哲学创新史:伯克利先生对珀西瓦尔女士的回答

Q2 Social Sciences Maetagused Pub Date : 2021-12-01 DOI:10.7592/mt2021.81.jakapi
Roomet Jakapi
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文讨论了乔治·伯克利在其作品《赫拉斯和菲洛诺斯的三次对话》(1713)中对创造的形而上学描述。正如我们从伯克利的信件中所知,他试图证明自己的非物质主义哲学与马赛克对创造的描述是一致的,这是由于他的朋友约翰·珀西瓦尔爵士的妻子的反对。根据伯克利的哲学,只有头脑和思想存在。书籍和树木等实物只是人类思想的集合。除非有头脑去感知,否则任何事物都不可能存在。然而,马赛克的故事表明,许多事物是在人类出现之前创造和存在的。珀西瓦尔女士指出,伯克利的观点让人很难理解,如果周围没有人类感知事物,事物是如何产生的。作为回应,伯克利提出了一个复杂的形而上学结构,其中物理世界的创造被解释为上帝的命令,在潜在的感知者中产生某些类型的想法。本文旨在展示伯克利对珀西瓦尔女士反对的回应如何反映18世纪初哲学与宗教之间的复杂关系。伯克利对圣经真理的承诺大大限制了他的哲学思辨。
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Loomislugu filosoofias: hr Berkeley vastus Lady Percivalile
The paper discusses George Berkeley’s metaphysical account of the Creation in his work Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous (1713). As we know from Berkeley’s correspondence, his detailed attempt to show that his immaterialist philosophy is compatible with the Mosaic description of the Creation was occasioned by an objection from the wife of his friend Sir John Percival. According to Berkeley’s philosophy, only minds and ideas exist. Physical things such as books and trees are mere collections of ideas in human minds. No thing can exist unless there is a mind to perceive it. Yet the Mosaic story states that many things were created and existed before humans came into being. Lady Percival pointed out that Berkeley’s view makes it hard to understand how things could be created if there were no human beings around to perceive them. In response, Berkeley offered a sophisticated metaphysical construct in which the creation of the physical world is interpreted as God’s decree to produce certain kinds of ideas in potential perceivers. The paper aims to show how Berkeley’s response to Lady Percival’s objection reflects the complicated relationship between philosophy and revealed religion in the early 18th century. Berkeley’s commitment to biblical truth sets significant limits to his philosophical speculation.
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来源期刊
Maetagused
Maetagused Social Sciences-Cultural Studies
CiteScore
0.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
20
审稿时长
16 weeks
期刊介绍: It is the only journal publishing original research on folkloristics, ethnomusicology, cultural anthropology, and religious studies in Estonian, with summaries in English. The journal has an important role in mediating to the scholarly community of one million Estonian speakers original studies and articles by foreign researchers specially submitted to the journal for translating. The journal also publishes translations of selected prime researches from scientific journals in other languages to elaborate specialised terminology in Estonian. In addition, the journal publishes articles on applied sciences, as well as reviews of books and audio materials, conferences and fieldwork, overviews of research centres in the world, defended theses, etc.
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