Pub Date : 2024-09-01Epub Date: 2024-05-27DOI: 10.1177/10659129241252811
Yuko Sato, Felix Wiebrecht
Disinformation has transformed into a global issue and while it is seen as a growing concern to democracy today, autocrats have long used it as a part of their propaganda repertoire. Yet, no study has tested the effect of disinformation on regime stability and breakdown beyond country-specific studies. Drawing on novel measures from the Digital Society Project (DSP) estimating the levels of disinformation disseminated by governments across 148 countries between 2000-2022 and from the Episodes of Regime Transformation (ERT) dataset, we provide the first global comparative study of disinformation and survival of democratic and authoritarian regimes, respectively. The results show that in authoritarian regimes, disinformation helps rulers to stay in power as regimes with higher levels of disinformation are less likely to experience democratization episodes. In democracies, on the other hand, disinformation increases the probability of autocratization onsets. As such, this study is the first to provide comparative evidence on the negative effects of disinformation on democracy as well as on the prospects of democratization.
{"title":"Disinformation and Regime Survival.","authors":"Yuko Sato, Felix Wiebrecht","doi":"10.1177/10659129241252811","DOIUrl":"10.1177/10659129241252811","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Disinformation has transformed into a global issue and while it is seen as a growing concern to democracy today, autocrats have long used it as a part of their propaganda repertoire. Yet, no study has tested the effect of disinformation on regime stability and breakdown beyond country-specific studies. Drawing on novel measures from the Digital Society Project (DSP) estimating the levels of disinformation disseminated by governments across 148 countries between 2000-2022 and from the Episodes of Regime Transformation (ERT) dataset, we provide the first global comparative study of disinformation and survival of democratic and authoritarian regimes, respectively. The results show that in authoritarian regimes, disinformation helps rulers to stay in power as regimes with higher levels of disinformation are less likely to experience democratization episodes. In democracies, on the other hand, disinformation increases the probability of autocratization onsets. As such, this study is the first to provide comparative evidence on the negative effects of disinformation on democracy as well as on the prospects of democratization.</p>","PeriodicalId":51366,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11305955/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141918051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-27DOI: 10.1177/10659129241268822
Pablo Valdivieso-Kastner, Sergio Huertas-Hernández
This study delves into the determinants of legislative overrides in multiparty legislatures, with a specific focus on the influence of partisan fragmentation within congress. Utilizing an original dataset spanning from 1995 to 2017, we examine the cases of Ecuador and Peru. Our argument posits that during lawmaking, a dispersed and fragmented party system prevents the president from anticipating the preferences of the congressional pivotal party. In such a scenario of incomplete information, the president’s capacity to introduce selective incentives through vetoes is limited. In this way, the president is less likely to break the congressional majority supporting a bill. Consequently, the vetoed bill becomes less acceptable compared to the original statute. This, in turn, provides the congressional majority with increased incentives to uphold the original bill, elevating the likelihood of a legislative override. In alignment with this rationale, our findings indicate that an increase in the effective number of parties (ENP) has a positive and significant impact on the probability of a legislative override. Additionally, our evidence underscores a noteworthy contrast between the relatively high rate of legislative overrides in Latin America and findings for the US case.
