{"title":"负外部性集团","authors":"Lan Yao, Chong Zhou","doi":"10.1002/ise3.37","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>We use a modified die-rolling experiment to study whether negative externality affects a group's decisions about whether to cheat. Our results show that group members are less likely to lie when faced with a passive out-group player only if two members of the group share an unequal payment for lying. The less-paid party in the group plays a dominant role in the honest decision by proposing the true number more frequently in arguments for group coordination.</p>","PeriodicalId":29662,"journal":{"name":"International Studies of Economics","volume":"18 2","pages":"184-192"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2022-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/ise3.37","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Group lying with negative externality\",\"authors\":\"Lan Yao, Chong Zhou\",\"doi\":\"10.1002/ise3.37\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>We use a modified die-rolling experiment to study whether negative externality affects a group's decisions about whether to cheat. Our results show that group members are less likely to lie when faced with a passive out-group player only if two members of the group share an unequal payment for lying. The less-paid party in the group plays a dominant role in the honest decision by proposing the true number more frequently in arguments for group coordination.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":29662,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Studies of Economics\",\"volume\":\"18 2\",\"pages\":\"184-192\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-11-07\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/ise3.37\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Studies of Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ise3.37\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Studies of Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ise3.37","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
We use a modified die-rolling experiment to study whether negative externality affects a group's decisions about whether to cheat. Our results show that group members are less likely to lie when faced with a passive out-group player only if two members of the group share an unequal payment for lying. The less-paid party in the group plays a dominant role in the honest decision by proposing the true number more frequently in arguments for group coordination.