压制有效吗?:使用工具变量模型测量镇压对抗议的影响

Victor Asal, Joseph M. Brown
{"title":"压制有效吗?:使用工具变量模型测量镇压对抗议的影响","authors":"Victor Asal, Joseph M. Brown","doi":"10.1080/17467586.2020.1821073","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Protest and repression are reciprocally related. Governments respond with repression when faced with challenges to their rule. Dissidents choose their strategies, turning out to protest or staying home, based on the state’s behaviour. But what effect does repression have on protestors’ decisions? The existing literature is of two minds on this issue. One school of thought argues that repression suppresses protest. A second school of thought argues that repression increases protest by inducing public backlash against the regime. Efforts to adjudicate these claims are complicated by the endogeneity between protest and repression. We use US economic development assistance as an instrument for government repression. Governments seeking US development assistance eschew the repression of protestors. An instrumental variable analysis of the MAROB Middle East dataset shows that repression (instrumented on US development aid commitments) discourages protest by a dissident group. The likelihood of protest decreases by roughly 20% in a given year if the group is repressed. The need for an instrumental variable model is highlighted by the fact that uninstrumented regressions show the opposite effect, giving the spurious appearance of backlash. Unfortunately for protestors, the appearance is deceiving. Repression works.","PeriodicalId":38896,"journal":{"name":"Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward Terrorism and Genocide","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17467586.2020.1821073","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Does repression work?: Measuring repression’s effect on protest using an instrumental variable model\",\"authors\":\"Victor Asal, Joseph M. Brown\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/17467586.2020.1821073\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACT Protest and repression are reciprocally related. Governments respond with repression when faced with challenges to their rule. Dissidents choose their strategies, turning out to protest or staying home, based on the state’s behaviour. But what effect does repression have on protestors’ decisions? The existing literature is of two minds on this issue. One school of thought argues that repression suppresses protest. A second school of thought argues that repression increases protest by inducing public backlash against the regime. Efforts to adjudicate these claims are complicated by the endogeneity between protest and repression. We use US economic development assistance as an instrument for government repression. Governments seeking US development assistance eschew the repression of protestors. An instrumental variable analysis of the MAROB Middle East dataset shows that repression (instrumented on US development aid commitments) discourages protest by a dissident group. The likelihood of protest decreases by roughly 20% in a given year if the group is repressed. The need for an instrumental variable model is highlighted by the fact that uninstrumented regressions show the opposite effect, giving the spurious appearance of backlash. Unfortunately for protestors, the appearance is deceiving. Repression works.\",\"PeriodicalId\":38896,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward Terrorism and Genocide\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-09-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17467586.2020.1821073\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward Terrorism and Genocide\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2020.1821073\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"Social Sciences\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward Terrorism and Genocide","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2020.1821073","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

摘要

抗议和镇压是相互关联的。政府在面临统治挑战时会采取镇压措施。持不同政见者根据国家的行为选择他们的策略,参加抗议或呆在家里。但是镇压对抗议者的决定有什么影响?现有的文献在这个问题上意见不一。一个学派认为镇压压制了抗议。第二种观点认为,镇压通过引发公众对政权的强烈反对来增加抗议。抗议和镇压之间的内生性使裁定这些主张的努力变得复杂。我们利用美国的经济发展援助作为镇压政府的工具。寻求美国发展援助的政府避免镇压抗议者。对MAROB中东数据集的工具变量分析显示,镇压(以美国发展援助承诺为工具)阻碍了持不同政见团体的抗议。如果该群体受到镇压,抗议的可能性在特定年份会降低约20%。无工具回归显示出相反的效果,从而产生虚假的反弹,这一事实突显了对工具变量模型的需求。不幸的是,对于抗议者来说,这种外表是骗人的。镇压奏效了。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Does repression work?: Measuring repression’s effect on protest using an instrumental variable model
ABSTRACT Protest and repression are reciprocally related. Governments respond with repression when faced with challenges to their rule. Dissidents choose their strategies, turning out to protest or staying home, based on the state’s behaviour. But what effect does repression have on protestors’ decisions? The existing literature is of two minds on this issue. One school of thought argues that repression suppresses protest. A second school of thought argues that repression increases protest by inducing public backlash against the regime. Efforts to adjudicate these claims are complicated by the endogeneity between protest and repression. We use US economic development assistance as an instrument for government repression. Governments seeking US development assistance eschew the repression of protestors. An instrumental variable analysis of the MAROB Middle East dataset shows that repression (instrumented on US development aid commitments) discourages protest by a dissident group. The likelihood of protest decreases by roughly 20% in a given year if the group is repressed. The need for an instrumental variable model is highlighted by the fact that uninstrumented regressions show the opposite effect, giving the spurious appearance of backlash. Unfortunately for protestors, the appearance is deceiving. Repression works.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
2.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
4
期刊最新文献
Should activism be treated as an indicator of attitudes towards political violence? ‘When militias go ‘rogue’: explaining anti-government extremism in so-called ‘pro-nation-state’ militias in the United States of America and Ukraine Perception of human rights, law enforcement interference and justifiability of terrorism: a Cross-National Analysis Why are some suicide terror attacks more newsworthy than others? Measuring the competitive communicative constitution of insurgencies and their opponents
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1