{"title":"新娘短缺:中国的独生子女政策与男性婚姻转变","authors":"Amanda Kerr","doi":"10.1016/j.rie.2023.05.002","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>China’s one child policy stands among the most consequential actions ever taken by a government to regulate the basic structure and fundamental nature of the family unit. Scholars and policy analysts have long recognized its likely effects with respect to the aging of Chinese society. In recent years they have also become more aware of the implications of the gender imbalance the policies have produced, in particular as they pertain to the formation of marriages. This paper analyzes the selection of surplus men into marriage by means of a model that explicitly accounts for earnings and wealth. Its central focus is the extent to which relatively scarce brides marry men with comparatively strong economic prospects in terms of earnings or wealth. Results of this study, based on data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey, provide evidence that marriage in the age of the one child policy is indeed selective of men who are relatively high earners. This result is robust to a series of alternative specifications of the model.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46094,"journal":{"name":"Research in Economics","volume":"77 3","pages":"Pages 310-321"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A shortage of brides: China’s one child policy and transitions of men into marriage\",\"authors\":\"Amanda Kerr\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.rie.2023.05.002\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>China’s one child policy stands among the most consequential actions ever taken by a government to regulate the basic structure and fundamental nature of the family unit. Scholars and policy analysts have long recognized its likely effects with respect to the aging of Chinese society. In recent years they have also become more aware of the implications of the gender imbalance the policies have produced, in particular as they pertain to the formation of marriages. This paper analyzes the selection of surplus men into marriage by means of a model that explicitly accounts for earnings and wealth. Its central focus is the extent to which relatively scarce brides marry men with comparatively strong economic prospects in terms of earnings or wealth. Results of this study, based on data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey, provide evidence that marriage in the age of the one child policy is indeed selective of men who are relatively high earners. This result is robust to a series of alternative specifications of the model.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":46094,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Research in Economics\",\"volume\":\"77 3\",\"pages\":\"Pages 310-321\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-09-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Research in Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090944323000248\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Research in Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090944323000248","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
A shortage of brides: China’s one child policy and transitions of men into marriage
China’s one child policy stands among the most consequential actions ever taken by a government to regulate the basic structure and fundamental nature of the family unit. Scholars and policy analysts have long recognized its likely effects with respect to the aging of Chinese society. In recent years they have also become more aware of the implications of the gender imbalance the policies have produced, in particular as they pertain to the formation of marriages. This paper analyzes the selection of surplus men into marriage by means of a model that explicitly accounts for earnings and wealth. Its central focus is the extent to which relatively scarce brides marry men with comparatively strong economic prospects in terms of earnings or wealth. Results of this study, based on data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey, provide evidence that marriage in the age of the one child policy is indeed selective of men who are relatively high earners. This result is robust to a series of alternative specifications of the model.
期刊介绍:
Established in 1947, Research in Economics is one of the oldest general-interest economics journals in the world and the main one among those based in Italy. The purpose of the journal is to select original theoretical and empirical articles that will have high impact on the debate in the social sciences; since 1947, it has published important research contributions on a wide range of topics. A summary of our editorial policy is this: the editors make a preliminary assessment of whether the results of a paper, if correct, are worth publishing. If so one of the associate editors reviews the paper: from the reviewer we expect to learn if the paper is understandable and coherent and - within reasonable bounds - the results are correct. We believe that long lags in publication and multiple demands for revision simply slow scientific progress. Our goal is to provide you a definitive answer within one month of submission. We give the editors one week to judge the overall contribution and if acceptable send your paper to an associate editor. We expect the associate editor to provide a more detailed evaluation within three weeks so that the editors can make a final decision before the month expires. In the (rare) case of a revision we allow four months and in the case of conditional acceptance we allow two months to submit the final version. In both cases we expect a cover letter explaining how you met the requirements. For conditional acceptance the editors will verify that the requirements were met. In the case of revision the original associate editor will do so. If the revision cannot be at least conditionally accepted it is rejected: there is no second revision.