数字会计:群体特征与暴力与非暴力策略的选择

IF 1.1 Q3 ECONOMICS Economics of Peace and Security Journal Pub Date : 2021-04-25 DOI:10.15355/EPSJ.16.1.5
K. Gleditsch, Marianne Dahl, S. Gates, Belén González
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引用次数: 13

摘要

学者们已经证明,非暴力运动往往比暴力运动更成功。一个关键的解释是,非暴力运动比暴力运动具有动员优势。由于非暴力运动积极参与的障碍较低,因此它们可以通过动员比暴力运动多得多的人数来迅速扩大。我们认为,这种动员优势并不普遍,不同的运动可能在一种策略上比另一种策略具有相对优势。我们开发了一个简单的模型,强调事前动员的潜力和成功的前景如何引导持不同政见者战术的选择。当一场运动能够动员比暴力更积极的参与者时,非暴力策略可能相对更有效,但动员潜力有限的运动可能存在暴力异议和非暴力动员劣势的可行前景。我们对照不同类型的持不同政见者策略以及诉诸非暴力和非暴力持不同政见的经验数据,研究了该模型的含义。我们展示了非暴力异见和暴力冲突中截然不同的参与者形象,并展示了这两种类型的异见在截然不同的环境下更有可能发生。要通过不同类型的异议来比较成功,我们必须考虑潜在人数或动员的差异如何影响战术选择。
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Accounting for Numbers: Group Characteristics and the Choice of Violent and Nonviolent Tactics
Scholars have shown that nonviolent movements tend to be more successful than violent movements. A key explanation is that nonviolent movements have a mobilization advantage over violent campaigns. As nonviolent movements have lower barriers to active participation, they can expand quickly by mobilizing much larger numbers than violent movements. We argue that such a mobilization advantage is not universal, and that different movements are likely to have a comparative advantage in one tactic over another. We develop a simple model emphasizing how the ex ante potential for mobilization and prospects for success steer the choice of dissident tactics. Nonviolent tactics can be relatively more effective when a movement can mobilize more active participants than with violence, but movements with limited mobilization potential can have feasible prospects for violent dissent and a nonviolent mobilization disadvantage. We examine the implications of the model against empirical data for different types of dissident tactics and on resort to nonviolent and nonviolent dissent. We demonstrate very different actor profiles in nonviolent dissent and violent conflict, and show how each of the two types of dissent are more likely under very different settings. To compare success by types of dissent we must account for how differences in potential numbers or mobilization shape tactical choices.
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7
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