Big states and little independence movements

Abstract The violence military-backed militias perpetrated on the East Timorese in 1999 illustrates the fundamental character of the Indonesian state: it is not merely non-democratic but also highly centralized. Both these characteristics were imprinted on the state by its late nineteenth century colonial origins. Efforts to both democratize and decentralize the state during the post-independence 1950s were undone by key state elites led by the military under Suharto. However, the separation of East Timor from Indonesia indicates a victory for the local that may well become a trend around Indonesia. While East Timor never legally belonged to the Indonesian state, its independence movement was driven by grievances that are shared by many other communities throughout Indonesia's periphery. Central state elites view these local movements in terms of “breakdown,” but at the local level they are seen as hopeful alternatives. It is not necessary to romanticize all local movements—elements of them are xenophobic, violent, and corrupt. But these elements are usually balanced by responsible and non-violent groups inspired by the search for a state that serves more human ends.