{"title":"When Congress Prevails: Veto Overrides and Legislative Fragmentation in Multiparty Legislatures","authors":"Pablo Valdivieso-Kastner, Sergio Huertas-Hernández","doi":"10.1177/10659129241268822","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129241268822","url":null,"abstract":"This study delves into the determinants of legislative overrides in multiparty legislatures, with a specific focus on the influence of partisan fragmentation within congress. Utilizing an original dataset spanning from 1995 to 2017, we examine the cases of Ecuador and Peru. Our argument posits that during lawmaking, a dispersed and fragmented party system prevents the president from anticipating the preferences of the congressional pivotal party. In such a scenario of incomplete information, the president’s capacity to introduce selective incentives through vetoes is limited. In this way, the president is less likely to break the congressional majority supporting a bill. Consequently, the vetoed bill becomes less acceptable compared to the original statute. This, in turn, provides the congressional majority with increased incentives to uphold the original bill, elevating the likelihood of a legislative override. In alignment with this rationale, our findings indicate that an increase in the effective number of parties (ENP) has a positive and significant impact on the probability of a legislative override. Additionally, our evidence underscores a noteworthy contrast between the relatively high rate of legislative overrides in Latin America and findings for the US case.","PeriodicalId":51366,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141797369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-26DOI: 10.1177/10659129241268820
Rachel M. Blum, Mike Cowburn, Seth Masket
Political elites play an important role in determining who wins primaries, yet comparatively little is known about which voices in party networks matter when different intra-party signals are sent. We examine this question using an original dataset of Republican Senate and gubernatorial primaries in 2022, an election cycle with substantial intra-party conflict in primary elections. We demonstrate that Fox News appearances (media), Trump’s endorsements (MAGA), campaign fundraising (money), and Twitter engagement (mentions) were all positively associated with vote share. We then assess the state of primary fields prior to Trump’s endorsements, showing that endorsed candidates were outperforming their competitors prior to his involvement. Finally, we consider the state of primary fields after Trump endorsed, demonstrating that his support was associated with a thirteen percentage point increase in both fundraising share and polling which lasted through to the primary. These findings provide clarity on the relative weight of different signals in contested party nominations.
{"title":"Who Decides? Media, MAGA, Money, and Mentions in the 2022 Republican Primaries","authors":"Rachel M. Blum, Mike Cowburn, Seth Masket","doi":"10.1177/10659129241268820","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129241268820","url":null,"abstract":"Political elites play an important role in determining who wins primaries, yet comparatively little is known about which voices in party networks matter when different intra-party signals are sent. We examine this question using an original dataset of Republican Senate and gubernatorial primaries in 2022, an election cycle with substantial intra-party conflict in primary elections. We demonstrate that Fox News appearances (media), Trump’s endorsements (MAGA), campaign fundraising (money), and Twitter engagement (mentions) were all positively associated with vote share. We then assess the state of primary fields prior to Trump’s endorsements, showing that endorsed candidates were outperforming their competitors prior to his involvement. Finally, we consider the state of primary fields after Trump endorsed, demonstrating that his support was associated with a thirteen percentage point increase in both fundraising share and polling which lasted through to the primary. These findings provide clarity on the relative weight of different signals in contested party nominations.","PeriodicalId":51366,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141800856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-24DOI: 10.1177/10659129241265118
Carlos Algara, Alexander Specht
Theories of collective accountability in American elections center on the ability, and willingness, of voters to hold legislators accountable for the job performance of the president and his party in Congress. While this work finds that legislators pay an electoral penalty for low institutional approval ratings under their party’s control, little is known whether this form of collective accountability translates to the state legislative context. We argue that collective accountability in state legislative elections follows a two-tiered approach, with state legislators being held accountable for national and state policymaking institutions. Using new state-level measures of institutional approval for national and state institutions, along with voter-level data from the 2007–2020 Cooperative Election Study, we find that presidential approval is the principal growing motivator of state legislative partisan choice with other policymaking institutions playing a minimal role, at best. These findings suggest that the electoral fortune of state legislative candidates, and state parties, are largely and increasingly determined by national forces outside of the purview of state-level policymaking institutions.
