{"title":"平衡约束下竞争中的努力最大化","authors":"Aner Sela","doi":"10.1016/j.serev.2022.100004","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study all-pay contests with complete information and two heterogeneous contestants who compete for a single prize. We combine two common designer's goals which are combined especially in sports contests; effort maximization and competitive balance. We focus on two cases when the designer's utility is either continuous or discontinuous in the contestants' efforts. We show that a maximum effort constraint is always efficient for increasing the designer's utility, namely, effort maximization under competitive balance.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101182,"journal":{"name":"Sports Economics Review","volume":"1 ","pages":"Article 100004"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Effort maximization in contests under balance constraints\",\"authors\":\"Aner Sela\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.serev.2022.100004\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>We study all-pay contests with complete information and two heterogeneous contestants who compete for a single prize. We combine two common designer's goals which are combined especially in sports contests; effort maximization and competitive balance. We focus on two cases when the designer's utility is either continuous or discontinuous in the contestants' efforts. We show that a maximum effort constraint is always efficient for increasing the designer's utility, namely, effort maximization under competitive balance.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":101182,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Sports Economics Review\",\"volume\":\"1 \",\"pages\":\"Article 100004\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Sports Economics Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2773161822000040\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Sports Economics Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2773161822000040","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Effort maximization in contests under balance constraints
We study all-pay contests with complete information and two heterogeneous contestants who compete for a single prize. We combine two common designer's goals which are combined especially in sports contests; effort maximization and competitive balance. We focus on two cases when the designer's utility is either continuous or discontinuous in the contestants' efforts. We show that a maximum effort constraint is always efficient for increasing the designer's utility, namely, effort maximization under competitive balance.