{"title":"Legal constitutionalism and the Ius/Lex distinction","authors":"Mathieu Carpentier","doi":"10.4000/revus.10130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.10130","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":"6 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140509793","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The State and Legal Otherness","authors":"Donald Bello Hutt","doi":"10.4000/revus.10044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.10044","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":"36 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140509582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What do we mean by constitutional supremacy? The role of legal traditions in shaping constitutional democracy. A reply to Paolo Sandro.","authors":"Graziella Romeo","doi":"10.4000/revus.10021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.10021","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":"11 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140509399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Normative power and The Making of Constitutional Democracy","authors":"Maris Köpcke","doi":"10.4000/revus.9898","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.9898","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":"28 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139532362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper reviews the proposal to give parents extra votes that they can cast as proxies on behalf of their children. Justifications of parental proxy voting (PPV) are examined with a focus on various interpretations of the concept of ‘proxy’. The first part of the paper assesses the notion that PPV does not violate the principles of equal and direct suffrage. Contrary to proponents of PPV, I argue that parents voting on behalf of their children cannot be considered as merely expressing children’s political preferences, and that persons who are taken to be unable to make a decision themselves cannot be represented in this way. Thus, PPV actually allocates extra voting rights to parents, giving additional weight to their preferences in decision-making. The second part turns to parents as possible proxies for children’s interests, with their extra votes being meant to overweigh those of the elderly or of non-parents. PPV thus understood could be supported by the claim that parents are better situated to represent their children’s interests than the average voter. Proposals of PPV usually refer to parents’ better access to information, their shared interests with their children, and/or their selflessness. These arguments are, however, either irrelevant or questionable, and do not therefore actually speak in favour of the introduction of PPV. In conclusion, while PPV is usually depicted as making political decisions simultaneously more democratic and more prudent, it does neither. Since these aims cannot be achieved through a single institution, different methods to achieve each aim need to be explored.
{"title":"Parental proxy voting and political representation","authors":"Miklós Könczöl","doi":"10.4000/revus.9753","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.9753","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reviews the proposal to give parents extra votes that they can cast as proxies on behalf of their children. Justifications of parental proxy voting (PPV) are examined with a focus on various interpretations of the concept of ‘proxy’. The first part of the paper assesses the notion that PPV does not violate the principles of equal and direct suffrage. Contrary to proponents of PPV, I argue that parents voting on behalf of their children cannot be considered as merely expressing children’s political preferences, and that persons who are taken to be unable to make a decision themselves cannot be represented in this way. Thus, PPV actually allocates extra voting rights to parents, giving additional weight to their preferences in decision-making. The second part turns to parents as possible proxies for children’s interests, with their extra votes being meant to overweigh those of the elderly or of non-parents. PPV thus understood could be supported by the claim that parents are better situated to represent their children’s interests than the average voter. Proposals of PPV usually refer to parents’ better access to information, their shared interests with their children, and/or their selflessness. These arguments are, however, either irrelevant or questionable, and do not therefore actually speak in favour of the introduction of PPV. In conclusion, while PPV is usually depicted as making political decisions simultaneously more democratic and more prudent, it does neither. Since these aims cannot be achieved through a single institution, different methods to achieve each aim need to be explored.","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135063552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
El objetivo del trabajo es considerar el posible impacto en la ontología jurídica de los descubrimientos en la ciencia cognitiva. Empiezo refutando el argumento de que nuestro esquema conceptual —y por tanto nuestra ontología básica— es a priori en relación con cualquier teoría científica. Luego esbozo una imagen del surgimiento de la cultura, tal como se encuentra en los escenarios evolutivos recientes y las teorías neurocientíficas. En este contexto, sostengo que no hay, y no puede haber, una comprensión correcta de lo que es el derecho, lo que explica por qué es posible desarrollar distintas ontologías jurídicas que sean igualmente aceptables.
{"title":"Ciencia cognitiva y naturaleza del derecho","authors":"Bartosz Brożek","doi":"10.4000/revus.9829","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.9829","url":null,"abstract":"El objetivo del trabajo es considerar el posible impacto en la ontología jurídica de los descubrimientos en la ciencia cognitiva. Empiezo refutando el argumento de que nuestro esquema conceptual —y por tanto nuestra ontología básica— es a priori en relación con cualquier teoría científica. Luego esbozo una imagen del surgimiento de la cultura, tal como se encuentra en los escenarios evolutivos recientes y las teorías neurocientíficas. En este contexto, sostengo que no hay, y no puede haber, una comprensión correcta de lo que es el derecho, lo que explica por qué es posible desarrollar distintas ontologías jurídicas que sean igualmente aceptables.","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135109493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hohfeld’s table of legal positions, though highly consistent under his own assumptions, seems to be vulnerable to the exact flaws assignable to those assumptions. Specifically, the assumptions that a norm is not a necessary condition of a legal position and that one single action in a correlativity line is sufficient to bring about the action’s result. With a simple proposal of norm individuation, this paper develops a totally norm-based table of legal positions in which co-action from correlated agents is also considered (without threatening atomicity). Since a legal position is just the result of a combination of normative variables, the present approach leads to a strictly formal composition of legal positions in a way that challenges the role played so far by the traditional theories of rights.