{"title":"The Role of State and National Institutional Evaluations in Fostering Collective Accountability Across the U.S. States","authors":"Carlos Algara, Alexander Specht","doi":"10.1177/10659129241265118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129241265118","url":null,"abstract":"Theories of collective accountability in American elections center on the ability, and willingness, of voters to hold legislators accountable for the job performance of the president and his party in Congress. While this work finds that legislators pay an electoral penalty for low institutional approval ratings under their party’s control, little is known whether this form of collective accountability translates to the state legislative context. We argue that collective accountability in state legislative elections follows a two-tiered approach, with state legislators being held accountable for national and state policymaking institutions. Using new state-level measures of institutional approval for national and state institutions, along with voter-level data from the 2007–2020 Cooperative Election Study, we find that presidential approval is the principal growing motivator of state legislative partisan choice with other policymaking institutions playing a minimal role, at best. These findings suggest that the electoral fortune of state legislative candidates, and state parties, are largely and increasingly determined by national forces outside of the purview of state-level policymaking institutions.","PeriodicalId":51366,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141807781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-24DOI: 10.1177/10659129241265703
Ian G. Anson
The U.S. Federal Reserve plays a major role in the global economy, despite low public awareness of its functions and responsibilities. Scholars have recently noted three ongoing developments in the politics of the Fed: A dramatic increase in the size of the Fed’s balance sheet, a decrease in the Fed’s insulation from partisan politics, and evidence that the Fed has struggled to manage inflation in recent times. Despite the contributions of recent studies, little is known about how Americans’ levels of diffuse and specific public support for Federal agencies are influenced by trends in agencies’ size and scope, politicization, and performance. In this study, I use a survey experimental design to evaluate the effects of emphasis frames on support for the Federal Reserve. Results demonstrate that while specific support declines in reaction to frames that associate Fed actions with rising inflation, messages about the Fed’s growing balance sheet erode diffuse support for the Fed. However, when reminded of the Fed’s declining political independence, partisans’ levels of support diverge. These results imply the potential for substantial future declines in public support for the operation of this critical, yet largely overlooked, Federal institution, especially among partisans of the presidential out-party.
{"title":"Fed Up: The Determinants of Public Opposition to the U.S. Federal Reserve","authors":"Ian G. Anson","doi":"10.1177/10659129241265703","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129241265703","url":null,"abstract":"The U.S. Federal Reserve plays a major role in the global economy, despite low public awareness of its functions and responsibilities. Scholars have recently noted three ongoing developments in the politics of the Fed: A dramatic increase in the size of the Fed’s balance sheet, a decrease in the Fed’s insulation from partisan politics, and evidence that the Fed has struggled to manage inflation in recent times. Despite the contributions of recent studies, little is known about how Americans’ levels of diffuse and specific public support for Federal agencies are influenced by trends in agencies’ size and scope, politicization, and performance. In this study, I use a survey experimental design to evaluate the effects of emphasis frames on support for the Federal Reserve. Results demonstrate that while specific support declines in reaction to frames that associate Fed actions with rising inflation, messages about the Fed’s growing balance sheet erode diffuse support for the Fed. However, when reminded of the Fed’s declining political independence, partisans’ levels of support diverge. These results imply the potential for substantial future declines in public support for the operation of this critical, yet largely overlooked, Federal institution, especially among partisans of the presidential out-party.","PeriodicalId":51366,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141807541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-24DOI: 10.1177/10659129241263481
Jack Maedgen, Christopher Wlezien
Research on policy responsiveness to public opinion highlights differences owing to political institutions—both electoral and governmental. Electoral institutions that produce coalition governments tend to reduce responsiveness in between elections. Government institutions that divide powers horizontally, by contrast, appear to increase that responsiveness. These findings point to the role of institutional “friction” in shaping what governments do, though the two sources appear to produce different effects—one harmful and the other helpful. This paper explores this apparent contradiction. We revisit and clarify theoretical assumptions and outline alternative models of the effects of friction. Extending previous tests, now in 18 countries, we find clearer evidence supporting that earlier research and more firmly establish friction as the mechanism, particularly as regards the influence of electoral systems. The two institutional sources of friction appear to influence responsiveness in different ways, which has implications for politics and policy that we consider in the concluding section.
