To Buy a War but Sell the Peace? Mercenaries and Post-Civil War Stability

Abstract Private military and security companies (PMSCs) and mercenaries are a common feature in civil wars, yet little systematic analysis of PMSC involvement and conflict dynamics exists. This article explores whether civil conflicts that feature PMSC forces in combat are more likely to recur. We contend that the presence of PMSCs in fighting exacerbates the postwar credible commitment problem, as belligerents will be concerned about the possibility to redeploy such forces in the future. Belligerents pay more attention to more recent and more visible information, meaning that the effects should be greatest if PMSCs feature extensively in combat and at the end of the conflict. A duration analysis of data from the Private Security Events Database and Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 1990–2014, offers robust support for these claims. Our results suggest that conflict management should consider aspects beyond the local context as risk factors for civil war recurrence.