人工制品:广义上的大图景

IF 0.1 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Filosofia Unisinos Pub Date : 2021-03-15 DOI:10.4013/FSU.2021.221.05
A. Leclerc
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我在这篇纲论性论文中的目的是探讨三个重要概念之间的关系:意向性、倾向和人工。如果没有我所说的“有意的工作”,就不会有人工制品,这是一种旨在生产某种商品的持续活动。我首先提出语境主义作为一种方法。然后我用它来界定有问题的概念ARTEFACT,意图将其应用于直接影响我们个人身份的心理倾向。至少在某种程度上,使用了不可避免但松散的人为干预标准。态度是具有概念性意旨的意向性状态,而概念是倾向。我们在一生中获得概念,有时是无意识的,有时是通过某种定义明确地获得概念,每个认知主体都有独特的概念库和独特的习语。我们的心理表征(至少其中一些)是人工制品的想法乍一看可能很奇怪,但我将努力证明它是完全有道理的。我们的大多数心理倾向——那些具有概念性内容的倾向——本身就是人工制品。最后,我们在心理上和文化上都是不同的,因为我们的习惯用语和概念库是不同的。在很大程度上,使我们这个物种如此特别的是一个持续的过程,通过这个过程,智人使自己成为现在的样子。关键词:意向性,处置,人工制品,语境主义,曲目。
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Artefacts: the big picture in broad terms
My aim in this programmatic paper is to explore the relationship among three important notions: intentionality, disposition and artefact. There wouldn’t be artefacts without what I call “intentional work,” a sustained activity directed to the production of some good. I first present contextualism as a method. Then I use it to delimit the problematic concept ARTEFACT, with the intention to apply it to repertoires of mental dispositions that affect directly our personal identity. The unavoidable but loose criterion of human intervention is used, at least to some degree. Attitudes are intentional states with conceptual content, and concepts are dispositions. We acquire concepts during our lives, sometimes unconsciously, sometimes explicitly through definition of some kind, and each cognitive agent has a unique repertoire of concepts and a unique idiolect as well. The idea that our mental representations (at least some of them) are artefacts might sound strange at first sight, but I shall try to show that it makes full sense. Most of our mental dispositions –those provided with a conceptual content– are themselves artefacts. At the end, we are all different psychologically and culturally because our idiolects and repertoires of concepts are different. For a large part, what makes our species so special is an ongoing process through which homo sapiens makes itself what it is.Keywords: Intentionality, disposition, artefact, contextualism, repertoire.
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来源期刊
Filosofia Unisinos
Filosofia Unisinos PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
10
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