Breaking Laws, Just and Unjust

Can a state punish citizens for breaking unjust laws? In his engaging defense of democratic political authority, Stephen P. Garvey answers affirmatively. Guilty Acts, Guilty Minds sets up a debate between philosophical anarchists, who think that a state can punish lawbreakers only if its laws are just, and statists, who think that a state can punish lawbreakers even if its laws are unjust. Garvey defends a version of statism that recognizes democratic political authority and defines the limits of this authority using the concepts of actus reus (guilty act) and mens rea (guilty mind). Guilty Acts, Guilty Minds provides an accessible overview of major issues in criminal and moral thought, exploring the terrain with nuance and care. The book uses real cases as starting points for discussions of issues such as insanity, duress, and incapacitation. Garvey writes for non-specialists, avoiding jargon and relegating his debates with other scholars to the footnotes, successfully pointing those looking for more detail and argumentation to the relevant scholarly literature. His larger aim—to draw the bounds of state authority using the concepts of actus reus and mens rea—is refreshingly novel and topical, especially at a time where many are wondering how state action can be legitimate when its laws are unjust. Garvey’s defense of democratic authority will spur discussions among his readers about what those limits ought to be —whether they agree with him or not. The book is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 sketches the debate between the anarchists and statists. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 provide an overview of the actus reus and mens rea requirements for crimes committed knowingly and unknowingly. Chapter 5 covers the insanity defense. Chapter 6 returns to the debate between anarchists and statists. Chapter 1 defends a version of statism. Contra the philosophical anarchist, who “makes no distinction between justice and legitimacy,” the statist recognizes that the state can Sarah W. Hirschfield, Email: sarah.w. hirschfield@gmail.com Criminal Justice Ethics, 2021 Vol. 40, No. 3, 269–273, https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2021.1997159