问与说:最高法院在口头辩论中对问题和陈述的策略性使用

IF 1.5 2区 社会学 Q2 POLITICAL SCIENCE Political Research Quarterly Pub Date : 2023-03-17 DOI:10.1177/10659129231164604
M. W. Sorenson
{"title":"问与说:最高法院在口头辩论中对问题和陈述的策略性使用","authors":"M. W. Sorenson","doi":"10.1177/10659129231164604","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Supreme Court oral arguments are often characterized as the Court rapidly firing questions at attorneys who struggle to keep up; however, nearly half of the Court’s utterances come not as questions but as statements. I ask whether patterns of questioning and commenting behavior during oral arguments can predict case outcomes and justice votes. To answer this question, I develop a theory of strategic communication that accounts for the differential ways justices—and other strategic actors—use queries and comments during arguments. Using transcripts from 1981 to 2019, I code for use of questions and statements, finding the two theoretically and empirically distinct: where questions increase a party’s chances of winning, statements increase their chance of losing.","PeriodicalId":51366,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Asking Versus Telling: The Supreme Court’s Strategic Use of Questions and Statements During Oral Arguments\",\"authors\":\"M. W. Sorenson\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/10659129231164604\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Supreme Court oral arguments are often characterized as the Court rapidly firing questions at attorneys who struggle to keep up; however, nearly half of the Court’s utterances come not as questions but as statements. I ask whether patterns of questioning and commenting behavior during oral arguments can predict case outcomes and justice votes. To answer this question, I develop a theory of strategic communication that accounts for the differential ways justices—and other strategic actors—use queries and comments during arguments. Using transcripts from 1981 to 2019, I code for use of questions and statements, finding the two theoretically and empirically distinct: where questions increase a party’s chances of winning, statements increase their chance of losing.\",\"PeriodicalId\":51366,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Political Research Quarterly\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-03-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Political Research Quarterly\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129231164604\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"POLITICAL SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Political Research Quarterly","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129231164604","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

最高法院的口头辩论通常被描述为法院迅速向律师抛出问题,而律师们却很难跟上;然而,法院近一半的发言不是作为问题而是作为陈述。我想知道口头辩论中的提问和评论行为模式是否可以预测案件结果和正义投票。为了回答这个问题,我发展了一种战略沟通理论,该理论解释了法官和其他战略行为者在辩论中使用询问和评论的不同方式。使用1981年至2019年的演讲记录,我对提问和陈述的使用进行了编码,发现这两者在理论上和经验上都是不同的:提问增加了一个政党获胜的机会,陈述增加了他们失败的机会。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Asking Versus Telling: The Supreme Court’s Strategic Use of Questions and Statements During Oral Arguments
Supreme Court oral arguments are often characterized as the Court rapidly firing questions at attorneys who struggle to keep up; however, nearly half of the Court’s utterances come not as questions but as statements. I ask whether patterns of questioning and commenting behavior during oral arguments can predict case outcomes and justice votes. To answer this question, I develop a theory of strategic communication that accounts for the differential ways justices—and other strategic actors—use queries and comments during arguments. Using transcripts from 1981 to 2019, I code for use of questions and statements, finding the two theoretically and empirically distinct: where questions increase a party’s chances of winning, statements increase their chance of losing.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
Political Research Quarterly
Political Research Quarterly POLITICAL SCIENCE-
CiteScore
3.60
自引率
4.80%
发文量
109
期刊介绍: Political Research Quarterly (PRQ) is the official journal of the Western Political Science Association. PRQ seeks to publish scholarly research of exceptionally high merit that makes notable contributions in any subfield of political science. The editors especially encourage submissions that employ a mixture of theoretical approaches or multiple methodologies to address major political problems or puzzles at a local, national, or global level. Collections of articles on a common theme or debate, to be published as short symposia, are welcome as well as individual submissions.
期刊最新文献
Disinformation and Regime Survival. A Deepening/Widening Tradeoff? Evidence from the GATT and WTO Ethnicity and Response to Internal Environmental Migrants in the United States Countering “Fake News” Through Public Education and Advertisements: An Experimental Analysis Deceptively Stable? How the Stability of Aggregate Abortion Attitudes Conceals Partisan Induced Shifts
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1