Is the Hobbesian State of Nature Racialized?

Thomas Hobbes, like other early modern social contract theorists, has been accused of promoting racist views in his philosophy – ideas used to justify European imperialism and the devastation of Indigenous peoples. I argue that his philosophy does not assume or promote a naturalized racial hierarchy. I demonstrate that the logic of Hobbes’s project requires rejecting a racially essentialist conception of human nature. His is a thoroughgoing and unrepentant anti-essentialism; he claims that there are no objective, immutable, necessary differences between ‘civilized’ people and ‘savages.’ Instead, I locate Hobbes’s bias in his reliance on culturally-specific notions of government. Finally, I suggest that the Hobbes’s natural law requirement of ‘acknowledging’ equality can be applied to questions about race. Though this was not its purpose, this requirement might provide a useful – and distinctively Hobbesian – tool to combat the impulse behind the problematic and persistent desire to find ‘real’ differences among racial groups.