保卫家园对抗巨人:独家交易是当地企业的生存策略*

IF 1.7 4区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-07-02 DOI:10.1111/joie.12326
Hiroshi Kitamura, Noriaki Matsushima, Misato Sato
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们认为独家合同是当地现有制造商面对跨国制造商进入的生存策略。尽管两家制造商都倾向于与高效的本地分销商进行交易,但由于进入者的效率,与低效的竞争性分销商进行交易只有进入者才能接受。因此,这种具有竞争力的分销商可能是进入者的外部选择。当进入者变得高效时,外部选择有效,这意味着进入者对高效的本地分销商没有太大的好处。因此,随着进入者变得高效,当地制造商更有可能与高效分销商签订反竞争排他性合同。
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Defending Home against Giants: Exclusive Dealing as a Survival Strategy for Local Firms*

We consider exclusive contracts a survival strategy for a local incumbent manufacturer facing a multinational manufacturer's entry. Although both manufacturers prefer to trade with an efficient local distributor, trading with inefficient competitive distributors is acceptable only to the entrant, because of the entrant's efficiency. Hence, such competitive distributors can be an outside option for the entrant. As the entrant becomes efficient, the outside option works effectively, implying that the entry does not considerably benefit the efficient local distributor. Thus, the local manufacturer is more likely to sign an anticompetitive exclusive contract with the efficient distributor as the entrant becomes efficient.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
27
期刊介绍: First published in 1952, the Journal of Industrial Economics has a wide international circulation and is recognised as a leading journal in the field. It was founded to promote the analysis of modern industry, particularly the behaviour of firms and the functioning of markets. Contributions are welcomed in all areas of industrial economics including: - organization of industry - applied oligopoly theory - product differentiation and technical change - theory of the firm and internal organization - regulation - monopoly - merger and technology policy Necessarily, these subjects will often draw on adjacent areas such as international economics, labour economics and law.
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