内疚,悲伤和美好

IF 0.3 4区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Social Philosophy & Policy Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI:10.1017/S0265052519000219
D. Nelkin
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引用次数: 8

摘要

摘要:在这篇文章中,我考虑了一个特殊版本的论点,即应受责备的人应该遭受痛苦,也就是说,他们应该在适当的程度上感到内疚(我称之为“沙漠内疚”)。人们认为还有两个论点可以解释和支持这一论点,一个主张应受责备的人得到他们应得的东西(在这种情况下,是内疚的经历),这是非工具性的善,另一个主张受责备提供了理由,促使应受责备的人得到他们应得的东西(在这种情况下,也是内疚的经历)。我称第一种为“善意内疚”,第二种为“理性内疚”。首先,我将探讨我所认为的支持善良的最有力的理由——内疚——它从内疚和悲伤的比较中获得了力量,而反对善良的最有力的理由是什么。我的结论是,善意的内疚可能是真的,但即使它是真的,支持它的最有力的论据也不能在某种程度上支持它,不能为该受责备的人应该感到内疚这一论点提供理由。然后我考虑一个假设,即理性内疚可能是正确的,可能是更基本的原则,支持好内疚和沙漠内疚。然而,我认为它没有成功,并提出了一个不同的原则,根据该原则,应受责备本身并不能为促使应受责备的人得到他们应得的东西提供理由,但应受责备与特定类型的背景环境相结合,系统地做到了这一点。最后,我得出结论,沙漠罪恶感可能是正确的,但它并没有明显地得到好罪恶感或理性罪恶感的支持。
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GUILT, GRIEF, AND THE GOOD
Abstract: In this essay, I consider a particular version of the thesis that the blameworthy deserve to suffer, namely, that they deserve to feel guilty to the proper degree (a thesis I call "Desert-Guilt"). Two further theses have been thought to explicate and support the thesis, one that appeals to the non-instrumental goodness of the blameworthy receiving what they deserve (in this case, the experience of guilt), and the other that appeals to the idea that being blameworthy provides reason to promote the blameworthy receiving what they deserve (again, in this case, the experience of guilt). I call the first "Good-Guilt" and the second "Reason-Guilt.” I begin by exploring what I take to be the strongest argument for Good-Guilt which gains force from a comparison of guilt and grief, and the strongest argument against. I conclude that Good-Guilt might be true, but that even if it is, the strongest argument in favor of it fails to support it in a way that provides reason for the thesis that the blameworthy deserve to feel guilty. I then consider the hypothesis that Reason-Guilt might be true and might be the more fundamental principle, supporting both Good-Guilt and Desert-Guilt. I argue that it does not succeed, however, and instead propose a different principle, according to which being blameworthy does not by itself provide reason for promoting that the blameworthy get what they deserve, but that being blameworthy systematically does so in conjunction with particular kinds of background circumstances. Finally, I conclude that Desert-Guilt might yet be true, but that it does not clearly gain support from either Good-Guilt or Reason-Guilt.
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来源期刊
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期刊介绍: Social Philosophy and Policy is an interdisciplinary journal with an emphasis on the philosophical underpinnings of enduring social policy debates. The issues are thematic in format, examining a specific area of concern with contributions from scholars in different disciplines, especially philosophy, economics, political science and law. While not primarily a journal of policy prescriptions, some articles in each issue will typically connect theory with practice. The 2006 issues are "Justice and Global Politics" and "Taxation, Economic Prosperity, and Distributive Justice". The 2007 issues will be "Liberalism: Old and New" and "Ancient Greek Political Theory".
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