调整激励措施:抵押贷款服务规则对止赎和拖欠的影响

IF 3.5 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Regional Science and Urban Economics Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI:10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2023.103922
Ryan Sandler
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引用次数: 0

摘要

取消抵押品赎回权具有巨大的社会成本,在许多情况下,抵押贷款持有人的成本比借款人恢复还款的成本更高。2014年,美国消费者金融保护局(CFPB)实施了针对抵押贷款服务商的法规,旨在解决服务商的行为,这些行为可能导致21世纪末不必要的止赎。该规定包括一项新的要求,即在大多数情况下,将取消抵押品赎回权的时间从通常的90天延长到借款人拖欠至少120天。我使用一大组抵押贷款业绩数据来估计CFPB规则对止赎的影响,以及对拖欠贷款的借款人恢复和流动的能力的影响。我发现该规则在三年内降低了丧失抵押品赎回权的发生率,并增加了收回的发生率。最低拖欠要求似乎是一个因素。在另一项使用七家抵押贷款服务公司的详细贷款水平信息的独特数据集进行的分析中,在该规定生效后拖欠90天的借款人在两个月内开始丧失抵押品赎回权的可能性降低了6个百分点。我还发现,该规则对那些更有可能根据抵押贷款持有人政策成功修改贷款的贷款产生了更大的影响。
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Aligning incentives: The effect of mortgage servicing rules on foreclosures and delinquency

Foreclosures have large societal costs, and in many cases are more costly to mortgage-holders than the borrower resuming payments. In 2014, the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) implemented regulations for mortgage servicers aimed at addressing servicer conduct that may have led to unnecessary foreclosures in the late 2000s. The rule included a new requirement to delay foreclosure until borrowers were at least 120-days delinquent in most cases, up from typically 90 days. I use a large panel of mortgage performance data to estimate the effect of the CFPB rules on foreclosures, and on the ability of delinquent borrowers to recover and become current. I find the rule reduced the incidence of foreclosure within three years, and increased the incidence of recovery. The minimum delinquency requirement seems to have been a factor. In a separate analysis using a unique dataset of detailed loan-level information from seven mortgage servicing firms, borrowers who became 90-days delinquent after the rule went into effect were six percentage points less likely to have foreclosure initiated within two months. I also find that the rule had larger effects on loans that would be more likely to receive a successful loan modification based on mortgage holder policies.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.30
自引率
9.70%
发文量
63
期刊介绍: Regional Science and Urban Economics facilitates and encourages high-quality scholarship on important issues in regional and urban economics. It publishes significant contributions that are theoretical or empirical, positive or normative. It solicits original papers with a spatial dimension that can be of interest to economists. Empirical papers studying causal mechanisms are expected to propose a convincing identification strategy.
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