (n 1) 20.11 UN Doc S/PV.9243 (n 1) 21; UN Doc A/ES-11/PV.18 (n 1) 10, 13; UN Doc S/PV.9254 (n 1) 20; UN Doc S/PV.9269 (n 1) 35; ibid, 29; UN Doc S/PV.9340 (n 1) 15; UN Doc A/ES-11/PV.17 (n 1) 17.12 UN Doc S/PV.9269 (n 1) 34.13 UN Doc A/ES-11/PV.18 (n 1) 20.14 UN Doc A/ES-11/PV.17 (n 1) 15.15 Ibid, 30–31.16 See, also, Letter dated 17 January 2023 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2023/46 (18 January 2023).17 See, e.g. statements made by Switzerland (UN Doc S/PV.9243 (n 1) 8); Poland (UN Doc S/PV.9243 (n 1) 20); Ukraine (UN Doc S/PV.9243 (n 1) 18); Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden, Norway (UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.9357 (23 June 2023) 20; UN Doc S/PV.9254 (n 1) 19; UN Doc S/PV.9300 (n 1) 21; UN Doc S/PV.9269 (n 1) 28); UK (UN Doc S/PV.9243 (n 1) 16); Luxemburg (UN Doc S/PV.9243 (n 1) 31); and Albania (UN Doc S/PV.9300 (n 1) 3).18 ‘Belarus leader says he wants guarantees that Russia will defend his country if it is attacked’, Reuters (10 April 2023) www.reuters.com/world/europe/belarus-leader-says-he-wants-guarantees-that-russia-will-defend-his-country-if-2023-04-10/.19","PeriodicalId":37206,"journal":{"name":"Journal on the Use of Force and International Law","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136294761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-21DOI: 10.1080/20531702.2023.2249347
C. Schaller
ABSTRACT This article explores when aiding or assisting another state in the use of force against a third state may turn into a ‘use of force’ within the meaning of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The provision of weapons to a belligerent state is usually not considered to pass this threshold. But one can imagine extreme cases where it is appropriate to assume that Article 2(4) is implicated. This article argues that a contribution that directly materialises in another state’s direct use of force against a third state, and is essential to that use of force, should be treated as an indirect use of force if the contributing state itself intends to force the will of the third state. Military support to Ukraine has come to a point where these criteria would be met.
{"title":"When aid or assistance in the use of force turns into an indirect use of force","authors":"C. Schaller","doi":"10.1080/20531702.2023.2249347","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20531702.2023.2249347","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article explores when aiding or assisting another state in the use of force against a third state may turn into a ‘use of force’ within the meaning of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The provision of weapons to a belligerent state is usually not considered to pass this threshold. But one can imagine extreme cases where it is appropriate to assume that Article 2(4) is implicated. This article argues that a contribution that directly materialises in another state’s direct use of force against a third state, and is essential to that use of force, should be treated as an indirect use of force if the contributing state itself intends to force the will of the third state. Military support to Ukraine has come to a point where these criteria would be met.","PeriodicalId":37206,"journal":{"name":"Journal on the Use of Force and International Law","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49595580","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-03DOI: 10.1080/20531702.2023.2272353
James A. Green, Christian Henderson, T. Ruys
{"title":"Introduction to issue 10(2)","authors":"James A. Green, Christian Henderson, T. Ruys","doi":"10.1080/20531702.2023.2272353","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20531702.2023.2272353","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37206,"journal":{"name":"Journal on the Use of Force and International Law","volume":"59 1","pages":"159 - 161"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139363916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/20531702.2023.2202448
T. Ruys
Welcome to this lustrum edition of the Journal on the Use of Force and International Law, now in its tenth year of publication.More than one year after the launchof Russia’s ‘specialmilitary operation’ in February 2022,we continue to put the spotlight on a range of jus ad bellum issues, both of a thematic nature as well as linked to specific armed confrontations, such as that mentioned above. Our issue opens with an editorial by co-editor-in-chief James Green, who observes how many western states have provided significant amounts of weapons as well as logistical aid toUkraine since early 2022. Green specifically poses the question whether such assistance qualifies as a ‘use of force’ in the sense of Article 2(4) UN Charter (on the assumption that, if this were to be the case, it would constitute a lawful exercise of collective self-defence). While some scholars have answered the question in the affirmative, and a few supporting states have expressly invoked the doctrine of self-defence, Green ultimately remains sceptical that the mere provision of weapons or logistical support triggers the application of the prohibition on the use of force. Next, Işıl Aral examines how international law scholars construct their arguments when they argue for the emergence of a new customary norm. In particular, the author examines democratic governance discourses to analyse the way in which scholars resort to the involvement of the Security Council as a narrative technique that provides persuasiveness to their argument. Aral does so by examining how scholars have reiterated the same interpretation regarding the Security Council’s involvement in the post-election crises in Haiti, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire, and by construing these precedents as forming part of a cumulative practice. In turn, Chloe Goldthorpe examines ongoing debates over the ‘armed attack’ requirement under Article 51 of the UN Charter from a ‘TWAIL’ perspective. Put differently, Goldthorpe uses insights from ‘Third World Approaches to International Law’ to analyse state-issued statements on the right of self-defence, contending that such conclusions result from academic approaches that not only over-privilege the limited practice of a few states, but also do not sufficiently consider inherent bias within the construction