{"title":"Institutional Friction and Policy Responsiveness: The Puzzle of Coalitional Fragmentation and Executive-Legislative Balance","authors":"Jack Maedgen, Christopher Wlezien","doi":"10.1177/10659129241263481","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129241263481","url":null,"abstract":"Research on policy responsiveness to public opinion highlights differences owing to political institutions—both electoral and governmental. Electoral institutions that produce coalition governments tend to reduce responsiveness in between elections. Government institutions that divide powers horizontally, by contrast, appear to increase that responsiveness. These findings point to the role of institutional “friction” in shaping what governments do, though the two sources appear to produce different effects—one harmful and the other helpful. This paper explores this apparent contradiction. We revisit and clarify theoretical assumptions and outline alternative models of the effects of friction. Extending previous tests, now in 18 countries, we find clearer evidence supporting that earlier research and more firmly establish friction as the mechanism, particularly as regards the influence of electoral systems. The two institutional sources of friction appear to influence responsiveness in different ways, which has implications for politics and policy that we consider in the concluding section.","PeriodicalId":51366,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141809099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-24DOI: 10.1177/10659129241266823
Rebecca Scheffauer, Lana Medina, Homero Gil de Zúñiga
Political consumerism has emerged as a popular form of participation among lay citizens. For the most part, research has delved into the main antecedents that explain this type of consumption. However, research has generally neglected to consider political consumerism as an independent variable, and its role influencing and igniting other forms of political behavior. This study theoretically argues that politically motivated consumerism will incite people to generally seek to persuade others of political issues. Using causal order tests and Random Intercept Cross-lagged Panel Structural Equation Models from a two-wave panel survey from the United States, the study shows robust empirical evidence that this is the case.
{"title":"Clarifying the Relationship Between Political Consumerism and Political Persuasion Over Time","authors":"Rebecca Scheffauer, Lana Medina, Homero Gil de Zúñiga","doi":"10.1177/10659129241266823","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129241266823","url":null,"abstract":"Political consumerism has emerged as a popular form of participation among lay citizens. For the most part, research has delved into the main antecedents that explain this type of consumption. However, research has generally neglected to consider political consumerism as an independent variable, and its role influencing and igniting other forms of political behavior. This study theoretically argues that politically motivated consumerism will incite people to generally seek to persuade others of political issues. Using causal order tests and Random Intercept Cross-lagged Panel Structural Equation Models from a two-wave panel survey from the United States, the study shows robust empirical evidence that this is the case.","PeriodicalId":51366,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141809243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-21DOI: 10.1177/10659129241265960
Thomas M. Holbrook, Amanda J. Heideman, Aaron C. Weinschenk
In this paper, we explore the roots of perceptions of local corruption in U.S. cities, using survey data collected from 39 cities during 40 different mayoral election campaigns. We examine the impact of the city-level corruption context alongside measures of political information, partisan and racial/ethnic representation in local government, evaluations of personal and policy satisfaction, and other individual-level attitudinal and demographic characteristics. We find that perceptions of local corruption are responsive to the local corruption context—though this relationship is heavily conditioned by political knowledge—satisfaction with local conditions, other attitudinal measures, and, to a lesser extent, co-ethnic representation in local government.
{"title":"Perceptions of Local Political Corruption","authors":"Thomas M. Holbrook, Amanda J. Heideman, Aaron C. Weinschenk","doi":"10.1177/10659129241265960","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129241265960","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we explore the roots of perceptions of local corruption in U.S. cities, using survey data collected from 39 cities during 40 different mayoral election campaigns. We examine the impact of the city-level corruption context alongside measures of political information, partisan and racial/ethnic representation in local government, evaluations of personal and policy satisfaction, and other individual-level attitudinal and demographic characteristics. We find that perceptions of local corruption are responsive to the local corruption context—though this relationship is heavily conditioned by political knowledge—satisfaction with local conditions, other attitudinal measures, and, to a lesser extent, co-ethnic representation in local government.","PeriodicalId":51366,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141818129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-19DOI: 10.1177/10659129241266824
Christine C. Bird, Brooke N. Shannon
We investigate the relationship between civil litigation and policing activity at a systems level and take a step toward a more rigorous understanding of the effect of civil litigation as an accountability mechanism for law enforcement misconduct. To investigate, we assemble original data on every civil lawsuit filed against a police department in North Carolina between 2003 and 2011, which we pair with existing traffic stops data from 2002 to 2016. We hypothesize that as an agency faces an accumulation of lawsuits, the agency will scale back its discretionary enforcement activities. Empirical tests reveal a 16 percent drop in the number of monthly stops made by officers in the aftermath of new civil litigation against their department. However, reductions in discretionary police behavior appear to benefit white motorists while rates of stops of Black motorists remain relatively unchanged. Our findings highlight the role of litigation in police accountability as well as the seeming intractability of racial disparities in discretionary police behavior.
