看似无关的信息?法律团队规模对第三方看法的影响

IF 0.9 3区 社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2022-09-01 DOI:10.1016/j.irle.2022.106068
Gilles Grolleau , Murat C. Mungan , Naoufel Mzoughi
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引用次数: 1

摘要

人们似乎经常使用不相关的信息来形成对他人的判断。通过调查实验,我们发现看似无关的事实实际上可能是行动者选择的信息,第三方可以利用这些信息来更新他们的信念。具体而言,我们表明,在代表被告的律师数量中,受试者对犯罪的感知严重性和建议惩罚显着增加。然而,一旦受试者被告知被告被随机分配了特定数量的律师,那么感知到的犯罪严重性与律师数量之间的显著关系在很大程度上消失了。因此,在我们的基准分析中,第三方可能会使用被告的法律团队规模作为代理来更新他们对所犯罪行性质的信念,而不是在形成判断时受到无关因素的影响。这是因为随机化使得第三方无法根据律师的数量推断被告所犯罪行的性质。然而,对于某些违法行为,我们发现,即使律师的数量是随机确定的,律师数量的增加也会提高第三方的建议制裁,这与一种被称为“运气嫉妒”的心理现象是一致的。
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Seemingly irrelevant information? The impact of legal team size on third party perceptions

People often appear to use irrelevant information in forming judgments about others. Using survey experiments, we show that seemingly irrelevant facts may actually be informative of actors’ choices, which third parties can use to update their beliefs. Specifically, we show that subjects’ perceived severity and recommended punishment for offenses are significantly increasing in the number of lawyers representing defendants. However, once subjects are informed that the defendant was randomly assigned a specific number of lawyers, the significant relationship between the perceived seriousness of the offense and the number of lawyers largely vanishes. Thus, third parties in our benchmark analysis may be using the defendant’s legal team size as a proxy to update their beliefs regarding the nature of the offense committed, as opposed to being affected by irrelevant factors in forming judgments. This is because randomization makes it impossible for third parties to draw inferences regarding the nature of the offense committed by the defendant based on the number of lawyers. However, for some offenses, we find that increasing the number of lawyers raises third parties’ recommended sanctions even when the number of lawyers is randomly determined, which is consistent with a psychological phenomenon called ‘luck envy’.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
18.20%
发文量
38
审稿时长
48 days
期刊介绍: The International Review of Law and Economics provides a forum for interdisciplinary research at the interface of law and economics. IRLE is international in scope and audience and particularly welcomes both theoretical and empirical papers on comparative law and economics, globalization and legal harmonization, and the endogenous emergence of legal institutions, in addition to more traditional legal topics.
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