负外部性集团

IF 0.5 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS International Studies of Economics Pub Date : 2022-11-07 DOI:10.1002/ise3.37
Lan Yao, Chong Zhou
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们使用一个修正的压模实验来研究负外部性是否会影响一个群体是否作弊的决定。我们的研究结果表明,只有当团队中的两个成员因撒谎而分享不平等的报酬时,团队成员在面对被动的团队外玩家时才不太可能撒谎。小组中收入较低的一方在诚实决策中发挥主导作用,因为他们在小组协调的争论中更频繁地提出真实数字。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

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Group lying with negative externality

We use a modified die-rolling experiment to study whether negative externality affects a group's decisions about whether to cheat. Our results show that group members are less likely to lie when faced with a passive out-group player only if two members of the group share an unequal payment for lying. The less-paid party in the group plays a dominant role in the honest decision by proposing the true number more frequently in arguments for group coordination.

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