Bix对Kelsen和Hart法律规范性观点的诠释

Q2 Arts and Humanities Revus Pub Date : 2019-05-24 DOI:10.4000/REVUS.4561
Torben Spaak
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引用次数: 3

摘要

布莱恩·比克斯讨论了法律规范性的问题,他认为(1)汉斯·凯尔森的基本规范理论最好理解为,一个人可以选择预设基本规范,以便规范地解释法律官员的行为;(2)对哈特的最佳理解是,他支持一种关于法律规范性的独特观点;(3)哈特的观点比普遍认为法律具有某种道德要求的观点更可取。我接受(1),但认为这是微不足道的。我认为(2)是合理的,但观点本身有问题,因此我对(3)持怀疑态度。
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A challenge to Bix's interpretation of Kelsen and Hart's views on the normativity of law
Brian Bix discusses questions of legal normativity, arguing (1) that Hans Kelsen’s theory of the basic norm is best understood as saying that a person may choose to presuppose the basic norm in order to interpret the actions of legal officials normatively; (2) that H. L. A. Hart is best understood as espousing a sui generis view of legal normativity; and (3) that Hart’s view is preferable to the rather popular view that law makes some sort of moral claim. I accept (1) but think it is rather trivial. I find (2) plausible but the view itself problematic, and am therefore skeptical of (3).
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来源期刊
Revus
Revus Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
30
期刊最新文献
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