{"title":"The Heat is On: Does Civil Litigation Affect Policing Practices?","authors":"Christine C. Bird, Brooke N. Shannon","doi":"10.1177/10659129241266824","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129241266824","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the relationship between civil litigation and policing activity at a systems level and take a step toward a more rigorous understanding of the effect of civil litigation as an accountability mechanism for law enforcement misconduct. To investigate, we assemble original data on every civil lawsuit filed against a police department in North Carolina between 2003 and 2011, which we pair with existing traffic stops data from 2002 to 2016. We hypothesize that as an agency faces an accumulation of lawsuits, the agency will scale back its discretionary enforcement activities. Empirical tests reveal a 16 percent drop in the number of monthly stops made by officers in the aftermath of new civil litigation against their department. However, reductions in discretionary police behavior appear to benefit white motorists while rates of stops of Black motorists remain relatively unchanged. Our findings highlight the role of litigation in police accountability as well as the seeming intractability of racial disparities in discretionary police behavior.","PeriodicalId":51366,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141822301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-19DOI: 10.1177/10659129241263585
J. A. Sinclair, R. M. Alvarez, Betsy Sinclair, Christian R. Grose
In 2020, Alaskans voted to adopt a nonpartisan top-4 primary followed by a ranked-choice general election. Proposals for “final four” and “final five” election systems are being considered in other states, as well as ranked-choice voting. The initial use of Alaska’s procedure in 2022 serves as a test case for examining whether such reforms may help moderate candidates avoid being “primaried.” In 2022, incumbent Alaska Senator Lisa Murkowski held her seat against a Trump-endorsed Republican, Kelly Tshibaka. We use data from the 2022 election in Alaska, along with a mixed-mode survey of Alaskan voters before the general election, to test hypotheses about how voters behave in these kinds of elections, finding: (1) the moderate Republican candidate, Murkowski, likely would have lost a closed partisan primary; (2) some Democrats and independents favored the moderate Republican over the candidate of their own party, and the new rules allowed them to support her at all stages of the election, along with others who voted for her to stop the more conservative Republican candidate; and (3) that Alaskan voters are largely favorable toward the new rules, but that certain kinds of populist voters are likely to both support Trump and oppose the rules.
{"title":"Electoral Innovation and the Alaska System: Partisanship and Populism Are Associated With Support for Top-4/Ranked-Choice Voting Rules","authors":"J. A. Sinclair, R. M. Alvarez, Betsy Sinclair, Christian R. Grose","doi":"10.1177/10659129241263585","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129241263585","url":null,"abstract":"In 2020, Alaskans voted to adopt a nonpartisan top-4 primary followed by a ranked-choice general election. Proposals for “final four” and “final five” election systems are being considered in other states, as well as ranked-choice voting. The initial use of Alaska’s procedure in 2022 serves as a test case for examining whether such reforms may help moderate candidates avoid being “primaried.” In 2022, incumbent Alaska Senator Lisa Murkowski held her seat against a Trump-endorsed Republican, Kelly Tshibaka. We use data from the 2022 election in Alaska, along with a mixed-mode survey of Alaskan voters before the general election, to test hypotheses about how voters behave in these kinds of elections, finding: (1) the moderate Republican candidate, Murkowski, likely would have lost a closed partisan primary; (2) some Democrats and independents favored the moderate Republican over the candidate of their own party, and the new rules allowed them to support her at all stages of the election, along with others who voted for her to stop the more conservative Republican candidate; and (3) that Alaskan voters are largely favorable toward the new rules, but that certain kinds of populist voters are likely to both support Trump and oppose the rules.","PeriodicalId":51366,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141823020","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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