{"title":"Rights as formal combinations of normative variables","authors":"David Duarte","doi":"10.4000/revus.9714","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.9714","url":null,"abstract":"Hohfeld’s table of legal positions, though highly consistent under his own assumptions, seems to be vulnerable to the exact flaws assignable to those assumptions. Specifically, the assumptions that a norm is not a necessary condition of a legal position and that one single action in a correlativity line is sufficient to bring about the action’s result. With a simple proposal of norm individuation, this paper develops a totally norm-based table of legal positions in which co-action from correlated agents is also considered (without threatening atomicity). Since a legal position is just the result of a combination of normative variables, the present approach leads to a strictly formal composition of legal positions in a way that challenges the role played so far by the traditional theories of rights.","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":"184 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135109833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper has three aims. The first is to explicate what kind of entity legal offices are and what their specific mode of existence amounts to. The second is to explain in virtue of what these offices can be said to be legal. Finally, third, to show the relevance of the actual use of legal offices for their existence. The main argument is that, ontologically, legal offices are best understood as immaterial institutional artifacts. This is because they can be created only if there is collective recognition of the relevant constitutive norms, which confer the status function of legal office, accompanied by the relevant deontic powers, and can continue to exist only for as long as this recognition is maintained. Furthermore, it is argued that so-called derived legal offices (e.g., the legislature and judiciary) are legal in virtue of the legal norms that constitute them, and the so-called original legal office (i.e., the constitution-maker) in virtue of the citizens’ norm of recognition (i.e., in virtue of its being collectively regarded as a legal office by the relevant community). Finally, the paper argues that as institutional artifacts, legal offices can be said to exist only on the condition that they are, at least initially, filled with officials actually carrying out the deontic powers accompanying the offices they hold and for as long as the initial citizens’ collective recognition of the original officials is not withdrawn.
{"title":"Legal office","authors":"Luka Burazin","doi":"10.4000/revus.9539","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.9539","url":null,"abstract":"This paper has three aims. The first is to explicate what kind of entity legal offices are and what their specific mode of existence amounts to. The second is to explain in virtue of what these offices can be said to be legal. Finally, third, to show the relevance of the actual use of legal offices for their existence. The main argument is that, ontologically, legal offices are best understood as immaterial institutional artifacts. This is because they can be created only if there is collective recognition of the relevant constitutive norms, which confer the status function of legal office, accompanied by the relevant deontic powers, and can continue to exist only for as long as this recognition is maintained. Furthermore, it is argued that so-called derived legal offices (e.g., the legislature and judiciary) are legal in virtue of the legal norms that constitute them, and the so-called original legal office (i.e., the constitution-maker) in virtue of the citizens’ norm of recognition (i.e., in virtue of its being collectively regarded as a legal office by the relevant community). Finally, the paper argues that as institutional artifacts, legal offices can be said to exist only on the condition that they are, at least initially, filled with officials actually carrying out the deontic powers accompanying the offices they hold and for as long as the initial citizens’ collective recognition of the original officials is not withdrawn.","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135753180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The author defends the thesis that the autonomization of the legal system cannot entail a complete dissociation of law from morality on the one hand, and politics on the other. Even law which has become positive does not sever its internal ties with morality and politics. The first section roughly outlines how modern law, with the help of rational law, has differentiated itself from the traditional complex of morality, law and politics. The middle section deals with the question of how an idea of the constitutional state emerges from the collapse of rational law, which does not have to merely stand impotent in relation to a society of high complexity and accelerated change. In the final section, the author examines how law and morality simultaneously complement and intertwine with each other today from an internal perspective.
{"title":"How is legitimacy made possible via legality?","authors":"Jürgen Habermas","doi":"10.4000/revus.9668","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.9668","url":null,"abstract":"The author defends the thesis that the autonomization of the legal system cannot entail a complete dissociation of law from morality on the one hand, and politics on the other. Even law which has become positive does not sever its internal ties with morality and politics. The first section roughly outlines how modern law, with the help of rational law, has differentiated itself from the traditional complex of morality, law and politics. The middle section deals with the question of how an idea of the constitutional state emerges from the collapse of rational law, which does not have to merely stand impotent in relation to a society of high complexity and accelerated change. In the final section, the author examines how law and morality simultaneously complement and intertwine with each other today from an internal perspective.","PeriodicalId":38165,"journal":{"name":"Revus","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135752663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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