{"title":"在线旅游平台对可持续发展的溢出效应","authors":"Yuting Chen, Nan Zhang, Xiaokang Cheng","doi":"10.1111/isj.12448","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>In recent years, the proliferation of self-established and third-party online tourism platforms has impacted the visitor economy and social welfare sustainably. Tourism enterprises face the key decision of whether to join third-party platforms or sell tourism services/products directly to consumers. Some researchers have addressed issues about online tourism platforms, but none analyse the internal mechanism and operational management, or the impact of the online tourism platform on sustainable economic growth and social welfare. To fill this gap, we establish an analytical model to explore the optimal tourism marketing and operational management of online tourism platforms for non-profit tourist attractions and for-profit tourism enterprises, which can help guide the decisions of managers. We construct a game-theoretical model in which competing tourism attractions can choose only solo or dual online tourism platform promotion. When competition on a third-party platform is intense, for-profit tourism enterprises benefit from dual platforms. We further illustrate that with high competition, non-profit tourist attractions provide higher social welfare when offering tourism products/services on both self-established and third-party tourism channels. However, with lower competition, third-party tourism platforms harm social welfare if the tourism service/product quality is extremely high or low. Under a decentralised structure, we find that related tourism enterprises prefer to follow and collaborate with their tourist attractions' channel selection when competition in the third-party platform is not fierce. This result indicates that a third-party tourism platform improves the visitor economy and social welfare if the tourist attraction collaborates with its tourism-related enterprises through the online tourism platform.</p>","PeriodicalId":48049,"journal":{"name":"Information Systems Journal","volume":"34 3","pages":"788-827"},"PeriodicalIF":6.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The spillover effects of online tourism platforms on sustainable development\",\"authors\":\"Yuting Chen, Nan Zhang, Xiaokang Cheng\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/isj.12448\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>In recent years, the proliferation of self-established and third-party online tourism platforms has impacted the visitor economy and social welfare sustainably. Tourism enterprises face the key decision of whether to join third-party platforms or sell tourism services/products directly to consumers. Some researchers have addressed issues about online tourism platforms, but none analyse the internal mechanism and operational management, or the impact of the online tourism platform on sustainable economic growth and social welfare. To fill this gap, we establish an analytical model to explore the optimal tourism marketing and operational management of online tourism platforms for non-profit tourist attractions and for-profit tourism enterprises, which can help guide the decisions of managers. We construct a game-theoretical model in which competing tourism attractions can choose only solo or dual online tourism platform promotion. When competition on a third-party platform is intense, for-profit tourism enterprises benefit from dual platforms. We further illustrate that with high competition, non-profit tourist attractions provide higher social welfare when offering tourism products/services on both self-established and third-party tourism channels. However, with lower competition, third-party tourism platforms harm social welfare if the tourism service/product quality is extremely high or low. Under a decentralised structure, we find that related tourism enterprises prefer to follow and collaborate with their tourist attractions' channel selection when competition in the third-party platform is not fierce. This result indicates that a third-party tourism platform improves the visitor economy and social welfare if the tourist attraction collaborates with its tourism-related enterprises through the online tourism platform.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48049,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Information Systems Journal\",\"volume\":\"34 3\",\"pages\":\"788-827\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":6.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-05-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Information Systems Journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/isj.12448\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"INFORMATION SCIENCE & LIBRARY SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Information Systems Journal","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/isj.12448","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"INFORMATION SCIENCE & LIBRARY SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
The spillover effects of online tourism platforms on sustainable development
In recent years, the proliferation of self-established and third-party online tourism platforms has impacted the visitor economy and social welfare sustainably. Tourism enterprises face the key decision of whether to join third-party platforms or sell tourism services/products directly to consumers. Some researchers have addressed issues about online tourism platforms, but none analyse the internal mechanism and operational management, or the impact of the online tourism platform on sustainable economic growth and social welfare. To fill this gap, we establish an analytical model to explore the optimal tourism marketing and operational management of online tourism platforms for non-profit tourist attractions and for-profit tourism enterprises, which can help guide the decisions of managers. We construct a game-theoretical model in which competing tourism attractions can choose only solo or dual online tourism platform promotion. When competition on a third-party platform is intense, for-profit tourism enterprises benefit from dual platforms. We further illustrate that with high competition, non-profit tourist attractions provide higher social welfare when offering tourism products/services on both self-established and third-party tourism channels. However, with lower competition, third-party tourism platforms harm social welfare if the tourism service/product quality is extremely high or low. Under a decentralised structure, we find that related tourism enterprises prefer to follow and collaborate with their tourist attractions' channel selection when competition in the third-party platform is not fierce. This result indicates that a third-party tourism platform improves the visitor economy and social welfare if the tourist attraction collaborates with its tourism-related enterprises through the online tourism platform.
期刊介绍:
The Information Systems Journal (ISJ) is an international journal promoting the study of, and interest in, information systems. Articles are welcome on research, practice, experience, current issues and debates. The ISJ encourages submissions that reflect the wide and interdisciplinary nature of the subject and articles that integrate technological disciplines with social, contextual and management issues, based on research using appropriate research methods.The ISJ has particularly built its reputation by publishing qualitative research and it continues to welcome such papers. Quantitative research papers are also welcome but they need to emphasise the context of the research and the theoretical and practical implications of their findings.The ISJ does not publish purely technical papers.