{"title":"Introduction to issue 10(1)","authors":"T. Ruys","doi":"10.1080/20531702.2023.2202448","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20531702.2023.2202448","url":null,"abstract":"Welcome to this lustrum edition of the Journal on the Use of Force and International Law, now in its tenth year of publication.More than one year after the launchof Russia’s ‘specialmilitary operation’ in February 2022,we continue to put the spotlight on a range of jus ad bellum issues, both of a thematic nature as well as linked to specific armed confrontations, such as that mentioned above. Our issue opens with an editorial by co-editor-in-chief James Green, who observes how many western states have provided significant amounts of weapons as well as logistical aid toUkraine since early 2022. Green specifically poses the question whether such assistance qualifies as a ‘use of force’ in the sense of Article 2(4) UN Charter (on the assumption that, if this were to be the case, it would constitute a lawful exercise of collective self-defence). While some scholars have answered the question in the affirmative, and a few supporting states have expressly invoked the doctrine of self-defence, Green ultimately remains sceptical that the mere provision of weapons or logistical support triggers the application of the prohibition on the use of force. Next, Işıl Aral examines how international law scholars construct their arguments when they argue for the emergence of a new customary norm. In particular, the author examines democratic governance discourses to analyse the way in which scholars resort to the involvement of the Security Council as a narrative technique that provides persuasiveness to their argument. Aral does so by examining how scholars have reiterated the same interpretation regarding the Security Council’s involvement in the post-election crises in Haiti, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire, and by construing these precedents as forming part of a cumulative practice. In turn, Chloe Goldthorpe examines ongoing debates over the ‘armed attack’ requirement under Article 51 of the UN Charter from a ‘TWAIL’ perspective. Put differently, Goldthorpe uses insights from ‘Third World Approaches to International Law’ to analyse state-issued statements on the right of self-defence, contending that such conclusions result from academic approaches that not only over-privilege the limited practice of a few states, but also do not sufficiently consider inherent bias within the construction","PeriodicalId":37206,"journal":{"name":"Journal on the Use of Force and International Law","volume":"10 1","pages":"1 - 2"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45949514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Digest of state practice: 1 July – 31 December 2022","authors":"Jasmin Johurun Nessa, Seyfullah Hasar, Agata Kleczkowska","doi":"10.1080/20531702.2023.2196208","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20531702.2023.2196208","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37206,"journal":{"name":"Journal on the Use of Force and International Law","volume":"10 1","pages":"104 - 152"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47968349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/20531702.2023.2180905
Chloe Goldthorpe
ABSTRACT Since the inception of the UN Charter, the specific parameters of an ‘armed attack’ triggering the right of states to use force in self-defence has been the subject of much academic discussion. Debate has intensified over the past two decades, with claims that state actions in the context of counter-terrorism have loosened the armed attack definition previously outlined by the International Court of Justice. This article explores how aspects of TWAIL insights on customary international law could be used to deepen the current debate on the armed attack requirement. Through analysis of opinio juris made outside the context of individual conflict events, it is argued that current debate favours perspectives of those more willing and able to use military force, with apparent geographical trends. Further, it is contended that greater consideration is needed of whose voices – both between and within states – are reflected within debates on the armed attack requirement.
自《联合国宪章》成立以来,引发国家使用武力自卫权利的“武装攻击”的具体参数一直是许多学术讨论的主题。在过去的二十年里,争论愈演愈烈,有人声称,国家在反恐背景下的行动放宽了国际法院(International Court of Justice)此前概述的武装袭击定义。本文探讨了如何利用TWAIL对习惯国际法的见解来深化当前关于武装攻击要求的辩论。通过对个别冲突事件以外的法律意见的分析,认为目前的辩论倾向于那些更愿意和能够使用军事力量的人的观点,具有明显的地理趋势。此外,有人认为,需要更多地考虑在关于武装攻击要求的辩论中反映了谁的声音- -国家之间和国家内部的声音。
{"title":"The armed attack requirement and customary international law: whose views count?","authors":"Chloe Goldthorpe","doi":"10.1080/20531702.2023.2180905","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20531702.2023.2180905","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Since the inception of the UN Charter, the specific parameters of an ‘armed attack’ triggering the right of states to use force in self-defence has been the subject of much academic discussion. Debate has intensified over the past two decades, with claims that state actions in the context of counter-terrorism have loosened the armed attack definition previously outlined by the International Court of Justice. This article explores how aspects of TWAIL insights on customary international law could be used to deepen the current debate on the armed attack requirement. Through analysis of opinio juris made outside the context of individual conflict events, it is argued that current debate favours perspectives of those more willing and able to use military force, with apparent geographical trends. Further, it is contended that greater consideration is needed of whose voices – both between and within states – are reflected within debates on the armed attack requirement.","PeriodicalId":37206,"journal":{"name":"Journal on the Use of Force and International Law","volume":"10 1","pages":"49 - 73"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47751973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}